Underwriters at Lloyds v. Yale

Full title: UNDERWRITERS AT LLOYDS, LONDON v. FREDERICK YALE ET AL

Court: Connecticut Superior Court Judicial District of Fairfield at Bridgeport

Date published: Mar 22, 2006

2006 Ct. Sup. 5578 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2006)

Opinion

No. CV 04-040 20 04 S

March 22, 2006

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO DISMISS (#108)

ARTHUR A. HILLER, JUDGE.

The defendant, Jeffery Mangels, moves to dismiss the plaintiff's September 10, 2004, complaint for declaratory judgment. The defendant argues that the applicable statute of limitations, General Statutes § 52-577¹ has run, and that the plaintiff's claim for declaratory judgment is barred by the equitable doctrine of laches. The plaintiff, Lloyds of London, opposes the motion on the grounds that: (1) § 52-577 is inapplicable, and (2) the declaratory judgment is not barred by the doctrine of laches because the defendant has not been unfairly prejudiced.²

1 § 52-577 provides: "No action founded upon a tort shall be brought but within three years from the date of the act or omission complained of."

2 The defendant's improper service of process arguments were withdrawn at a hearing held on December 12, 2005.

"A motion to dismiss properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court. A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Filippi v. Sullivan, 273 Conn. 1, 8, 866 A.2d 599 (2005). In deciding a motion to dismiss, "a court must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

In support of his argument that § 52-577 is the applicable statute of limitations, the defendant relies on Wilson v. Kelley, 224 Conn. 110, 116, 617 A.2d 433 (1992), wherein the Supreme Court noted that, "in analyzing whether a declaratory judgment action is barred by a particular statutory period of limitations, a court must examine the underlying claim or right on which the declaratory action is based." The defendant argues § 52-577 is applicable because the plaintiff seeks declaratory judgment in connection with the underlying personal injury action, brought by himself.

In Wilson, the plaintiffs' complaint for declaratory judgment sought the same relief regarding the assessment of their taxable real property as provided by General Statutes § 12-119.³ The court held that the declaratory judgment was time barred because the one-year limitation set forth in § 12-119 had run. That is not the situation in the present case as the plaintiff's complaint for declaratory judgment does not seek tort relief. Rather, the plaintiff seeks the adjudication of the rights and obligations of the parties under the policy of insurance. "[A]n insurance policy is a contract that is construed to effectuate the intent of the parties as expressed by their words and purposes." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Aetna Casualty Surety Co., 255 Conn. 295, 305, 765 A.2d 891 (2001). The applicable statute of limitations, therefore, is General Statutes § 52-576.⁴ The court finds that the plaintiffs have timely brought their claim under § 52-576, and § 52-577 is inapplicable. Because "[t]here is no question that a declaratory judgment action is a suitable vehicle to test the rights and liabilities under an insurance policy"; St. Paul Fire Marine Insurance Co. v. Shernow, 22 Conn.App. 377, 380, 577 A.2d 1093 (1990); this court has jurisdiction over the plaintiff's claim.

3 § 12-119 provides in relevant part: "When it is claimed that . . . a tax laid on property . . . was manifestly excessive . . . the owner thereof or any lessee thereof . . . may make application for relief to the superior court . . . Such application may be made within one year from the date as of which the property was last evaluated for purposes of taxation . . ."

4 § 52-576 provides in relevant part: "(a) No action for . . . any contract in writing, shall be brought but within six years after the right of action accrues . . ."

The defendant's laches argument is also defective. "The equitable doctrine of laches is an affirmative defense that serves as a bar to a claim for equitable relief where a party's delay in bringing was (1) unreasonable, and (2) resulted in prejudice to the opposing party." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Unified School District No. 1 v. Dept. of Education, 64 Conn.App. 273, 284, 780 A.2d 154, cert. denied, 258 Conn. 910, 782 A.2d 1253 (2001). "Prejudice by delay in instituting an equitable action is an essential element of laches . . . Laches in legal significance is not mere delay but delay that works a disadvantage to another . . . The mere lapse of time does not constitute laches . . . unless it results in prejudice to the defendant . . . as where, for example, the defendant is led to change his position with respect to the matter in question." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 287. The defendant has not shown that the plaintiff's commencement of this action on September 10, 2004, constituted an unreasonable delay and caused prejudice. The defendant's ability to pursue his tort action is distinct from the issue presented by the plaintiff's complaint for declaratory judgment. Whether the plaintiff must indemnify the insured, Frederick Yale, does not affect the defendant's ability to prevail on the merits of his personal injury claim. The court therefore finds that the defendant is not entitled to the affirmative defense of laches.

The court finds that § 52-577 is inapplicable and the plaintiff's complaint for declaratory judgment is not barred by the doctrine of laches. Accordingly, the defendant's motion to dismiss is denied.