Opinion
CA 04-00237.
Decided June 14, 2004.
Appeal from a judgment (denominated order) of the Supreme Court, Oneida County (John G. Ringrose, A.J.), entered April 7, 2003 in an action pursuant to RPAPL article 15. The judgment was entered in favor of defendant County of Oneida after a nonjury trial.
PETER S. PALEWSKI, NEW YORK MILLS, FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT.
RANDAL B. CALDWELL, COUNTY ATTORNEY, UTICA (LINDA M.H. DILLON OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.
Before: PRESENT: PIGOTT, JR., P.J., GREEN, PINE, WISNER, AND LAWTON, JJ.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from be and the same hereby is unanimously affirmed without costs.
Memorandum: In this action brought pursuant to RPAPL article 15 to determine title to certain real property, plaintiff appeals from a judgment entered in favor of defendant County of Oneida (County) following a nonjury trial. We affirm for reasons stated in the decision at Supreme Court (John G. Ringrose, A.J.). We add only that there is no merit to the contention of plaintiff that the determination of Supreme Court (Anthony F. Shaheen, J.) denying plaintiff's motion to strike the County's answer became null and void when Justice Shaheen thereafter recused himself from the case. "[I]t is well established that, absent a showing of actual bias or a statutory basis for recusal, proceedings conducted prior to a motion for recusal, or prior to a voluntary withdrawal from the case, remain valid" ( Rochester Community Individual Practice Assn. v. Excellus Health Plan [appeal No. 2], 305 A.D.2d 1007, 1008, lv dismissed 1 N.Y.3d 546). The motion therefore was properly denied when it was brought again before Acting Justice Ringrose ( see Home Mtge. Corp. v. Saxon Equities Corp., 241 A.D.2d 511). In any event, because the motion was, in effect, a motion for summary judgment when it was brought again, and plaintiff's own submissions on the motion raised a triable issue of fact regarding the County's claim of title, the motion was properly denied "regardless of the sufficiency of the opposing papers" ( Alvarez v. Prospect Hosp., 68 N.Y.2d 320, 324; see Gawera v. Scrogg, 4 A.D.3d 760).