Uhlenbrock v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue (In re Estate of Duttenhofer)

20 Citing cases

  1. Boyle v. United States

    710 F.2d 1251 (7th Cir. 1983)   Cited 9 times

    However, our reading of the cases reveals only three circuits that have unequivocally adopted a per se rule that reliance on counsel is not "reasonable cause" within the meaning of 26 U.S.C. § 6651(a)(1), see Ferrando v. United States, 245 F.2d 582 (9th Cir. 1957); Millette Assoc. Inc. v. Commissioner, 594 F.2d 121 (5th Cir.), cert. den. 444 U.S. 899, 100 S.Ct. 207, 62 L.Ed.2d 135 (1979); Estate of Lillehei v. Commissioner, 638 F.2d 65 (8th Cir. 1981). There are other circuits which have found that reliance on counsel was not "reasonable cause," but the determination was based on the facts of the case, and not on the application of the per se rule advocated by the government, see e.g. Estate of Duttenhofer v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 200 aff'd per curiam, 410 F.2d 302 (6th Cir. 1969); Estate of Lammerts v. Commissioner, 456 F.2d 681 (2nd Cir. 1972). The government argues that the Rohrabaugh decision is bad law because it encourages executors to remain ignorant of the filing deadline and because:

  2. Estate of Melville v. Commissioner

    66 T.C.M. 1076 (U.S.T.C. 1993)

    Whether petitioner has sufficiently shown reasonable cause and no willful neglect is a question of fact to be decided on the entire record. Estate of Duttenhofer v. Commissioner [Dec. 28,699], 49 T.C. 200, 204 (1967), affd. [69-1 USTC ¶ 12,600] 410 F.2d 302 (6th Cir. 1969). Petitioner first contends that it reasonably relied on the advice of its attorney not to timely file its return.

  3. DiRezza v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue (In re Estate of DiRezza)

    78 T.C. 19 (U.S.T.C. 1982)   Cited 18 times
    Reviewing relevant legislative history

    Whether reasonable cause exists is, of course, primarily a question of fact to be determined from all of the facts and circumstances in a particular case. Estate of Duttenhofer v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 200, 204 (1967), affd. per curiam 410 F.2d 302 (6th Cir. 1969). DiRezza contends that reasonable cause exists in this case because he did not specifically know of the requirement to file a Federal estate tax return and relied on Fielding to file all necessary tax returns in a timely fashion.

  4. Wright v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue (In re Estate of Rapelje)

    73 T.C. 82 (U.S.T.C. 1979)   Cited 15 times

    Where a taxpayer is advised by a professional tax consultant that no return is required, he is generally held to have exercised ordinary business care and prudence in relying on that advice. Commissioner v. American Ass'n of Engineers Employment, Inc., 204 F.2d 19 (7th Cir. 1953); Hatfried, Inc. v. Commissioner, 162 F.2d 628 (3d Cir. 1947); Estate of Christ v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 493 (1970), affd. 480 F.2d 171 (9th Cir. 1973); Estate of Lammerts v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 420, 446 (1970), affd. per curiam on this issue 456 F.2d 681 (2d Cir. 1972); Estate of Duttenhofer v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 200, 205-206 (1967), affd. per curiam 410 F.2d 302 (6th Cir. 1969). The same conclusion has been reached in situations involving complicated areas of tax law where the taxpayer, who could not reasonably be expected to know whether a tax return is required, provided the adviser with all the necessary information and directed him to file the appropriate returns.

  5. Leigh v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue

    72 T.C. 1105 (U.S.T.C. 1979)   Cited 8 times

    Miller v. United States, 211 F.Supp 758 (D. Wyo. 1962); In Re Fisk's Estate, 203 F.2d 358 (6th Cir. 1953); Clum v. United States, 424 F.Supp 2 (S.D. Ohio 1976). See, however, Estate of Duttenhofer v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 200 (1967), affd. per curiam 410 F.2d 302 (6th Cir. 1969), wherein this Court held that where the executors of an estate had reason to know that an estate tax return was required, reliance upon an attorney to file the return did not constitute reasonable cause under section 6651 for failure to file a timely return. Additionally, assuming that the standard under sec. 6651 is controlling, the cases cited by petitioner are contrary to the Ninth Circuit's decision in Ferrando v. United States, 245 F.2d 582 (9th Cir. 1957).

  6. Savarese v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue (In re Estate of DiPalma)

    71 T.C. 324 (U.S.T.C. 1978)   Cited 7 times
    In Estate of DiPalma v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 324, 327 (1978), the attorney for the estate led the executrix to believe that pending litigation justified delaying the filing of the estate tax return.

    In any event, they do no more than set forth a general rule (see Latham Park Manor, Inc. v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 199, 219 (1977)), and do not abrogate the principle that whether the failure to file on time was due to reasonable cause is primarily a question of fact to be determined from all of the circumstances in a particular case. Estate of Duttenhofer v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 200, 204 (1967), affd. per curiam 410 F.2d 302 (6th Cir. 1969); Latham Park Manor, Inc. v. Commissioner, supra; Estate of Geraci v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1973-94, affd. per curiam 502 F.2d 1148 (6th Cir. 1974). Under these circumstances, a review of the numerous decisions on the issue “pro and contra (is) of little help.”

  7. United States v. Boyle

    469 U.S. 241 (1985)   Cited 997 times   24 Legal Analyses
    Holding that a client could be penalized for counsel's tardy filing of a tax return

    Although at one point the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that reliance on counsel could constitute reasonable cause, see In re Fisk's Estate, 203 F.2d 358, 360 (1953), the Sixth Circuit appears now to be following those courts that have held that the taxpayer has a nondelegable duty to ascertain the deadline for a return and ensure that the return is filed by that deadline. See Estate of Geraci v. Commissioner, 32 TCM 424, 425 (1973), aff'd, 502 F.2d 1148 (CA6 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 992 (1975); Estate of Duttenhofer v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 200, 205 (1967), aff'd, 410 F.2d 302 (CA6 1969) (per curiam). III

  8. Larkin v. Comm'r

    T.C. Memo. 2020-70 (U.S.T.C. May. 28, 2020)   Cited 1 times

    But as the Larkins acknowledge, this Court has not found that open years constitute a sufficient reason for finding reasonable cause for late filing. Accord Denenburg v. United States, 920 F.2d 301, 306 n.10 (5th Cir. 1991) (stating that an audit of a prior tax year was not sufficient to establish reasonable cause for late filing of a subsequent affected year); see Estate of Duttenhofer v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 200 (1967) (holding that taxpayer did not establish reasonable cause to excuse late filing where there was pending estate litigation that might affect tax liability at issue), aff'd, 410 F.2d 302 (6th Cir. 1969); Namakian v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2018-200, at *12 ("the pendency of litigation, even where the decision for an earlier year may affect the determination of a taxpayer's liability for a later year, is not reasonable cause for failure to timely file"). We hold that the Larkins did not have reasonable cause for the untimely filing of their returns, and we sustain respondent's determination that they are liable for additions to tax under section 6651(a)(1) for 2008, 2009, and 2010.

  9. Ozimkoski v. Comm'r

    T.C. Memo. 2016-228 (U.S.T.C. Dec. 19, 2016)   1 Legal Analyses

    While the Court is sympathetic to petitioner's situation, it has held that litigation is not reasonable cause for untimely filing a Federal income tax return. See Estate of Duttenhofer v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 200 (1967), aff'd, 410 F.2d 302 (6th Cir. 1969); Dunne v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2008-63. Therefore, the Court finds that petitioner is liable for the addition to tax under section 6651(a)(1).

  10. AJAH v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE

    No. 18458-08S (U.S.T.C. Jul. 8, 2010)

    United States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241, 243 (1985). "Reasonable cause as applied in section 6651 has been defined as the `exercise of ordinary business care and prudence.'"Estate of Duttenhofer v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 200, 204 (1967) (quoting Se. Fin. Co. v. Commissioner, 153 F.2d 205, 205 (5th Cir. 1946), affg. 4 T.C. 1069 (1945)), affd. 410 F. 2d 302 (6th Cir. 1969); see also sec. 301.6651-1(c)(1), Proced.