Opinion
No. 18-1201-cv(L) No. 18-1264-cv(CON) No. 18-1266-cv(CON) No. 18-2162-cv(CON) No. 18-2171-cv(CON)
10-15-2019
Appearing for Appellants: Richard D. Klingler, Sidley Austin LLP (Carter G. Phillips, Sidley Austin; Stephen A. Cozen, Sean P. Carter, Cozen O'Connor; James L. Bernard, Patrick N. Petrocelli, Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP; Paul J. Napoli, Christopher R. LoPalo, Napoli Shkolnik PLLC; Robert C. Sheps, on the brief), Washington, D.C. Appearing for Appellee: Christopher M. Curran, White & Case LLP (Nicole Erb, Matthew S. Leddicotte, Reuben J. Sequeira II, on the brief), Washington, D.C.
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT'S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION "SUMMARY ORDER"). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated Term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York on the 15th day of October two thousand nineteen. Present: PIERRE N. LEVAL, ROSEMARY S. POOLER, BARRINGTON D. PARKER, Circuit Judges. Appearing for Appellants: Richard D. Klingler, Sidley Austin LLP (Carter G. Phillips, Sidley Austin; Stephen A. Cozen, Sean P. Carter, Cozen O'Connor; James L. Bernard, Patrick N. Petrocelli, Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP; Paul J. Napoli, Christopher R. LoPalo, Napoli Shkolnik PLLC; Robert C. Sheps, on the brief), Washington, D.C. Appearing for Appellee: Christopher M. Curran, White & Case LLP (Nicole Erb, Matthew S. Leddicotte, Reuben J. Sequeira II, on the brief), Washington, D.C. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Daniels, J.).
ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of said District Court be and it hereby is REVERSED.
Plaintiffs-Appellants, corporate entities and individuals who suffered injury from the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001 ("9/11 Attacks"), appeal from the June 27, 2018 judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Daniels, J.), dismissing their claims that Al Rajhi Bank aided and abetted al Qaeda in attacking the United States and its interests for lack of personal jurisdiction and denying Plaintiffs-Appellants request for jurisdictional discovery. In brief, Plaintiffs-Appellants principally allege that Al Rajhi Bank provided financial services and donations to charities that it knew financially supported al Qaeda and provided financial services to known extremist operatives. They further allege Al Rajhi Bank's provision of financial services was done with the specific intent to further al Qaeda's terrorism against the United States. Plaintiffs-Appellants argue that the Southern District of New York has jurisdiction over Al Rajhi Bank because of its financial support of al Qaeda, and, in the alternative, because Al Rajhi Bank and al Qaeda entered into a conspiracy to target U.S. interests. We assume the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and specification of issues for review.
Although the district court issued its decision and order on March 28, 2018, the court entered judgment after granting the parties' joint Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58(d) motion on June 27, 2018.
"We review a district court's dismissal of an action for want of personal jurisdiction de novo, construing all pleadings and affidavits in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and resolving all doubts in the plaintiff's favor." Penguin Grp. (USA) Inc. v. Am. Buddha, 609 F.3d 30, 34 (2d Cir. 2010). "We review a district court's denial of jurisdictional discovery for abuse of discretion." Haber v. United States, 823 F.3d 746, 754 (2d Cir. 2016).
This Court has held that "[p]roviding indirect funding to an organization that was openly hostile to the United States does not constitute . . . intentional conduct" that is "expressly aimed . . . at residents of the United States." In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 538 F.3d 71, 95 (2d Cir. 2008) ("Terrorist Attacks III"), abrogated on other grounds by Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 714 F.3d 659, 675 (2d Cir. 2013) ("Terrorist Attacks VII"). Therefore, the defendants in those cases were not subject to personal jurisdiction in the United States.
The inclusion of allegations related to Al Rajhi Bank's specific intent to further terrorism in the United States, however, distinguishes the present case from those in which we have not granted personal jurisdiction and warrants jurisdictional discovery. Construing all reasonable inferences in favor of the Plaintiffs-Appellants, the support alleged here, in conjunction with this specific intent, we believe is "more direct and one step closer to al Qaeda" when compared to the support we have previously found inadequate. Terrorist Attacks VII, 714 F.3d at 678. Given the factual issues that persist, we remand for jurisdictional discovery to determine: "(1) when the alleged support was given to al Qaeda, (2) what support was given, (3) whether the support was 'earmarked' for use in specific schemes or attacks not directed at the United States, or (4) specifically how these defendants were involved in the process of providing support to al Qaeda." Id. at 678-79.
The order of the district court hereby is REVERSED and the case is REMANDED to the district court.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O'Hagan Wolfe, Clerk