He could, of course, have testified as to whether the car was moving rapidly or slowly, but not to fix the rate of speed at so much per hour, without having shown some special knowledge which would enable him to speak as an expert. Mantik's Case [United Rys. Electric Co. of Baltimore v. State to Use of Mantik], 127 Md. [197], 205, 96 A. 261."

No damages shall be awarded as a solace for the grief or mental suffering of relatives of the deceased. Baltimore Ohio R. Co. v. State, to Use of Mahone, 63 Md. 135, 146; United Railways Electric Co. of Baltimore v. State, to Use ofMantik, 127 Md. 197, 205; 96 A. 261. In the case of the children of a person killed by negligence, the jury may estimate the prospective damages up to the time of their marriage or majority.

This Court concludes that neither Ronald nor Howard is entitled to share in any damages awarded in this case, but that the entire award should be made to the widow. The recovery by the widow is governed by the rule frequently reiterated by the Court of Appeals of Maryland, that damages under the Maryland Act may be awarded for pecuniary losses which have already been sustained by the widow and which she will probably suffer in the future as a result of the death of her husband, but that no damages may be awarded as a solace for her grief or mental suffering. State, Use of Bowman v. Wooleyhan Transport Company, 192 Md. 686, 65 A.2d 321 (1949); Baltimore Transit Co. v. State, Use of Castranda, 194 Md. 421, 71 A.2d 442 (1949); United Railways Electric Co. of Baltimore v. State, Use of Mantik, 127 Md. 197, 96 A. 261 (1915); Baltimore Ohio R. Co. v. State, Use of Mahone, 63 Md. 135 (1885). See also State, Use of Gaegler v. Thomas, D.Md., 173 F. Supp. 568 (1959), and Jennings v. United States, D.Md., 178 F. Supp. 516 (1959), vacated and remanded on another point, 4 Cir., 291 F.2d 880 (1961).

No damages shall be awarded as a solace for the grief or mental suffering of relatives of the deceased. Baltimore Ohio R. Co. v. State, to Use of Mahone, 63 Md. 135, 146; United Railways Electric Co. of Baltimore v. State, to Use of Mantik, 127 Md. 197, 205, 96 A. 261. In the case of the children of a person killed by negligence, the jury may estimate the prospective damages up to the time of their marriage or majority.

The trial judge said the testimony of the witness might have been shaken by the answer on which appellant relies, but that he found "that he was an unusually strong witness." We think the court's acceptance of the "clear meaning of his testimony as a whole" was justified and that he was not required to segregate and accept as decisive one isolated answer "which may be supposed to vary from the general idea sought to be conveyed," as was said in U. Rwys. E. Co. of Balto. v. Mantik, 127 Md. 197, 202. Judgment affirmed.

There is no evidence on what side of the bus the emergency brake was, or whether the driver, thrown from his seat toward the "step well", could have reached the emergency brake before the "second accident", or that the brake would have been as effective as the steering wheel if the wheels had not been locked. In United Railways and Electric Co. v. Mantik, 127 Md. 197, 203-204, 96 A. 261, 264, the court said, "By its sixteenth prayer the defendant asked a direction that a verdict be rendered in its favor if the jury found that the collision was caused by the failure of the chauffeur to apply his emergency brake when he first saw the cars approaching. The testimony of the chauffeur was emphatic and undenied to the contrary, and his instant and diligent effort to escape the danger indicates that he was anxious to employ the most practicable means to that end.

The plaintiff, in its brief, states that the only question in controversy is: "Was the Plaintiff's chauffeur, under the facts and circumstances in this case, guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law, because, before crossing the northbound tracks of the Transit Company the Plaintiff's chauffeur did not look the second time". It is well settled that the rights of operators of street cars and automobiles to the use of the streets of a city are equal, and the duties of their operators in reference to the observance of precautions against injuries reciprocal. Rumbley v. Baltimore Transit Co., 194 Md. 164, 69 A.2d 805; United Railways Electric Co. v. Mantik, 127 Md. 197, 96 A. 261. It is also well settled that where the plaintiff in a suit for damages is guilty of contributory negligence the negligence of the defendant becomes immaterial. Girton v. Baltimore Transit Co., 192 Md. 671, 65 A.2d 329; Heying v. United Railways Co., 100 Md. 281, 59 A. 667, 668.

We are not unmindful of the rule that street cars and automobiles have reciprocal rights in the use of the streets in the City of Baltimore, and due care must be exercised by the operator of each vehicle to prevent accidents. United Rwys. Electric Co. of Baltimore v. Mantik, 127 Md. 197, 96 A. 261; Girton v. Baltimore Transit Co., 192 Md. 671, 676, 65 A.2d 329, 331. "But a street car may be so close to the intersection that the driver of an automobile would be rash in attempting the hazard of crossing, and in such a case the court should adjudge him guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law.

The trial judge then granted defendant's motion for judgment n.o.v. Plaintiff has appealed here from that judgment. It is an established rule that the respective rights of the operators of street cars and automobiles to the use of the streets of a city are equal, and their duties in reference to the observance of precautions against injury are reciprocal. United Railways Electric Co. v. Mantik, 127 Md. 197, 96 A. 261. Chief Judge McSherry said of the care required in the operation of street cars: "There is no analogy between a case like this and a case which grows out of an injury inflicted at a crossing over a railroad in the open country, because the rights and reciprocal duties of both the injured and the injuring parties are radically different in the one instance from their rights and their reciprocal duties in the other instance. A street railway company has no exclusive right to the use of a public highway in a city for the movement of its cars, and possesses no greater or superior right to use the street than is enjoyed by any individual, apart from the mere franchise to lay its rails thereon.

While it is true, as pointed out in the case of E.H. Koester Bakery Co. v. Poller, 187 Md. 324, 50 A.2d 234, that the street railway owes its passengers a duty to deliver them to their destination as quickly as possible, consistent with safety, it has been held by this Court in numerous cases that it is the duty of the motorman, when operating a street car on the public streets, to keep a lookout, signal the approach when such warning is reasonably necessary, move at a moderate speed and stop when necessity for stopping becomes apparent. Baltimore Transit Co. v. Worth, supra; Baltimore Transit Co. v. Alexander, 172 Md. 454, 192 A. 349; Washington B. A.R. Co. v. Fingles, 135 Md. 574, 109 A. 431; United Rys. Electric Co. v. Mantik, 127 Md. 197, 96 A. 261. The rule with respect to contributory negligence is that the act relied on to establish, as a matter of law, the existence of contributory negligence must be distinct, prominent and decisive, and one about which ordinary minds would not differ in declaring it to be negligent. Where the nature and attributes of an act relied on to show negligence contributing to an injury sustained can only be determined correctly by considering all the attending and surrounding circumstances of the transaction, it falls within the province of the jury to pass upon and characterize it, and it is not for the court to determine its quality as a matter of law.