Opinion
10-19-00470-CV
04-27-2022
ANTONIO ASCENCIO UGARTE, Appellant v. AMY HATHCOCK, KEITH A. BUTLER, AND JEANNIE BURTON, Appellees
From the 378th District Court Ellis County, Texas Trial Court No. 101, 521
Before Chief Justice Gray, Justice Johnson, and Justice Smith
MEMORANDUM OPINION
MATT JOHNSON, JUSTICE
Appellant Antonio Ascencio Ugarte appeals the trial court's denial of his request for a temporary injunction. We granted a stay of the order denying the injunction and denied Appellee Jeannie Burton's motion to reconsider. We will affirm.
Background
Keith Butler and Janet Butler bought a home in 1997 (the Property). The Butlers secured a promissory note for $10,000 payable to Keith's mother, Jeannie Burton, secured by a deed of trust. The deed of trust and note were filed of record.
Keith and Janet divorced in October 2002. As part of the divorce settlement, Janet conveyed her undivided fifty percent interest in the Property to Keith. Burton released Janet from liability on the $10,000 note. Keith then married Amy Hancock, but they divorced in 2007. After Keith and Amy's divorce was finalized, Keith conveyed the Property to Amy by special warranty gift deed. The deed did not reserve or except Burton's $10,000 note or lien.
Amy sold the Property to Ugarte in November 2018. The general warranty deed did not reserve or except the $10,000 note or lien to Burton. The title company did not discover Burton's lien. Ugarte then invested $65,000 in the Property. When Burton found out about the sale, she made demand on Keith on the $10,000 note and sent courtesy copies to Amy and Ugarte. Burton then posted the Property for a substitute trustee's sale.
Ugarte filed suit for declaratory and injunctive relief to enjoin the substitute trustee's sale and asserted claims against Keith and Amy for breach of implied warranty. Ugarte also asserted a claim of statutory fraud against Amy. The trial court granted a temporary restraining order but denied Ugarte's request for a temporary injunction after a hearing. The basis for the trial court's ruling was that Ugarte did not demonstrate an irreparable injury or no adequate remedy at law. The record does not contain findings of fact and conclusions of law or a request for the same.
Only Appellee Jeannie Burton has filed a brief in opposition to Ugarte's appeal.
Issues
Ugarte asserts the following issues:
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying Ugarte a temporary injunction to restrain the foreclosure of the Burton lien because a bona fide dispute existed whether: (1) the lien was barred by the four year statute of limitations, or (2) the loan was a wedding gift from Jeannie Burton to Keith and Janet Butler?
2. Did the trial court err in excluding Plaintiff's Exhibit 9?
Issue One
Authority
A trial court's ruling on a request for a temporary injunction is reviewed for a clear abuse of discretion. Henry v. Cox, 520 S.W.3d 28, 33 (Tex. 2017).
We limit the scope of our review to the validity of the order, without reviewing or deciding the underlying merits, and will not disturb the order unless it is so arbitrary that it exceeds the bounds of reasonable discretion. No abuse of discretion exists if some evidence reasonably supports the court's ruling.Id. at 33-34 (footnoted citations and internal quotations omitted).
We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's order, indulging every reasonable inference in its favor. Morgan v. Clements Fluids S. Tex., LTD., 589 S.W.3d 177, 193 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2018, no pet.). Where no findings of fact are entered, the order of the trial court must be upheld on any legal theory supported by the record. See Davis v. Huey, 571 S.W.2d 859, 862 (Tex. 1978).
An applicant seeking injunctive relief must plead and prove three elements: "'(1) a cause of action against the defendant; (2) a probable right to the relief sought; and (3) a probable, imminent, and irreparable injury in the interim.'" State v. Hollins, 620 S.W.3d 400, 405 (Tex. 2020) (quoting Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198, 204 (Tex. 2002)). "'[A]n injury is irreparable if the injured party cannot be adequately compensated in damages or if the damages cannot be measured by any certain pecuniary standard.'" Id. at 410 (quoting Butnaru, 84 S.W.3d at 204).
A trial court cannot issue an injunction when the party seeking relief has a plain and adequate remedy at law. Stewart Beach Condo. Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. Gili N Prop Inv.'s, LLC, 481 S.W.3d 336, 350 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, no pet.). However, a temporary injunction is appropriate to block the foreclosure of real property. Id. (citing Irving Bank & Tr. Co. v. Second Land Corp., 544 S.W.2d 684, 688 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.)). Monetary damages may not adequately compensate a party for the loss of real property if that property is "legally unique or irreplaceable." Danbill Partners, L.P. v. Sandoval, 621 S.W.3d 738, 747 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2020, no pet.) (quoting Burkholder v. Wilkins, 504 S.W.3d 485, 491 (Tex. App.- Corpus Christi[-Edinburg] 2016, no pet.)).
Discussion
As noted, the trial court found that Ugarte did not meet his burden to demonstrate an irreparable injury or no adequate remedy at law. We will assume for purposes of this appeal that Ugarte met his burden to prove the other elements required for issuance of a temporary injunction.
Ugarte argues that he established that foreclosure of the property would result in irreparable injury for which there is no adequate remedy at law because of the unique nature of real estate, citing Lavigne v. Holder, 186 S.W.3d 625 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2006, no pet.). While each piece of real estate is unique, an injunction to forestall foreclosure requires more than just the existence of real property-it requires some evidence regarding the unique nature of the property. See In re Stark, 126 S.W.3d 635, 640 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2004, orig. mandamus). In Lavigne, the property at issue was unique because it contained a business from which Lavigne earned his livelihood. In a similar case, the property could be classified as unique because it was the appellee's residence. See Austin v. Mitchell, No. 05-18-00052-CV, 2018 WL 2949443, at *6 (Tex. App.-Dallas June 13, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.). In other cases, real property was viewed as unique because of its sentimental value. See Stark, 126 S.W.3d at 640; see also Danbill Partners, 621 S.W.3d at 747. On the other hand, commercial real estate is not necessarily unique. See Ginther-Davis Ctr., Ltd. v. Houston Nat. Bank, 600 S.W.2d 856, 865 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.). In the present case, Ugarte failed to present evidence regarding the unique nature of the Property, particularly since he planned to "flip it" rather than use it as his residence or business or because it possessed some sort of sentimental value.
Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the temporary injunction because Ugarte failed to establish that he would suffer an irreparable injury or had an inadequate remedy at law. We overrule Ugarte's first issue. Because our ruling on Ugarte's first issue is dispositive, we need not address the second issue.
Conclusion
Having overruled Ugarte's first issue, we affirm the trial court's order denying Ugarte's request for a temporary injunction and remand the case for further proceedings. The stay previously entered in this case is lifted.
Affirmed.