Ulloa v. Prince George's Cnty.

Full title: SONIA ULLOA, et al. v. PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY, MARYLAND, et al.

Court: UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

Date published: Dec 4, 2015

Civil Action No. 15-0257 (D. Md. Dec. 4, 2015)

Opinion

Civil Action No. 15-0257

12-04-2015

SONIA ULLOA, et al. v. PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY, MARYLAND, et al.

DEBORAH K. CHASANOW United States District Judge

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Presently pending and ready for resolution in this civil rights action is a partial motion to dismiss the complaint of Sonia Ulloa and Maria Blanco (collectively, the "Plaintiffs"), filed by Prince George's County, Maryland (the "County"), Prince George's County Police Officer Tonya Brooks, and Prince George's County Police Corporal Clarence Black (collectively, the "Defendants"). (ECF No. 26). The issues have been fully briefed, and the court now rules, no hearing being deemed necessary. Local Rule 105.6. For the following reasons, Defendants' partial motion to dismiss will be granted.

I. Background

A. Factual Background ¹

1 Unless otherwise noted, the facts recounted here are construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the nonmoving parties.

On July 12, 2014, Sonia Ulloa and her sister, Maria Blanco, attended an automobile auction at Capital Auto & Truck Auction, Inc. ("Capital Auto"). (ECF No. 24 ¶ 10). Prince George's Police Officer Tonya Brooks, allegedly working in her capacity as a police officer and as an employee of Capital Auto, stated that she observed Ms. Ulloa raise her hand to bid on a car.² When Ms. Ulloa explained that she had not bid on a car, Officer Brooks asked Ms. Ulloa and Ms. Blanco to leave the facility. As Ms. Ulloa walked toward the cashier to pay for the cars on which she had already bid, Officer Brooks stepped behind Ms. Ulloa. Plaintiffs allege that Officer Brooks placed a gun under her t-shirt and began pushing Ms. Ulloa. According to Plaintiffs, Officer Brooks then grabbed Ms. Ulloa by the neck and hair, threw her to the ground, and punched her in the head, face, and arms. Ms. Blanco attempted to pull Officer Brooks off of Ms. Ulloa; when she did so, Prince George's County Police Corporal Clarence Black allegedly punched Ms. Blanco in her shoulder. Plaintiffs contend that Corporal Black was working in his capacity as a police officer and as an employee of Capital Auto. At the time, Plaintiffs allege, Ms. Blanco had not committed any crime, attempted to escape, or resisted arrest. After several minutes, Corporal Black intervened and pulled Officer Brooks away from Ms. Ulloa. Corporal Black arrested Ms. Ulloa for assault and disorderly conduct, although Plaintiffs contend that she had not committed any crime.

2 Plaintiffs' amended complaint identifies Police Officer Tonya Brooks as a defendant, but subsequent briefing by the parties identifies her as Police Officer Tanya Brooks.

Ms. Ulloa sustained injuries to her head, neck, face, back, and arms. (Id. ¶ 11). Plaintiffs allege that, as a result of the assault and false arrest, Ms. Ulloa missed time from work and suffered severe mental and emotional distress. Ms. Blanco sustained an injury to her shoulder and experienced other physical pain and suffering. Plaintiffs contend that Officer Brooks and Corporal Black acted within the scope of their employment as employees of both the County and Capital Auto. (Id. ¶¶ 10; 12; 13). Plaintiffs provided notice of their claims to Prince George's County Attorney M. Andree Green on October 15, 2014, and December 1, 2014, as required by the Local Government Tort Claims Act. (Id. ¶ 14); Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-304.

According to Plaintiffs, "[t]he actions taken by Officer Brooks and Corporal Black may have been motivated by actual malice, conscious and deliberate violence and wrongdoing, evil or wrongful motive, intent to injure and ill will." (ECF No. 24 ¶ 15). In addition, Plaintiffs assert that "[a]t least ten other individuals have filed claims against [the County] between 2002 and 2014[] alleging that [the County's] police officers have used excessive force and have arrested and incarcerated [the County's] residents without probable cause." (Id. ¶ 16). Concluding that the County's police department "has a long and well documented history of violating the civil rights of its citizens," Plaintiffs allege that their injuries resulted from the County's "custom, policy, and practice of deliberate indifference to, and failure to take action to stop, the widespread and on-going practice of arresting individuals without probable cause by the County's police officers." (Id.; see id. ¶¶ 30; 37; 50).

B. Procedural Background

Plaintiffs sued the County, Officer Brooks, Corporal Black, and Capital Auto in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County, Maryland. (ECF Nos. 2; 14). On January 29, 2015, the County removed the action to this court based on federal jurisdiction over claims brought under 43 U.S.C. § 1983 and supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. (ECF No. 1). The court consolidated the actions brought by Ms. Ulloa and Ms. Blanco on February 10, 2015. (ECF No. 12). Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on March 24, 2015, alleging civil rights violations under § 1983, assault, battery, and false arrest. (ECF No. 24).

Defendants filed the pending motion to dismiss Counts Five, Seven, and Eleven of Plaintiffs' amended complaint, which assert claims against the County for arrest without probable cause and excessive use of force under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants also moved to dismiss any claims against Officer Brooks and Corporal Black in their official capacities. (ECF No. 26). Plaintiffs responded in opposition (ECF Nos. 28; 29), and Defendants replied (ECF No. 30).³

3 Also pending is Plaintiffs' motion for an extension of time to respond to Defendants' discovery requests and name expert witnesses. (ECF No. 40). Defendants responded in opposition. (ECF No. 41). The undersigned will schedule a telephone conference with the parties to discuss the schedule.

II. Standard of Review

The purpose of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is to test the sufficiency of the complaint. Presley v. City of Charlottesville, 464 F.3d 480, 483 (4^th Cir. 2006). A complaint need only satisfy the standard of Rule 8(a), which requires a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). "Rule 8(a)(2) still requires a 'showing,' rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 n.3 (2007). That showing must consist of more than "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action" or "naked assertion[s] devoid of further factual enhancement." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citations omitted).

At this stage, all well-pleaded allegations in a complaint must be considered as true, Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 268 (1994), and all factual allegations must be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 783 (4^th Cir. 1999) (citing Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4^th Cir. 1993)); Brockington v. Boykins, 637 F.3d 503, 505-06 (4^th Cir. 2011). In evaluating the complaint, unsupported legal allegations need not be accepted. Revene v. Charles Cnty. Comm'rs, 882 F.2d 870, 873 (4^th Cir. 1989). Legal conclusions couched as factual allegations are insufficient, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, as are conclusory factual allegations devoid of any reference to actual events. United Black Firefighters v. Hirst, 604 F.2d 844, 847 (4^th Cir. 1979). "[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged, but it has not 'show[n] that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)). Thus, "[d]etermining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id. "Even though the requirements for pleading a proper complaint are substantially aimed at assuring that the defendant be given adequate notice of the nature of a claim being made against him, they also provide criteria for defining issues for trial and for early disposition of inappropriate complaints." Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 192 (4^th Cir. 2009).

III. Analysis

Section 1983 imposes liability on anyone who, acting under color of state law, deprives a person of any "rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws." 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see Pee Dee Health Care, P.A. v. Sanford, 509 F.3d 204, 210 (4^th Cir. 2007). Counts Five, Seven, and Eleven of Plaintiffs' complaint assert § 1983 claims against the County for arrest without probable cause and excessive use of force. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' claims against the County (and against Officer Brooks and Corporal Black in their official capacities) should be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

A. Section 1983 Claims Against the County

To state a § 1983 claim against a county, a plaintiff must allege that the action at issue was one that "execute[s] a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body's officers" or that represents informal governmental "custom." See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978).⁴ Counties and other local governments cannot be held liable under § 1983 for injuries inflicted by their employees or agents based on the theory of respondeat superior - that is, "for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents." Id. at 694; see Austin v. Paramount Parks, Inc., 195 F.3d 715, 727-28 (4^th Cir. 1999); Powell v. Shopco Laurel Co., 678 F.2d 504, 506 (4^th Cir. 1982). "Section 1983 plaintiffs seeking to impose liability on a municipality must, therefore, adequately plead and prove the existence of an official policy or custom that is fairly attributable to the municipality and that proximately caused the deprivation of their rights." Jordan by Jordan v. Jackson, 15 F.3d 333, 338 (4^th Cir. 1994) (emphasis added) (citing Spell, 824 F.2d at 1387-88); see City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989); Carter v. Morris, 164 F.3d 215, 218 (4^th Cir. 1999).

4 "An official policy often refers to 'formal rules or understandings that are intended to, and do, establish fixed plans of action to be followed under similar circumstances consistently and over time.'" Semple v. City of Moundsville, 195 F.3d 708, 712-13 (4^th Cir. 1999) (quoting Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480 (1986)). "Outside of such formal decisionmaking channels, a municipal custom may arise if a practice is so 'persistent and widespread' and 'so permanent and well settled as to constitute a 'custom or usage' with the force of law.'" Carter v. Morris, 164 F.3d 215, 218 (4^th Cir. 1999) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 691); see Simms ex rel. Simms v. Hardesty, 303 F.Supp.2d 656, 670 (D.Md. 2003). A custom "may be attributed to a municipality when the duration and frequency of the practices warrants a finding of either actual or constructive knowledge by the municipal governing body that the practices have become customary among its employees." Spell v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380, 1387 (4^th Cir. 1987). Furthermore, "a policy or custom may possibly be inferred from continued inaction in the face of a known history of widespread constitutional deprivations on the part of city employees, or, under quite narrow circumstances, from the manifest propensity of a general, known course of employee conduct to cause constitutional deprivations to an identifiable group of persons having a special relationship to the state." Milligan v. City of Newport News, 743 F.2d 227, 229 (4^th Cir. 1984) (internal citations omitted).

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has cautioned that while "the substantive requirements for proof of municipal liability are stringent," "[§] 1983 claims are not subject to a heightened pleading standard paralleling the rigors of proof demanded on the merits." Jordan, 15 F.3d at 338 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Instead, "a § 1983 plaintiff seeking to impose municipal liability must satisfy only the usual requirements of notice pleading specified by the Federal Rules." Id. at 339; see Harrison v. McNeill, No. CCB-07-3399, 2008 WL 2074146, at *3 n.1 (D.Md. May 9, 2008). Consequently, although Monell does not impose heightened pleading requirements above the basic "short and plain statement" requirement of Rule 8(a), Plaintiffs still must adequately allege a County policy or custom that proximately caused the deprivation of their rights. Jordan, 15 F.3d at 338; see Peters v. City of Mount Rainier, No. GJH-14-00955, 2014 WL 4855032, at *4 (D.Md. Sept. 29, 2014).

Defendants argue that "Plaintiffs make general allegations regarding the County's policy with respect to use of force" and that Plaintiffs' specific allegations "merely demonstrate that the action at issue was a single incident involving two police officers." (ECF No. 26, at 7). Plaintiffs identify ten lawsuits since 2002 in which police officers of the County were alleged to have used excessive force or made arrests or incarcerated residents without probable cause to show that the County had a custom, policy, or practice. (ECF No. 24 ¶ 16). In addition, Plaintiffs argue that they have adduced sufficient circumstantial evidence to survive dismissal and warrant discovery. (ECF Nos. 28, at 3; 29, at 3). Defendants contend that Plaintiffs have not met their burden by simply reciting the elements of the claim and string-citing cases to demonstrate that the County has a de facto custom, policy, or practice. (ECF No. 26, at 7-8).

"[T]he Fourth Circuit has made clear that a plaintiff in a Monell action need not 'plead the multiple incidents of constitutional violations that may be necessary at later stages to establish the existence of an official policy or custom and causation.'" Jones v. Chapman, No. ELH-14-2627, 2015 WL 4509871, at *15 (D.Md. July 24, 2015) (quoting Jordan, 15 F.3d at 339-40).

Although prevailing on the merits of a Monell claim is difficult, simply alleging such a claim is, by definition, easier. For to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint need only allege facts which, if true, "'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570) (emphasis added). The recitation of facts need not be particularly detailed, and the chance of success need not be particularly high. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. A plaintiff fails to state a claim only when he offers "labels and conclusions" or formulaically

recites the elements of his § 1983 cause of action. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

Owens v. Baltimore City State's Attorney's Office, 767 F.3d 379, 403 (4^th Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub nom. Baltimore City Police Dep't v. Owens, 135 S.Ct. 1893, 191 L.Ed.2d 762 (2015). Here, however, Plaintiffs do not adequately plead a policy or custom to survive Defendants' motion to dismiss. In the most general terms, Plaintiffs state that the County's police department "has a long and well documented history of violating the civil rights of its citizens. Officer Brooks and Corporal Black's actions are the result of [the County's] custom, policy, and practice of deliberate indifference to . . . the widespread and on-going practice of arresting individuals without probable cause." (ECF No. 24 ¶ 16). In briefing their opposition to Defendants' motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs do not elaborate on the factual basis of the complaint, nor do they seek leave to amend it. Rather, Plaintiffs assert that "[a]t least ten other individuals have filed claims against [the County] between 2002 and 2014[] alleging that [County] police officers have used excessive force and have arrested and incarcerated [County] residents without probable cause." (Id.). Plaintiffs support their assertion by simply including a string citation of ten lawsuits dating to 2002 without further explanation as to whether or why the listed cases involved similar factual allegations and amount to evidence of a custom, policy, or practice. In so doing, Plaintiffs fail to provide "factual allegations of known, widespread conduct by [the County's] employees comparable to" the injuries alleged by Plaintiffs. Milligan, 743 F.2d at 230 (emphasis added) (upholding the district court's dismissal of a plaintiff's Monell claim where the complaint alleged only that the city was "'grossly negligent' in failing adequately to train its personnel and that this exhibited 'callous disregard' for [the plaintiff's] constitutional rights"); see Ross v. Prince George's Cnty., MD, No. DKC-11-1984, 2012 WL 1204087, at *9 (D.Md. Apr. 10, 2012) (dismissing the plaintiff's Monell claim because the complaint "wholly fails . . . to support [his] bald conclusion with any factual allegations beyond those surrounding his own injury and arrest"). Citation to lawsuits is not equivalent to offering factual allegations of known, widespread conduct.

Moreover, the cases Plaintiffs cite demonstrate only that a handful of County residents have brought § 1983 claims against County police officers over the course of more than a decade and with varying degrees of success. In fact, almost all of the cited cases resulted in no judicial finding of liability against County police officers for arrest without probable cause or excessive use of force. And, in most of the cited cases, the plaintiffs' respective claims were dismissed before trial.⁵ Taylor v. Prince George's Cnty., DKC-13-01678, ECF No. 25 (approving the plaintiff's stipulation of dismissal with prejudice)⁶; Chestnut v. Prince George's Cnty., AW-10-0583, ECF No. 32 (dismissing the case under Fed.R.Civ.P. 37 as a sanction for the plaintiff's discovery violations)⁷; Culmer v. Prince George's Cnty., RWT-09-2877, ECF No. 49 (approving the plaintiff's stipulation of dismissal with prejudice); Davis v. Prince George's Cnty., AW-07-1458, ECF No. 40, at 5 (granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants because, beyond the plaintiff's "bald allegations in the complaint, there is no evidence that [the officer] did anything inappropriate, illegal, or tortious"); Bullock v. Prince George's Cnty., DKC-04-3120, ECF No. 10 (approving the plaintiff's stipulation of dismissal with prejudice).⁸ Two other cases cited by Plaintiffs did not involve claims for excessive use of force. Robles v. Prince George's Cnty., Maryland, 302 F.3d 262, 268-69 (4^th Cir. 2002) ("[The plaintiff] acknowledges that the police had probable cause for his arrest. . . . [He] also admits that [the police officers] did not use excessive force when they took custody of him.")⁹; Randall v. Prince George's Cty., Md., 302 F.3d 188, 204 n.23 (4^th Cir. 2002) (noting that there were no allegations of excessive force in this case). In Randall, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's award of summary judgment to the defendant county on the plaintiffs' Monell claims, affirmed judgment against two police officers under Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, and vacated the jury verdict against three police officers rendered on the theory of supervisory liability.¹⁰ Finally, in McCollum v. McDaniel, the Fourth Circuit affirmed a jury verdict finding the defendants liable for excessive use of force. 32 F.App'x 49, 51 (4^th Cir. 2002).¹¹ By citing to these ten cases, Plaintiffs compile mostly allegations and attempt to pass them as judicial findings of liability involving excessive use of force and unlawful arrests. The two Fourth Circuit cases from 2002 that did find liability are not enough to support Plaintiffs' Monell claims. Substituting factual allegations with citations to earlier lawsuits - and in particular cases in which the plaintiff did not prevail on excessive use of force or unlawful arrest claims - does not adequately allege a pattern, practice, or custom.

5 Two cases cited by Plaintiffs, captioned in the complaint as "Antono Tyer v. Prince George's County, et al., Case No. 10-20957 (D.Md. 2010)" and "David Rieves (2010)," appear to have been captioned or cited incorrectly such that the undersigned cannot locate the corresponding docket. (See ECF No. 24 ¶ 16).

6 On an earlier motion for summary judgment, the court determined that, crediting the plaintiff's version of events, there was a "genuine dispute as to whether [the defendant police officer] used excessive force against [the plaintiff]." Taylor v. Prince George's Cty., Md., No. DKC-13-1678, 2014 WL 2964093, at *6 (D.Md. June 30, 2014).

7 Before the entire case was dismissed for discovery violations, Judge Williams dismissed the plaintiff's Monell claim for excessive use of force. Chestnut v. Prince George's Cty., No. 08:10-CV-583-AW, 2011 WL 939034, at *3 (D.Md. Mar. 16, 2011).

8 In their complaint, Plaintiffs incorrectly captioned this case as "Vernon Bullock v. Prince George's County, et al., Case No. 14-17104 (D.Md. 2004)." (ECF No. 24 ¶ 16).

9 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit held that the plaintiff's arrest comported with the Fourth Amendment, but the police officers violated his federal due process rights when they tied him to metal pole in a deserted parking lot and left him there for approximately ten minutes. Despite the constitutional violation, however, the officers were shielded by qualified immunity from liability under § 1983. Robles, 302 F.3d at 270-71.

10 Concurring in judgment, Judge Michael noted that "it remains true that the jury reasonably concluded that county police officers rounded up and involuntarily detained the plaintiffs in the knowing absence of probable cause." Randall, 302 F.3d at 214 (Michael, J., concurring).

11 In their complaint, Plaintiffs incorrectly captioned this case as "McCollum v. Prince George's County, 32 Fed Appx (4^th Cir. 2002)." (ECF No. 24 ¶ 16).

Plaintiffs' failure to plead facts plausibly alleging that the County has a custom, policy, or practice is fatal to their Monell claims. Beyond their string citation, Plaintiffs offer only "threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action supported by mere conclusory statements," thus failing to satisfy the pleading requirements of Iqbal. 556 U.S. at 663. A policy or custom that gives rise to § 1983 liability will not "be inferred merely from municipal inaction in the face of isolated constitutional deprivations by municipal employees." Milligan, 743 F.2d at 230 (citations omitted). In Chen v. Mayor of Balt., the court permitted the plaintiff's Monell claim to proceed past the motion-to-dismiss stage because he had alleged two "separate incidents," occurring nearly one week apart, in which the city had purportedly committed analogous due process violations. L-09-47, 2009 WL 2487078, at *5 (D.Md. Aug. 12, 2009). Similarly, in Ames v. Harford Cnty., although the court described the plaintiffs' Monell allegations as "not voluminous," the complaint contained many more factual allegations from which municipal liability could be inferred. No. RDB-09-1929, 2010 WL 1791547, at *1 (D.Md. May 4, 2010). Here, Plaintiffs fail to offer factual allegations of known, widespread conduct by County employees comparable to that allegedly committed by Officer Brooks and Corporal Black. Milligan, 743 F.2d at 230. The complaint does not pair general averments of a policy or custom with particular examples, and Plaintiffs' bare allegations do not suggest that discovery could provide any evidence of "deliberate indifference" on the part of the County. See Farmer v. Maryland, No. GJH-14-02584, 2015 WL 3560011, at *6 (D.Md. June 4, 2015). Even if County officers violated Plaintiffs' constitutional rights, these violations alone do not permit an inference of municipal culpability, which only attaches if Plaintiffs adequately plead a policy or custom. See Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty., Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 406 (1997). Instead, Plaintiffs' complaint "consists of speculative, legal conclusions couched as factual allegations; not facts supporting a plausible claim." Lewis v. Simms, No. AW-11-CV-2172, 2012 WL 254024, at *5 (D.Md. Jan. 26, 2012), aff'd, 582 F.App'x 180 (4^th Cir. 2014).

Defendants' partial motion to dismiss will be granted, and Plaintiffs' § 1983 claims against the County will be dismissed.

B. Section 1983 Claims Against Officer Brooks and Corporal Black

Plaintiffs sue Officer Brooks and Corporal Black in their official capacities as police officers. (ECF No. 24 ¶¶ 4; 5). Defendants argue that "Plaintiffs' claims against Officer Brooks and Corporal Black in their official capacities are the same as their claims against the County and, therefore, are redundant." (ECF No. 26, at 2). A suit against Officer Brooks and Corporal Black in their official capacities is functionally equivalent to a suit against the municipality because it "is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official's office." Will v. Mich. Dep't State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (citing Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471 (1985)); see Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985). The police officers "can be held liable in their official capacities only if the execution of a policy or custom inflicts the injury on [Plaintiffs]." Flanagan v. Anne Arundel Cnty., 593 F.Supp.2d 803, 809 (D.Md. 2009). Accordingly, because Plaintiffs have failed to state a plausible Monell claim alleging that a policy or custom of the County caused the deprivation of Plaintiffs' rights, Plaintiffs have similarly failed to state a claim under § 1983 against Officer Brooks and Corporal Black in their official capacities. To the extent that the complaint includes claims against Officer Brooks and Corporal Black in their official capacities, those claims will be dismissed.

Defendants do not move for the dismissal of Plaintiffs' § 1983 claims against Officer Brooks and Corporal Black in their individual or personal capacities. Accordingly, those causes of action and Plaintiffs' state law claims remain.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' partial motion to dismiss will be granted. A separate order will follow.

/s/_________

DEBORAH K. CHASANOW

United States District Judge

ORDER

For the reasons stated in the foregoing Memorandum Opinion, it is this ___ day of December, 2015, by the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, ORDERED that:

1. The partial motion to dismiss filed by Defendants Prince George's County, Maryland, Prince George's County Police Officer Tonya Brooks, and Prince George's County Police Corporal Clarence Black (ECF No. 26) BE, and the same hereby IS, GRANTED;

2. Claims brought by Plaintiffs Sonia Ulloa and Maria Blanco in Counts Five, Seven, and Eleven of the amended complaint and against Officer Brooks and Corporal Black in their official capacities (ECF No. 24) BE, and the same hereby ARE, DISMISSED; and

3. The clerk will transmit copies of the memorandum opinion and this order to counsel for the parties.

/s/_________

DEBORAH K. CHASANOW

United States District Judge G:\Drafts for DKC\15-0257 Ulloa & Blanco v. PG County - MTD v3.docx 12/4/15 Judge, This draft opinion grants Defendants' partial motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' complaint. I have incorporated your edits and added a footnote on page two noting that "Plaintiffs' amended complaint identifies Police Officer Tonya Brooks as a defendant, but subsequent briefing by the parties identifies her as Police Officer Tanya Brooks." Please find the complaint and relevant briefing attached. Regarding Plaintiffs' remaining § 1983 claims against the police officers in their individual capacities, I want to raise an issue that the court may notice sua sponte for lack of subject matter jurisdiction: Plaintiffs make only the bare assertion that the police officers acted within the scope of their employment with the County. (ECF No. 24 ¶¶ 10; 12; 13). The "under color of state law" requirement is synonymous with state action. Philips v. Pitt Cnty. Mem. Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4^th Cir. 2009). Acts of police officers "in the ambit of their personal, private pursuits fall outside of 42 U.S.C. § 1983." Revene v. Charles Cnty. Comm'rs, 882 F.2d 870, 872 (4^th Cir. 1989). Here, the County does not argue for dismissal on the ground that the police officers' actions amounted to private conduct unattributable to the municipality. Accordingly, I think this issue should remain for discovery and summary judgment. But see Morales v. Richardson, 841 F.Supp.2d 908, 913-14 (D.Md. 2012), aff'd, 475 F.App'x 894 (4^th Cir. 2012) ("The [plaintiffs'] statements amount to a mere 'formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action' and do not state a § 1983 claim plausible on its face. [Plaintiff's] § 1983 claims are therefore dismissed."). Cases are here: G:\lawclk1\Andrew Bank\15-0257 -- Ulloa & Blanco v. PG County\Cases Thanks,
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