Unger v. Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton G

5 Citing cases

  1. Dubinsky v. American Arbitration Assn

    303 A.D.2d 318 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003)

    Prudential was justified in advising the American Arbitration Association (AAA) that plaintiff had been removed as a claims appeals reviewer pursuant to the manual governing the class action settlement, which provided for termination of an appeals reviewer's services upon a determination by two out of three of the parties involved in conducting or administering the alternative dispute resolution procedures. In view of such justification, there was no basis for plaintiff's tortious interference claim against Prudential (see Unger v. Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton Garrison, 265 A.D.2d 156). The breach of contract claim against AAA was properly dismissed since, once others had determined to remove plaintiff, AAA lacked authority to assign him any claims for review.

  2. Chadbourne & Parke, LLP v. HGK Asset Management, Inc.

    295 A.D.2d 208 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002)   Cited 4 times

    The resulting verdict was not against the weight of the evidence. The trial evidence, fairly interpreted, supports the jury's evident rejection of the defense contentions, that but for the plaintiffs' advice (see, Taylor v. Sullivan, 205 A.D.2d 416, 417), defendants would have been spared some loss or expense compensable in damages (see, Unger v. Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton Garrison, 265 A.D.2d 156, 157). The evidence, including the expert testimony, which the jury was entitled to reject even though it was unopposed, (see, Ares v. State of New York, 176 A.D.2d 203, affd 80 N.Y.2d 959), did not require a finding that, in advising defendants, the lawyers of plaintiff law firm disregarded settled law (see, Darby Darby, P.C. v. VSI Intl., 95 N.Y.2d 308, 313) and would have permitted the jury to conclude that the advice itself was not the proximate cause of defendants' losses (see, Sumo Container Sta., Inc., v. Evans, Orr, Pacelli, Norton Laffan, P.C., 278 A.D.2d 169, 171-172).

  3. Waggoner v. Caruso

    2008 N.Y. Slip Op. 51891 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008)

    However, "an attorney's failure to disclose a conflict of interest is not actionable absent allegations that such a failure proximately caused actual damages." Unger v. Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton Garrison, 265 AD2d 156, 157 (1st Dep't 1999) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). Furthermore, in the context of attorney liability, the First Department has "never differentiated between the standard of causation requested for a claim of legal malpractice and one for breach of fiduciary duty."

  4. Duane Morris v. Krieg, Keller, Sloan, Reilly

    2007 N.Y. Slip Op. 33472 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2007)

    See e.g., Sage Realty Corp. v Proskauer Rose L.L.P., 251 AD2d 35 (1st Dept 1998). However, a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility is not, by itself, actionable (Shapiro v McNeill, 92 NY2d 91, 97; Arkin Kaplan LLP v Jones, 2007 WL 2050946 [1st Dept 2007]; Kantor v Bernstein, 225 AD2d 500, 501-02 [1st Dept 1996]), defendants must demonstrate an actual conflict of interest which proximately caused actual damages (Unger v Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton Garrison, 265 AD2d 156, 156-57 [1st Dept 1999]; see also Weil, Gotshal Manges, LLP v Fashion Boutique of Short Hills, Inc., 10 AD3d 267, 271 (1st Dept 2004) ("but for" standard of causation applies to claims for breach of fiduciary duty in the context of attorney liability). There is simply no admissible evidence establishing that Duane Morris had reason to believe that an actual conflict of interest existed with the defendants as of March 16, 2004, when Duane Morris retained the Krieg firm in connection with a wholly unrelated matter.

  5. Barbara King Family Tr. v. Voluto Vent. LLC

    2006 N.Y. Slip Op. 30279 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2006)

    An attorney's failure to disclose a conflict of interest is not itself actionable, absent allegations that such failure was the proximate cause of actual damages. Unger v Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton Garrison, 265 AD2d 156 (1st Dept 1999). King argues that had she been advised to seek independent counsel, she would have done so, and would have been protected from her ill-advised investment in Voluto.