Opinion
7:21-CV-00040 (WLS)
09-27-2023
MICHAELA UNDERWOOD, as the duly appointed Administratix of the Estate of James Aaron McBrayer, Deceased, et al., Plaintiffs, v. HON. GENE SCARBROUGH, et al., Defendants.
ORDER
W. LOUIS SANDS, SR. JUDGE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
Before the Court is Defendant Scarbrough; Defendants Tripp, Spurgeon, and Henderson's Motions (Doc. 45-4 & 45-5) for summary judgment. For the reasons that follow, Defendants Scarbrough, Tripp, Spurgeon and Henderson's Motions for summary judgment are GRANTED-IN-PART and DENIED-IN-PART.
I. Relevant Procedural Background
Plaintiffs commenced the present action on April 9, 2021, by filing a Complaint alleging three (3) causes of action. (Doc. 1). Count One alleges Deprivation of Mr. McBrayer civil rights by Defendants Scarbrough and Henderson pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Id.) Count Two alleges Deprivation of Mr. McBrayer's civil rights by Defendants Tripp and Spurgeon pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Id.) Count Three alleges a Products Liability claim against Defendant Axon. (Id.) Plaintiffs also seek compensatory and punitive damages. (Id.) Defendants Scarbrough, Tripp, Spurgeon, and Henderson filed their answer on June 07, 2021. (Doc. 10).
Defendants Scarbrough; and Defendants Tripp, Spurgeon and Henderson filed Motions for summary judgment (Docs. 45-4 & 45-5) on August 31, 2022. (Doc. 45). Therein, Defendants Scarbrough; and Defendants Henderson, Spurgeon, and Tripp contend that they are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs' Section 1983 claims. (Docs. 45-4 & 45-5). Plaintiffs filed a Response (Doc. 67) on September 21, 2022. On October 19, 2022, Defendants Scarbrough; and Defendants Henderson, Spurgeon, and Tripp filed Replies to Plaintiffs' Response (Docs. 78 & 79).
All parties have filed their respective responses, and the motion for summary judgment are fully briefed and ripe for ruling.
II. Relevant Factual Background
The following facts are derived from Plaintiffs' Complaint (Doc. 1); Defendants' Answer to the Complaint (Doc. 10); the Parties' Statements of Material Facts (Docs. 45-3 & 67-2); Defendants Scarbrough, Tripp, Spurgeon, and Henderson's Motions for summary judgment (Docs. 45-4 & 45-5); Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Motions for summary judgment (Doc. 67); Defendants' Scarbrough, Tripp, Spurgeon, and Henderson's Reply to Plaintiffs' response (Docs. 78 & 79); the Depositions in the record (Docs. 50-56, 58, 60, 63 & 74); and all exhibits attached to the foregoing documents. Where relevant, the factual summary also includes undisputed and disputed facts derived from the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits, all of which are construed in a light most favorable to Plaintiffs as the nonmoving party. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
On April 24, 2019, Mr. James Aaron McBrayer was involved in a single vehicle accident on Hall Road in Tift County, Georgia. (Doc. 1 ¶ 9). This collision occurred “in the area of [Mr. McBrayer's] family property.” (Id.) As a result of this accident, which left Mr. McBrayer's car in a ditch, Mr. McBrayer received a severe head injury. (Id.)
After the accident, Mr. McBrayer appears to have exited his vehicle and “went on to his family's property.” (Doc. 1 ¶ 10). Mr. McBrayer subsequently began to yell for help. (Id.) Neighbors in the vicinity heard Mr. McBrayer's yells and called 911. (Id.) Those neighbors “reported that they heard someone crying out for help.” (Id.) The neighbors did not provide any additional pertinent information when calling 911. (Id.) The 911 dispatcher sent Defendant Sheriff s Deputy Connor Spurgeon (“Defendant Spurgeon”) to the scene. (Id.)
When Defendant Spurgeon arrived at the scene he found Mr. McBrayer's vehicle-a silver truck-in a ditch on the side of the road. (Doc. 1 ¶ 11); (Doc. 40, at 18). Upon inspection of the vehicle, Defendant Spurgeon noted that the vehicle had been in a wreck, as evidenced by the fact that the airbags had deployed and that there was nobody near the vehicle. (Doc. 40, at 18).
Shortly thereafter, Ms. Angie McBrayer, Mr. McBrayer's ex-wife allegedly stated that Mr. McBrayer needed a medical evaluation and treatment. (Doc. 1, at ¶ 11); (Doc 40, at 18). While Ms. McBrayer and Defendant Spurgeon were talking, Defendant Sheriff's Deputy Anthony Tripp, Jr. (“Defendant Tripp”) arrived at the scene. (Doc. 1, at ¶ 12); (Doc. 39, at 26); (Doc. 45-3, at 2 ¶ 5); (Doc. 50, at 26 ¶ 26). The record is unclear whether Defendant Tripp stopped to speak with Defendant Spurgeon and Ms. McBrayer. What is clear, however, is that Defendant Tripp set off alone to “see if we could determine who was-who was asking for help. (Doc., 1 ¶ 12); (Doc. 39, at 26 & 40); (Doc. 40, at 23).
Defendant Tripp subsequently encountered Mr. McBrayer at 381 Hall Road. (Doc. 51, at 24-25). When Defendant Tripp encountered Mr. McBrayer, Mr. McBrayer was leaning up against a building, in a crouched position with his elbows on his knees. (Doc. 50, at 31). While Defendant Tripp did not identify himself as a police officer or use his vehicle's emergency lights or sirens, at the time he encountered Mr. McBrayer, Defendant Tripp was in uniform and driving a marked police vehicle. (Doc. 46-3, at 2 ¶ 3, 3 ¶ 8); (Doc. 67-2, at ¶ 1) (Doc. 50, at 26, 248).
Defendant Tripp approached Mr. McBrayer by driving his vehicle closer. (Doc. 45-3, at 2 ¶¶ 8-9); (Doc. 64-1, at 2 ¶ 1). Defendant Tripp drove his vehicle closer to Mr. McBrayer, but before they could communicate, Mr. McBrayer got up and ran away from Defendant Tripp, around the building. (Doc. 45-3, at 2 ¶ 9) (Doc. 67-2, at 2 ¶ 2) (Doc. 50, at 32-33). Mr. McBrayer then circled back to the front of the building, crouching behind a backhoe bucket under a lean-to approximately thirty-five (35) feet from Defendant Tripp. (Doc. 45-3, at 2 ¶ 10); (Doc. 67-2, at 2); (Doc. 50, at 33-33). During this time, Mr. McBrayer was yelling things such as “God hates you,” and talking about the devil. (Doc. 45-3, at 2 ¶ 6) (Doc. 67-2, at 2 ¶ 1); (Doc. 50, at 36).
Deputy Tripp then drew his Taser and instructed Mr. McBrayer to stop and show his hands several times. (Doc. 45-3, at 2 ¶ 11); (Doc. 67-2, at 2 ¶ 3) (Doc. 50, at 36). Defendant Tripp testified that Mr. McBrayer's flight and behavior were inconsistent with someone who needed help, and that Mr. McBrayer's behavior, based on Defendant Tripp's training and experience as a law enforcement officer, raised the possibility that he was using drugs. (Doc. 45-3, at 3 ¶ 16) (Doc. 67-2, at 3 ¶ 5); (Doc. 50, at 38-39). Defendant Tripp also testified that he did not know at this time whether Mr. McBrayer “was the reason that somebody [else] was yelling for help.” (Doc. 50, at 35).
The encounter escalated after Defendant Tripp ordered Mr. McBrayer to show him his hands and Mr. McBrayer ran at Defendant Tripp. (Doc. 45-3, at 3 ¶ 20); (Doc. 67-2, at 3 ¶ 7); (Doc. 50, at 46). Perceiving Mr. McBrayer to be hostile, Defendant Tripp deployed his Taser into Mr. McBrayer's chest when Mr. McBrayer was approximately ten (10) feet from Defendant Tripp. (Doc. 45-3, at 3 ¶ 24); (Doc. 67-2, at 4 ¶ 10); (Doc. 50, at 52-53); (See Doc. 48-9, at 6). According to Defendant Tripp, Mr. McBrayer seemed to be unaffected, in that neuromuscular incapacitation (“NMI”) was not achieved, as evidenced by the fact that Mr. McBrayer continued to run toward Defendant Tripp. (Doc. 50, at 55).
Given that Mr. McBrayer continued to run toward Defendant Tripp, Defendant Tripp backpedaled establishing a distance of approximately twenty (20) feet. (Doc. 50, at 57). At this point, Mr. McBrayer fell to his hands and knees. (Id., at 57). Believing that Mr. McBrayer was surrendering, Defendant Tripp approached. (Id., at 58). As Defendant Tripp approached, Mr. Mc Brayer got back up and ran at Defendant Tripp again. (Id.) While the exact sequence of events is unclear, what is clear is that Mr. McBrayer struck Defendant Tripp in the face and Defendant Tripp reactivated his Taser. (Id., at 62). During the encounter, Defendant Tripp activated the Taser four (4) times. (Doc. 48-9, at 12).
At this point, Defendant Spurgeon arrived on the scene. (Doc. 51, at 29). When Defendant Spurgeon attempted to take Mr. McBrayer into custody, Defendant Spurgeon's kneecap was dislocated. (Doc. 51, at 31-32). Defendant Spurgeon fell onto Mr. McBrayer and proceeded to wrestle with him on the ground. (Doc. 51, at 31-33). Defendant Spurgeon then drew his Taser and applied the weapon to Mr. McBrayer twice in “drive-stun” mode. (Doc. 51, at 35); (Doc. 48-9, at 10-11). According to Defendant Spurgeon, there was no opportunity to find out more about what was going on with Mr. McBrayer, or to deescalate the situation, prior to this sequence of events. (Doc. 51, at 40-43).
Deputies restrained Mr. McBrayer on the ground for several minutes while waiting for backup to arrive. (Doc. 51, at 46). During this time, Defendant Spurgeon called on the radio for an EMS dispatch for his knee injury. (Doc. 81, at 45). In order to maintain control, Deputies applied pressure to Mr. McBrayer's torso and, according to Defendant Spurgeon, Mr. McBrayer continued to actively resist detention. (Doc. 51, at 45-47).
Once backup arrived, deputies then handcuffed Mr. McBrayer and placed him in a hobble strap. (Doc. 45-3, at 12 ¶ 95); (Doc. 67-2, at 13 ¶ 36). Deputies then lifted Mr. McBrayer into the back seat of a patrol car. (Doc. 51, at 47).
At some point after Mr. McBrayer was placed in the patrol car, he stopped breathing. (Doc. 45-3, at 14 ¶¶ 112-117); (Doc. 67-2, at 18 ¶ 46). Mr. McBrayer was not given a medical assessment before he stopped breathing. (Doc. 51, at 173). Mr. McBrayer was pronounced dead at the scene. (Doc. 54-1, at 6).
III. Standard of Review
A. Motion for Summary Judgment Standard
Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56, “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a).
A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by:
(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials; or
(B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). “The court need consider only the cited materials, but it may consider other materials in the record.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(3).
Summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). “‘A genuine issue of material fact does not exist unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a reasonable jury to return a verdict in its favor.'” Grimes v. Miami Dade Cnty., 552 Fed.Appx. 902, 904 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting Chapman v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1023 (11th Cir. 2000)). “An issue of fact is ‘material' if it is a legal element of the claim under the applicable substantive law which might affect the outcome of the case.” Allen v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 121 F.3d 642, 646 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). “It is ‘genuine' if the record taken as a whole could lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party.” Tipton v. Bergrohr GMBH-Siegen, 965 F.2d 994, 998 (11th Cir. 1992) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)).
The movant bears the initial burden of showing, by citing to the record, that there is no genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. The movant can meet that burden by presenting evidence showing there is no dispute of material fact, or by demonstrating that the nonmoving party has failed to present evidence in support of an element of its case on which it bears the ultimate burden of proof. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-24. Once the movant has met its burden, the nonmoving party is required “to go beyond the pleadings” and identify “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 324. Moreover, to avoid summary judgment after the movant has met its burden, the nonmoving party must “do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.'” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 (citations omitted).
On a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view all evidence and factual inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and determine whether that evidence could reasonably sustain a jury verdict. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 58788; Allen, 121 F.3d at 646. However, the Court must grant summary judgment if there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).
IV. Law and Analysis
A. Defendants Tripp, Spurgeon and Henderson's Motion for Summary Judgment
Defendants Tripp, Spurgeon and Henderson (“Deputy Sheriff Defendants”) move for summary judgment on Plaintiffs' claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of Plaintiffs' civil rights. (Doc. 45-5, at 1). Plaintiffs allege that the Deputy Sheriff Defendants deprived Mr. McBrayer of his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution; and his right to be free from an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section I. Paragraph 13 of the Constitution of the State of Georgia. (Doc. 1, at 15-16 ¶ 35, 26 ¶ 55). The Deputy Sheriff Defendants make various arguments, the Court will address each in turn.
1. Qualified Immunity
The Deputy Sheriff Defendants, assert that they are entitled to the protection of Qualified Immunity for Plaintiffs' claims for violations of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. (Doc. 45-5, at 10). “The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials ‘from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). The doctrine “balances two important interests - the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.” Id. There are two parts to the qualified immunity analysis: (1) the relevant facts must set forth a violation of a constitutional right, and (2) the defendant must have violated a constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of defendant's conduct. Id. at 232. Whether qualified immunity is available as a defense is a question of law for the court. Ansley v. Heinrich, 925 F.2d 1139, 1348 (11th Cir. 1991).
The Eleventh Circuit has held that:
To be eligible for qualified immunity, the official must first establish that he was performing a discretionary function at the time the alleged violation of federal law occurred. Once the official has established that he was engaged in a discretionary function, the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that the official is not entitled to qualified immunity. In order to demonstrate that the official is not entitled to qualified immunity, the plaintiff must show two things: (1) that the defendant has committed a constitutional violation and (2) that the constitutional right the defendant violated was clearly established at the time he did it.Crosby v. Monroe Cnty., 394 F.3d 1328, 1332 (11th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted). Thus, in the Eleventh Circuit, the Court first determines whether Defendants Tripp, Spurgeon and Henderson were engaged in a discretionary function before moving on to determine whether Plaintiffs have presented relevant facts that Defendant committed a constitutional violation, and that violation was clearly established at the time of the Deputy Sheriff Defendants' conduct. “To determine whether an official was engaged in a discretionary function, we consider whether the acts the official undertook are of a type that fell within the employee's job responsibilities.” Id at 1332 (internal quotations marks omitted) (citation omitted).
In this case, the Deputy Sheriff Defendants are law enforcement officers who are being sued for apprehending and detaining a suspect. (See generally, Docs. 50 & 51). Plaintiffs do not object to this characterization. (See Doc. 67). Additionally, the record evidence shows that Defendants were acting in their capacity as law enforcement officers at the time of the incident. Accordingly, the Court finds that the Deputy Sheriff Defendants were engaged in a discretionary function, the Court, therefore, turns to whether Plaintiffs have presented relevant facts that the Deputy Sheriff Defendants committed a constitutional violation, and, if so, whether that violation was clearly established at the time of the violation.
i. Fourth Amendment Claims
Plaintiffs allege that the Deputy Sheriff Defendants, by detaining Mr. McBrayer without reasonable suspicion, and using excessive force against Mr. McBrayer, violated his “right to be free from all unreasonable seizure under the 4th Amendment of the United States Constitution.” (Doc. 1, at 25 ¶ 53). The Deputy Sheriff Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on the claims arising under the Fourth Amendment because the record demonstrates that Defendants Tripp and Spurgeon's conduct did not violate the Fourth Amendment, and even if it did, their conduct did not violate clearly established law, thus entitling Defendants Tripp and Spurgeon to qualified immunity. (Doc. 45-5, at 20).
a. Constitutional Violation
The Court's first inquiry is whether the facts, taken in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, show that the Deputy Sheriff Defendants violated Mr. McBrayer's Fourth Amendment Rights. The Deputy Sheriff Defendants' use of force on Mr. McBrayer raises two issues. Whether the deputies, in the first place, had the authority to detain, or “seize,” Mr. McBrayer, and second, whether the force they used to detain him-including the applications of their Tasers-was excessive. The Court will address both.
Under the Fourth Amendment, officers may detain a person if, based on the totality of the circumstances, that officer has reasonable suspicion that “criminal activity may be afoot.” United States v. Arvizu, 543 U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (citing United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1,7 (1989)); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 31 (1968). The determination of reasonable suspicion must be based on “commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior.” United States v. Gordon, 231 F.3d 750, 756 (11th Cir. 2000) (citing Illinois. v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000). If officers lacked the right to detain a person, then any force they used was, per se, unreasonable. Derowitsch v. Granger, 783 Fed.Appx. 979, 984 (11th Cir. 2019) (citing Jackson v. Sauls, 206 F.3d 1156, 1171 (11th Cir. 2000)). Although an individual may, ultimately, turn out to be engaged in perfectly lawful conduct, officers may detain the individual to resolve the ambiguity. United States v. Lewis, 674 F.3d 1298, 1304 (11th Cir. 2012) (citing Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000)). The analysis hinges upon the information available to the officer at the time of detention. See Lewis, 674 F.3d at 1305.
Detention begins when an officer restricts a person's freedom of movement. West v. Davis, 767 F.3d 1063, 1071 (11th Cir. 2014) (citing Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 381 (2007)). The parties do not dispute that Deputy Tripp “drew his Taser and shined his flashlight at [Mr.] McBrayer, telling him to stop and show his hands several times.” (Doc. 45-3, at 2 ¶ 11) (Doc. 67-2, at 2 ¶ 3). When Deputy Tripp pointed his Taser and told Mr. McBrayer to stop, Mr. McBrayer's movement was restricted, and, accordingly, the Court finds that Mr. McBrayer's detention within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment began then. The Court will only consider what information was available to Deputy Tripp at the time he detained Mr. McBrayer.