Opinion
Civ. File No. 02-1806 (PAM/RLE).
April 11, 2005
ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Gary Lynn Underdahl's application for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Respondent Terry Carlson requests that the Court dismiss the petition in its entirety without holding an evidentiary hearing. For the following reasons, the Court dismisses the petition with prejudice.
BACKGROUND
On February 25, 1997, a jury found Underdahl guilty on nine criminal counts, including burglary, kidnaping, assault, criminal sexual conduct, felony harassment, and making terroristic threats. This conviction was affirmed on appeal. He unsuccessfully sought post-conviction relief. After exhausting his state court remedies, Underdahl filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which this Court denied. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of his petition. See Underdahl v. Carlson, 381 F.3d 740 (8th Cir. 2004).
After the first conviction, several witnesses who had testified on Underdahl's behalf told police that Underdahl had forced them to commit perjury. Underdahl was then charged with perjury, witness tampering, and soliciting juveniles to commit perjury. He was convicted by a jury on all counts. Underdahl appealed his conviction, and asserted the following issues on appeal: violation of his right to speedy trial, prosecutorial misconduct, failure to instruct the jury on the corroboration of accomplice testimony, insufficiency of the evidence, and error in sentencing. The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirming the conviction and his consecutive sentence, but remanded for re-sentencing because Underdahl could not be sentenced on more than one court of perjury under Minnesota law. See State of Minn. v. Underdahl, C4-01-761, 2002 WL 485310 (Minn.Ct.App. Apr. 2, 2002). In July 2002, Underdahl filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. In that petition, Underdahl sought relief for the same reasons presented in his direct appeal, but additionally claimed ineffective assistance of counsel. This Court dismissed the petition because Underdahl's petition included both exhausted and unexhausted claims. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals remanded and instructed the Court to allow Underdahl to amend his petition to include only his exhausted claims. See Underdahl, 381 F.3d at 744.
In December 2004, this Court ordered Underdahl to amend his petition to include only his exhausted claims. (See Dec. 2, 2004, Order.) Underdahl's petition asserts that he is entitled to relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 because (1) he was denied the right to a speedy trial; (2) of prosecutorial misconduct; (3) the court improperly instructed the jury under Minn. Stat. § 634.04; and (4) the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction. Carlson contends that the petition must dismissed with prejudice.
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
Underdahl asks this Court to review his state court conviction. The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") permits federal courts to exercise "limited and deferential review of underlying state court decisions" in a habeas corpus action. Jones v. Luebbers, 359 F.3d 1005, 1011 (8th Cir. 2004). 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) requires that the petitioner demonstrate that the state court's decision was (1) "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," or (2) based on "an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding."
A state court decision is contrary to clearly established Supreme Court precedent if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Court on a question of law or decides a case differently than the Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. A state court decision involves an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from the Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case. Finally, a state court decision involves an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceedings, only if it is shown that the state court's presumptively correct factual findings do not enjoy support in the record.Ryan v. Clarke, 387 F.3d 785, 790-91 (8th Cir. 2004) (citations and quotations omitted).
Furthermore, Underdahl submits that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his claims.
A federal habeas court's power to conduct an evidentiary hearing is, however, sharply limited by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(B), which provides that, as a prerequisite to such a hearing, a petitioner must show that the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underyling offense.Perry v. Kemna, 356 F.3d 880, 889 (8th Cir. 2004) (quotations omitted).
B. Speedy Trial
Underdahl contends that he was denied the right to a speedy trial as required under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. Underdahl's trial proceeded in January 2001. He argues that he was subjected to both pre-charge and post-charge delay. He contends that the state completed its investigation in January 1998, but waited twenty-five months to formally charge him with the perjury-related charges. Underdahl further contends that he immediately demanded a speedy trial in March 2000 after he was formally charged. Finally, he asserts that the record does not accurately reflect his speedy trial request, as he asserted it at his plea hearing in April 2000.
According to Underdahl, he exercised his speedy trial rights in writing in March 2000. On April 14, 2000, at his plea hearing, Underdahl contends that his court-appointed attorney failed to articulate his speedy trial request and rather represented to the court that Underdahl did "not" request a speedy trial. Trial was set for July 18, 2000, but on June 19, 2000, Underdahl's counsel requested a continuance which was granted to August 15, 2000. On July 31, 2000, Underdahl sought to dismiss the charges, and trial was again continued to September 12, 2000. On September 12, 2000, at the request of both parties, trial was again continued to December 5, 2000. At the pretrial conference on November 27, 2000, Underdahl renewed his request for a speedy trial and his trial took place within sixty days of that request.
The Minnesota Court of Appeals evaluated Underdahl's claim under the standard iterated in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530-32 (1972). A post-charge speedy trial claim requires the court to balance the length of the delay, the reason for the delay, whether the defendant asserted the right to a speedy trial, and whether the defendant suffered any prejudice as a result of the delay. See id. No single factor is determinative, but rather these factors must be considered together in relation to the facts of the case. See id. Applying Barker, the Minnesota Court of Appeals concluded that Underdahl was not denied his right to a speedy trial.
The Minnesota Court of Appeals further evaluated Underdahl's claim for pre-charge delay. Relying on State v. F.C.R., 276 N.W.2d 636 (Minn. 1979), the court concluded that Underdahl failed to demonstrate both "actual prejudice" and "improper state purpose." Although F.C.R. was decided before the Supreme Court's decision in Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 (1992), which governs pre-charge delays, F.C.R. is consistent with this Supreme Court precedent. Indeed, actual prejudice and improper state purpose are considerations required underDoggett. See 505 U.S. at 651-57. Applying the governing law, the Minnesota Court of Appeals concluded that Underdahl was not denied his right to a speedy trial.
Evaluating Underdahl's arguments in their entirety, the Court finds that the state court's ruling was consistent with controlling Supreme Court precedent, and reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances. With regard to Underdahl's alleged pre-charge delay, the fact that the government waited until Underdahl's previous post-conviction petitions were finalized does not evidence prejudice. Underdahl "must demonstrate that the prejudice actually impaired his ability to meaningfully present a defense," and his arguments do not amount to this severity. See Bennett v. Lockhart, 39 F.3d 848, 851 (8th Cir. 1994) (quoting United States v. Bartlett, 794 F.2d 1285, 1289-90) (emphasis omitted). As to post-charge delay, even if the record does not accurately reflect Underdahl's intent to assert his speedy trial demand at the April 2000 hearing, the evidence shows that the subsequent delays were either at Underdahl's request or by agreement of the parties. Therefore, Underdahl's petition on this point fails.
C. Prosecutor's Closing Arguments
Underdahl next argues that the prosecutor's closing arguments violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to a fair. During closing, the prosecutor stated:
And in this trial is sort of the first time the kids have had an opportunity to really tell their story and indicate . . . the kind of abuse that they had. The charges in this trial are not for child abuse, they're for perjury and witness tampering. But this is where the kids get their vindication for the years of abuse. I hope you go back to the jury room and you'll think about it, what the kids went through all those years and justice that's denied them. And think about how this is the opportunity to rank at least a little bit of that.See Underdahl, 2002 WL 485310 at * 4. Underdahl's counsel immediately objected, and the court issued the following curative instruction:
[This] is an improper argument and I instruct you again that Mr. Underdahl is on trial only for the charges in the complaint that have been brought in this action. And you are to consider his guilt only on those matters and he is not to be convicted for any other acts, or incidents, or things that you may consider to be crimes or bad acts. It would be improper for a jury to make a finding of guilty for that purpose to vindicate people that you consider victims of other bad conduct if that should be the case.Id. Although the court commented on the egregious nature of the prosecutor's comments and determined that the misconduct was "unusually serious," the court concluded that the misconduct was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at *5; see also State v. Caron, 218 N.W.2d 197, 200 (1974). The overwhelming evidence against Underdahl coupled with the court's remedial instruction precluded the court from finding the misconduct so "inexcusable and so serious and prejudicial" as to deny Underdahl a fair trial. See State v. Smith, 541 N.W.2d 584, 588 (Minn. 1996).
The court's ruling on this point is consistent with Supreme Court precedent that governs prosecutorial misconduct in closing arguments. See Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986) ("[t]he relevant question is whether the prosecutors' comments so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process") (internal quotation omitted). Furthermore, the Court finds that the state court's decision is supported by reasonable evidence. Underdahl offers no evidentiary support for his claim that he received an unfair trial, or that the outcome would have been different absent the prosecutor's comments. Although the Court also notes the egregious nature of the prosecutor's comments, the Court finds that the state court's ruling is supported by reasonable evidence.
D. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Underdahl was convicted on three counts of perjury. He argues that his convictions must be reversed because the purported statements are immaterial. He also argues that the government failed to prove that he made these purported statements. The Minnesota Court of Appeals determined, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the conviction, that the evidence was sufficient to permit the jurors to reach the resulting verdict.See State of Minn. v. Webb, 440 N.W.2d 426, 430 (Minn. 1989) (identifying standard of review). Although the court agreed with Underdahl that the charges in the complaint were more accurately characterized as opinions or legal conclusions, the instructions submitted to the jury by the trial court more appropriately contained statements of the specific facts underlying the charges. See Underdahl, 2002 WL 485310 at *7. Therefore, the Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the perjury conviction.
The perjury charges were based on Underdahl's denials made in his previous criminal trial. He argues that his not guilty plea and his general denial that he committed the crimes cannot be considered material. However, as the Minnesota Court of Appeals noted, the false statements made by Underdahl during trial amounted to more than mere general denials, and the testimony of Underdahl's three sons and his former girlfriend corroborated the false and material nature of these statements. After the submission of detailed jury instructions, the jury convicted Underdahl. This Court finds that the conviction is supported by reasonable evidence and is likewise consistent with controlling law.
Underdahl also argues that the recanted testimony of his sons and former girlfriend cannot support his conviction. He submits that these recantations were false and coerced by government officials. Underdahl discusses these recantations in detail, but fails to point to any evidence to support the assertion that these recantations were the direct result of government misconduct. Morever, based on all of the evidence, the jury chose not to believe Underdahl's version of the events. The Court will not disturb a jury verdict merely because Underdahl disagrees with its findings. Thus, this Court finds that the Minnesota Court of Appeals properly evaluated the sufficiency of the evidence and correctly concluded that reasonable evidence supported the jury verdict.
E. Right to a Fair Trial
Underdahl claims that he was denied his right to a fair trial. Specifically, he claims that his fair trial rights were denied because he was escorted into the courtroom in handcuffs and because a witness directed an expletive at him during trial. Although the Minnesota Court of Appeals acknowledged the inadequacy of the briefing on these points, the court nonetheless concluded that even if these incidents were error, they were not erroneous beyond a reasonable doubt. Indeed, the court applied the appropriate law. Underdahl also appears to further contend that malicious prosecution resulted because his lawyer failed to request a mistrial on these grounds. Bald allegations, absent any evidentiary support, do not support a claim for relief. Underdahl's petition on this point is denied.
F. Accomplice Testimony
Underdahl maintains that the trial court erred because it refused to instruct the jury that it could not use uncorroborated accomplice testimony to convict Underdahl. Minn. Stat. § 634.04. Again, the state court extensively evaluated the merits of Underdahl's argument, and concluded that the trial court did not err by concluding that Underdahl's children and former girlfriend were not accomplices as a matter of law. Thus, under Minnesota law, an instruction regarding the need for corroboration of accomplice testimony was not required. See State of Minn. v. Shoop, 441 N.W.2d 475, 479 (Minn. 1989).
However, this Court may not entertain Underdahl's petition on this point. As the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has noted, "this corroboration requirement is a matter of state law which does not implicate a constitutional right cognizable on habeas review." Berrisford v. Wood, 826 F.2d 747, 750 n. 3 (8th Cir. 1987). Therefore, Underdahl's claim on this point is denied.
CONCLUSION
This Court has limited power to conduct an evidentiary hearing.See Cox v. Burger, 398 F.3d 1025, 1030 (8th Cir. 2005); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). In this case, Underdahl fails to demonstrate that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing under § 2254, and therefore, the Court declines to hold an evidentiary hearing on any of the claims in Underdahl's petition. Furthermore, Underdahl fails to demonstrate that he is entitled to any relief under § 2254. Accordingly, based on all the files, records and proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Gary Lynn Underdahl's application for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Clerk Doc. No. 1) is DISMISSED with prejudice. LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.