This Court applies a de novo standard of review to a trial court's denial of a JNOV and will view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Union Carbide Corp. v. Nix, Jr., 142 So.3d 374, 384–85 (Miss.2014). The Court gives the nonmoving party the benefit of all favorable inferences that reasonably may be drawn from the evidence, and we “will reverse the denial of a JNOV only if the facts are so overwhelmingly in favor of the moving party that reasonable jurors could not have arrived at a verdict against the moving party.”

This Court applies a de novo standard of review to a trial court's denial of a JNOV and will view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Union Carbide Corp. v. Nix, Jr., 142 So.3d 374, 384–85 (Miss.2014). The Court gives the nonmoving party the benefit of all favorable inferences that reasonably may be drawn from the evidence, and we “will reverse the denial of a JNOV only if the facts are so overwhelmingly in favor of the moving party that reasonable jurors could not have arrived at a verdict against the moving party.”

Standard of Review ¶20. This Court applies a de novo standard of review to a trial court's denial of a JNOV and will view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Union Carbide Corp. v. Nix, Jr., 142 So. 3d 374, 384-85 (Miss. 2014). The Court gives the nonmoving party the benefit of all favorable inferences that reasonably may be drawn from the evidence, and we "will reverse the denial of a JNOV only if the facts are so overwhelmingly in favor of the moving party that reasonable jurors could not have arrived at a verdict against the moving party.

4. the inadequate warning "proximately caused the damages for which recovery is sought."Id. § 11-1-63(a), (c) ; see Johnson & Johnson, Inc. v. Fortenberry , 234 So.3d 381, 390 (Miss. 2017), reh'g denied (Feb. 1, 2018); Union Carbide Corp. v. Nix, Jr. , 142 So.3d 374, 385 (Miss. 2014).Manitowoc claims Williams failed to prove her failure-to-warn claim as a matter of law, thus the district court should have granted Manitowoc judgment as a matter of law.

5. Learned intermediary doctrineUnder the common law, a manufacturer's duty to warn is discharged when it provides information to an intermediary, upon whom the manufacturer can reasonably rely to communicate that information to the ultimate end user. Union Carbide Corp. v. Nix, Jr., 142 So. 3d 374, 386 (Miss. 2014). To use the defense, the manufacturer must show that it provided the "learned intermediary" with information or warning regarding the hazard.

"Because the trial court is vested with gatekeeping responsibility, it must make a preliminary assessment regarding the scientific validity of the reasoning or methodology underlying the expert testimony and the proper application of that reasoning or methodology to the facts of the case at issue." Union Carbide Corp. v. Nix , 142 So. 3d 374, 388 (Miss. 2014) (citing McLemore , 863 So. 2d at 36 ). ¶74.

Because the Court sustains its grant of summary judgment on the issue of causation in the underlying claims, it must also sustain its grant of summary judgment on the issue of punitive damages. Union Carbide Corp. v. Nix, Jr., 142 So.3d 374, 392 (Miss. 2014) (noting in an asbestos case that “[a]bsent a valid claim for compensatory damages, there can be no claim for punitive damages”); Elliott v. El Paso Corp., 181 So.3d 263, 275 (Miss. 2015) (holding that where “Plantiffs' underlying claims fail as a matter of law, . . . Plaintiffs' punitive-damages claims also fail”) (citing Nix, 142 So.3d at 392). Therefore, the Court will not disturb this holding.

2020) ("[W]ithout actual damages, punitive damages are not recoverable.") (citing Jenkins v. CST Timber Co., 761 So. 2d 177, 180 (Miss. 2000)); Union Carbide Corp. v. Nix, Jr., 142 So. 3d 374, 392 (Miss. 2014) (noting in an asbestos case that "[a]bsent a valid claim for compensatory damages, there can be no claim for punitive damages"). Hence, where "Plantiffs' underlying claims fail as a matter of law, . . . Plaintiffs' punitive-damages claims also fail."

"A manufacturer is liable under a failure-to-warn theory if the product 'failed to contain adequate warnings,' the inadequate warnings 'rendered the product unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer,' and the inadequate warning 'proximately caused the damages for which recovery is sought.'" Union Carbide Corp. v. Nix, Jr., 142 So.3d 374, 385 (Miss. 2014) (quoting Miss. Code Ann. § 11-1-63(a)(i)-(iii)). However, a defendant will not be liable for failure to warn unless the plaintiff proves "that at the time the product left the control of the [defendant, the defendant] knew or in light of reasonably available knowledge should have known about the danger that caused the damage for which recovery is sought and that the ordinary user or consumer would not realize its dangerous condition."

Ordinarily, the adequacy of a warning is a factual matter that will be determined by the trier of fact. Union Carbide Corp. v. Nix , 142 So. 3d 374, 389 (Miss. 2014). Here, the district court held that the IFU "expressly warned" the treating physician of the "very complications" that Dennis Nelson ultimately suffered; thus, the warnings were adequate as a matter of law.