Opinion
Argued February 5, 1976
February 20, 1976.
Unemployment compensation — Words and phrases — Wilful misconduct — Unemployment Compensation Law, Act 1939, December 5, P.L. (1937) 2897 — Findings of fact — Substantial evidence — Credibility — Weight of evidence — Fighting.
1. An employe discharged for wilful misconduct is ineligible for benefits under the Unemployment Compensation Law, Act 1936, December 5, P.L. (1937) 2897. [432]
2. In an unemployment compensation case findings of fact supported by substantial evidence are binding upon a reviewing court, questions of credibility and evidentiary weight being for the fact finder. [432-3]
3. Wilful misconduct is a wanton or wilful disregard of the employer's interest, a deliberate violation of rules, a disregard of expected behavior standards, or negligence manifesting culpability, wrongful intent, evil design or intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interest or the employe's duties. [433]
4. An employe engaging in a fight on the employer's premises, knowing such conduct is contrary to company policy is guilty of wilful misconduct and is acting in total disregard of the employe's interest even had there been no expressed company policy condemning such conduct. [433]
Argued February 5, 1976, before Judges CRUMLISH, JR., WILKINSON, JR., and MENCER, sitting as a panel of three.
Appeal, No. 909 C.D. 1975, from the Order of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, No. B-125829.
Application to Bureau of Employment Security for unemployment compensation benefits. Benefits denied. Applicant appealed to the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review. Denial affirmed. Applicant appealed to the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania. Held: Affirmed.
James W. Carroll, Jr., with him Michael A. Donadee, for appellant.
Daniel R. Schuckers, Assistant Attorney General, with him Sydney Reuben. Assistant Attorney General, and Robert P. Kane, Attorney General, for appellee.
On February 11, 1975, appellant was employed by Mobil Oil Company as a dispersion operator and group leader. On that day, prior to the time for work to commence, appellant became involved in an altercation with a fellow employee. The parties to this appeal agree, and our review of the record confirms, that it is not clear how the fight began or who struck the first blow. Appellant did testify that he was aware that it was against company policy to fight on the job.
On February 13, 1975, appellant was dismissed for "fighting on the job." The following day, he applied for unemployment compensation benefits. The Bureau of Employment Security denied the benefits. On March 4, 1975, an appeal was taken to the referee who, after a hearing, similarly denied benefits. That decision was appealed to the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review (Board) which affirmed. It is the Board's decision which is now on appeal to this Court.
Section 402(e) of the Unemployment Compensation Law, Act of December 5, 1936, Second Ex. Sess., P.L. (1937) 2897, as amended, 43 P. S. § 802(e), disqualifies any claimant who is discharged due to "willful misconduct connected with his work". Appellant contends the record in the instant case does not contain substantial evidence to support a finding of willful misconduct connected with his work. We cannot agree.
The findings of fact of the Board are binding on this Court if supported by substantial evidence with matters of credibility and weight left to the Board. Progress Manufacturing Co., Inc. v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 406 Pa. 163, 176 A.2d 632 (1962); Winkler v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 19 Pa. Commw. 49, 338 A.2d 770 (1975). The appellant's own testimony supports the finding that he was discharged for fighting on the job in violation of company policy.
Appellant asserts that his conduct falls short of willful misconduct in that it was unintentional and not in substantial disregard of the employer's interest. Willful misconduct is a wanton or willful disregard of the employer's interest, a deliberate violation of rules, a disregard of behavior standards an employer can rightfully expect or negligence such as to manifest culpability, wrongful intent, evil design or intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or the employee's duties and obligations. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review v. Filips, 18 Pa. Commw. 478, 336 A.2d 667 (1975); Millersville State College v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 18 Pa. Commw. 238, 335 A.2d 857 (1975); Lipshutz v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 18 Pa. Commw. 180, 334 A.2d 810 (1975).
Appellant's contention that an employee who engaged in a fight, unsure of whether or not he struck the first blow, on the employer's premises after he has punched in but before the time to begin work, engages in conduct not connected with his work is without merit. Further, participation in a fight with the knowledge that such activity is contrary to company policy is intentional misconduct, substantial misconduct, and in deliberate violation of the employer's rules. Even without a stated policy, this type of conduct is in total disregard of the employer's interest and of the most basic standards of behavior which any employer demands.
Accordingly, we enter the following
ORDER
NOW, February 20, 1976, the order of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, affirming the referee's denial of benefits to Richard M. Vojtas, is affirmed.