Opinion
1121.1 CA 14-02175
11-20-2015
In the Matter of Patrick J. UNDERWOOD, Petitioner–Respondent, v. Barbara J. FIALA, New York State Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, Respondent–Appellant, and Eric T. Schneiderman, New York State Attorney General, Respondent. (Appeal No. 2.).
Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Jeffrey W. Lang of Counsel), For Respondent–Appellant. William G. Pixley, Pittsford, for Petitioner–Respondent.
Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Jeffrey W. Lang of Counsel), For Respondent–Appellant.
William G. Pixley, Pittsford, for Petitioner–Respondent.
Opinion
MEMORANDUM:
Petitioner's license to drive a motor vehicle was revoked in January 2012 as a result of a conviction of driving while ability impaired (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1193). In June 2012, petitioner applied for a new license. Pending the adoption of emergency regulations, the Commissioner held petitioner's application in abeyance, along with the applications of other persons with three or more alcohol- or drug-related driving offenses (see Matter of Kenny v. Fiala, 127 A.D.3d 1359, 1359, 9 N.Y.S.3d 692). In January 2013, after the emergency regulations became effective, petitioner's application was denied on the ground that petitioner had “five or more alcohol- or drug-related driving convictions or incidents” (15 nycrr 136.5[B]1 ). following an adMInistrative appeal, petitioner commenced this proceeding, contending in pertinent part that the Commissioner unlawfully applied the emergency regulations retroactively to his relicensing application. The court agreed with that contention, granted the petition, and directed the Commissioner to restore to petitioner full driving privileges without restrictions.
Contrary to the court's determination, there is no merit to petitioner's contention that the Commissioner erred in retroactively applying the amended regulations to his application (see Matter of Acevedo v. New York State Dept. of Motor Veh., 132 A.D.3d 112, 114, 14 N.Y.S.3d 790 2015; Kenny, 127 A.D.3d at 1359, 9 N.Y.S.3d 692). “[P]etitioner's driver's license is not generally viewed as a vested right, but merely a personal privilege subject to reasonable restrictions and revocation by [the Commissioner] under her discretionary powers ... Thus, [the Commissioner] remained free to apply her most recent regulations when exercising her discretion in deciding whether to grant or deny petitioner's application for relicensing. This is especially so in light of the rational, seven-month moratorium placed on all similarly-situated applicants for relicensing—i.e., persons with three or more alcohol-related driving convictions” (Matter of Scism v. Fiala, 122 A.D.3d 1197, 1198, 997 N.Y.S.2d 798; see Matter of Klink v. Fiala, 129 A.D.3d 1685, 1686, 11 N.Y.S.3d 399).
Finally, petitioner failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to his remaining contention, and we therefore do not have the power to review it (see generally Matter of Nelson v. Coughlin, 188 A.D.2d 1071, 1071, 591 N.Y.S.2d 670, appeal dismissed 81 N.Y.2d 834, 595 N.Y.S.2d 396, 611 N.E.2d 297).
It is hereby ORDERED that the amended judgment insofar as appealed from is unanimously reversed on the law without costs and the petition is dismissed in its entirety.