Opinion
Civil Action No. 03-5297.
August 13, 2004
MEMORANDUM
The trial of William Penn, in Old Bailey, London in 1670 for disturbing the peace while conducting a Quaker worship service, is most famous because the jury, refusing to return the guilty verdict which the court demanded, was locked up over night. It still refused to yield its independence, eventually finding Penn and his co-defendant, William Mead, not guilty. The court's hostility to Penn is illustrated by an incident at the beginning of the trial and which warrants the reference in this case, which presents a civil rights claim arising out of the refusal of the plaintiff to remove a cap of religious significance when seated in a courtroom.
Judging Penn and Mead were a group of city officials including the mayor and the recorder. Penn and Mead had entered the courtroom without their hats on, but the mayor, who was presiding, ordered a court officer to put the defendants' hats back on their heads. The following occurred:
"Mayor[:] Sirrah, who bid you put off their hats? [P]ut on their hats again."
An officer of the court enforced this order and the men were brought to the bar, hatted.
"Recorder[:] Do you not know there is respect due to the court?
"Penn[:] Yes.
"Recorder[:] Why do you not pay it then?
"Penn[:] I do so.
"Recorder[:] Why do you not pull off your hat then?
"Penn[:] Because I do not believe that to be any respect.
"Recorder[:] Well, the court sets forty marks apiece upon your heads, as a fine for your contempt of the court.
"Penn[:] I desire it might be observed, that we came into the court with our hats off (that is, taken off), and if they have been put on since, it was by order from the bench; and therefore not we, but the bench should be fined."
The story is recounted in IRVING BRANT, THEBILL OF RIGHTS: ITSORIGIN AND MEANING 57 (Bobbs-Merrill 1965). The entire trial transcript is reported within The Peoples Ancient and Just Liberties Asssrted [sic] in the Tryal of William Penn, and William Mead, available at http://tarlton.law.utexas.edu/lpop/etext/penntrial.html. Even though Penn and Mead were acquitted of the substantive offenses against them, they were nonetheless imprisoned for failing to pay the fine of 40 marks levied when they appeared with their hats on in front of judges.
Penn's fine, however, does not compare to the punishment that befell Charles I, King of England (1600-1649), who, while standing trial for treason and high misdemeanors, refused to remove his hat before Parliament. King Charles lost his head.The Trial of Charles I, 1649, available at http://history.hanover.edu/courses/excerpts/212trial.html.
It is generally accepted etiquette to remove an every-day hat when entering a courtroom. However, this is not a case about the etiquette of hats, but about whether an individual has a civil rights claim for actions taken against him by a deputy sheriff when Plaintiff was wearing a head covering with religious significance in a public courtroom.
The "tipping" or removal of a hat is said to have originated from the same place as the military salute. Knights would lift the visor (face guard) on their helm, showing their face as a sign of respect and their empty hand as an indication they meant no harm. This tradition evolved into the modern military salute. Similarly, the removal of a helm (helmet) or other headgear indoors and as a sign of respect or reverence is said to have originated before the Dark Ages. This tradition was carried on throughout the centuries by men of arms (soldiers) and nobility, as well as their staff, servants and slaves. After the Dark Ages, manners and etiquette grew to become an essential part of everyday life and the conventions of hat etiquette became ingrained in civilized culture. See http://www.askandyaboutclothes.com/Clothes%20Articles/ etiquette_for_hats_and_caps.htm. The Court thanks Ms. Judith Ambler of the Third Circuit Library for her assistance and research.
Kenneth Tyson ("Plaintiff") has filed a six-count Complaint against Sheriff's Deputy Anthony Damore ("Defendant"). Count One alleges false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Count Two alleges Denial of Equal Protection under the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Count Three alleges an unlawful search under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Counts Four through Six respectively allege state tort claims of malicious prosecution, false arrest and false imprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Presently before this Court is Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. (Docket No. 9.) Oral argument was held on June 17, 2004. For the reasons set forth below, the Motion will be denied in part and granted in part.
I. Background
A. Facts as Recounted by Plaintiff
On January 22, 2003, Plaintiff was seated in the public section of a courtroom of the Berks County Court of Common Pleas, where Judge Linda Ludgate was presiding. Plaintiff was a scheduled witness in a court case involving Plaintiff's niece. (Compl. ¶ 6; Pl.'s Dep., Pl.'s Ex. A, at 36.) Plaintiff, as a practicing Muslim, then wore a kufi on his head. As to his interaction with Defendant, Plaintiff testified as follows:
Well, I went into the courtroom. I was going to meet my niece there. She was out on bail then, January 22nd. And I went — she wasn't there yet and I was going to see the DA. I was going to talk to the DA because I was told to go talk to him and, when I went through the door, I looked to see if my niece was there first. She wasn't there yet. And then — so I was going to come back out.
I never even got a chance to sit down. But as I was looking, Deputy Damore came to me and said: Remove that from your head. And then I said: Excuse me? He said: remove that from your head. I said: I'll explain to you outside in the vestibule.
So I stepped outside in the vestibule — the doors were closed — out of the courtroom. And I said to him, I said: I wear this for religious reasons and I'm required to wear this and this is my right, religious right, to wear this. And then he said: Well, not in my courtroom. He said: Not in my courtroom. And then he said: Take it off. I said: Well, I'm not in the courtroom no more. I'm leaving. You know, because I found out — the social worker came in the hallway then, the vestibule, and she said [my niece's legal matter] had been continued.
And then he said, you're going to take that off in this building then, in this building. And I said: I'm not taking it off. He said: Well, turn around. I turned around. And he said: I'm putting you under arrest. And I said: What for? He handcuffed me to my back and he never to [sic] took me back in the courtroom. He took me down in the public elevator, took me downstairs.
I had these same pants on and I had this jacket on and this kufi on. And he said: Got anything in your pockets? I emptied my pockets of the money in there, keys. And then he said: Turn around. And he started frisking me, right? Then he said: Take off your jacket. I took off my jacket. I had two shirts on, a sweater and shirt on. I took that off, right?
Then the other sheriffs — before he took me in the holding cell he had me in the hallway — and two other sheriffs came out and said: What's the problem? And one sheriff, I know her by Linda. I know her by Linda because I go in the courthouse a lot and pay fines. And she knows — she came over and she said: What's the problem, Kenneth? I said: He's arresting me for not taking off my kufi. And she said: Well, you can wear that. And then he yelled at her saying that — do you want to do this? You know what I mean? I got this — like that. And she said: Excuse me. And she said: Don't worry, Kenneth. Everything will be all right.
Then he said: Are you going to take that off? And I said: No. I"m not taking it off still. So he went back in a room, kept me in handcuffs, another sheriff there was watching. And he came back and said: What's your Social Security number? And I told him my Social Security number. And he went in there, on the computer and he came back and he said: Well, you're going to Berks County Prison. You've got a warrant for your arrest. I said: A warrant for my arrest? I said: I don't have no warrant for my arrest. And then he took me, put me in a van, and he took me to a District Justice office.
When I got to the District Justice office, the District Justice, he looked at me and said: Kenneth, what are you doing here? I said: He said I have a warrant. He said: Oh, that was old. That's '95. That's taken care of. You got time served for that. And then he let me go. He said: What does he have you in handcuffs for anyway? I said: Because of my hat. He said: Really? And there was [sic] two other police officers there and they was [sic] laughing, you know what I mean, but he had left already. And then he released me and then I went to work. I got to work by eleven o'clock and told my supervisor what happened.
There is no dispute but that Plaintiff's religious practices are sincere, genuine and authentic. Plaintiff testified extensively about his adherence to the tenets of his religion, Islam. (Pl.'s Dep., Pl.'s Ex. A, at 93-101.) Most relevant for purposes of the pending Motion, Plaintiff testified that practicing Muslims cover their heads with kufis in order to emulate the prophet Muhammed, and that practicing Muslims remove their kufis only while sleeping or conducting their ablutions. (Id. at 93-95.) Plaintiff also testified that, according to his religion, he would have shirked his responsibilities as a practicing Muslim had he obeyed the order of a non-Muslim (i.e., Defendant) to remove his kufi. (Id. at 100.)
For ease of reading, the Court has divided Plaintiff's deposition transcript into separate paragraphs. The content, except where marked, is unchanged.
(Pl.'s Dep., Pl.'s Ex. A, at 36-39.)
Plaintiff thereafter received a notice informing him that he was to appear for a hearing regarding his disorderly conduct citation. When Plaintiff later appeared for the hearing, he was informed by Defendant that the charges had just been withdrawn. (Id. at 80-81.) Plaintiff asked Defendant why he had been cited in the first place, Defendant allegedly explained that "he was having a bad day [on January 22, 2003]." (Id. at 81.)
B. Defendant's Version
While Defendant agrees that the basic events took place (e.g., conversations with Plaintiff inside and outside the courtroom), Defendant strongly disagrees with Plaintiff's characterization of the events. Defendant recounted the events of January 22, 2003 in an affidavit, which the Court quotes at length:
I am a Deputy Sheriff for the County of Berks, assigned to Courtroom security at the Berks County Courthouse.
On January 22, 2003, I was assigned to the security for the Courtroom of the Honorable Linda Ludgate, of the Berks County Court of Common Pleas in Courtroom 7-A.
Judge Linda Ludgate has strict rules as to the operation of her courtroom including assuring that order is maintained, that proceedings not be disrupted and prohibits hats in the courtroom.
On October 19, 1999 Judge Ludgate was severely assaulted by an individual who was being sentenced and I understand Judge Ludgate to be particularly sensitive to security and compliance with her courtroom directives.
I have been made aware of Judge Ludgate's directives and I believe that it is my duty to ensure that attorneys and the general public comply with the directives.
Judge Linda Ludgate maintains two signs, one in English and one in Spanish, which specify some of her directives that the Sheriff's office charged with enforcing.
The signs . . . were in place outside courtroom 7-A while court was in session on January 22, 2003.
On January 22, 2003 I saw Kenneth Tyson enter the courtroom while court was in session, wearing what appeared to be a knit cap.
I approached Mr. Tyson to advise that the hat must be removed while in the courtroom and he immediately became loud and yelled that his constitutional rights are being violated.
I asked Mr. Tyson to step outside the courtroom because I was concerned that his loud demeanor would disrupt the proceedings in front of Judge Ludgate.
While in the vestibule outside the courtroom, the Plaintiff continued to yell that his constitutional rights were being violated.
Mr. Tyson continued to be loud after he had been warned about his tone in the vestibule and advised that he would be taken into custody for disorderly conduct.
I then placed Mr. Tyson into handcuffs and escorted him [through public elevators] to the courthouse cell block in the basement of the courthouse.
In the cell block area, the Plaintiff was seated in a chair in the prisoner processing area and his name was given to Deputy Sheriff Doris Natal to run an electronic check for outstanding warrants on Scofflaw, CLEAN and NCIC.
After we determined that the Plaintiff had an outstanding warrant his belongings were collected including his belt and shoelaces.
The outstanding warrant was issued out of Reading District Court 23-1-02, District Justice Michael J. Leonardziak, in Reading, Pennsylvania.
I issued a citation to Mr. Tyson for Disorderly Conduct 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5503(a)(2) for making loud and unreasonable noise in the courtroom and vestibule.
Defendant has taken photographs of these signs, and has attached copies to his affidavit.
Defendant has attached a copy of this citation to his affidavit.
(Def.'s Aff., Def.'s Ex. B, ¶¶ 1-19.)
Plaintiff was subsequently scheduled for a hearing on the disorderly conduct charge and had requested that a subpoena be issued for Judge Linda Ludgate to testify as a witness. (Def.'s Statement of Undisputed Facts, Docket No. 14, ¶ 17.) On the morning of the scheduled hearing, Defendant withdrew the disorderly conduct citation. (Id. ¶ 18.)
II. Jurisdiction and Legal Standard
This Court has jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides, in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. . . .42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2003). "The purpose of Section 1983 is to provide a civil cause of action to protect persons against the misuse of power possessed by virtue of state law and made possible because the defendant was cloaked with the authority of the state." Douris v. Dougherty, 192 F. Supp. 2d 358, 363 (E.D. Pa. 2002). Venue is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). An issue is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986). A factual dispute is "material" if it might affect the outcome of the case under governing law. Id.
A party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility for informing the district court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record that it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986). Where the non-moving party bears the burden of proof on a particular issue at trial, the moving party's initial burden can be met simply by "pointing out to the district court that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case." Id. at 325. After the moving party has met its initial burden, "the adverse party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e). Summary judgment is appropriate if the non-moving party fails to rebut by making a factual showing "sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. Under Rule 56, the Court must view the evidence presented on the motion in the light most favorable to the opposing party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.
III. Discussion
The thrust of Defendant's Motion is that security measures warranted the actions that were taken in this case. Defendant recites a violent attack several years ago on Judge Ludgate, as well as general concerns over the security of judicial officers in courts. (Def.'s Aff., Def.'s Ex. B., ¶ 4; Holly Herman,Ludgate Empathizes with Beating Victim, READING EAGLE, Feb. 24, 2004, at A2, Def.'s Ex. E.) This is indeed a serious topic on which courts must have discretion to protect judges and other court officers. However, the record is sparse on details about security in the Berks County Courthouse. For example, there is no definitive evidence, one way or the other, as to whether magnetometers were in use in the Berks County Courthouse on the day in question, or ever. There is also no evidence as to whether members of the public going to a courtroom went through any other kind of screening device or security measures to check for hidden weapons or contraband
The record shows that there is a sign outside the courtroom that says, inter alia, "no hats". However, there is no evidence as to whether there was, or could be, a procedure in effect in the Berks County Courthouse so that individuals who wanted to enter a courtroom, but were wearing a head covering of religious significance, would briefly remove the head covering before entering the courtroom so that an examination could be made to ensure that no weapon or other contraband was concealed.See Spanks-El v. Finley, No. 85-C-9259, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3374 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 23, 1987) (discussed below). It is certainly possible for individuals to conceal a weapon under a hat, even a head covering with religious significance, such as the kufi, which the Plaintiff in this case wore on the day in question.
Against this background of security concerns, raised by Defendant, but unsupported in the record, Plaintiff claims that he was wearing the kufi for religious reasons and he asserts that the Defendant's actions violated his civil rights. Although Plaintiff does not make a specific First Amendment claim that Defendant denied his right to exercise his religion by his wearing of the kufi, Plaintiff does assert that the actions taken against him had religious discriminatory motivations.
The Court must decide this motion on the evidence presented. There is not sufficient evidence in this record to find that security concerns alone warranted the falling dominoes in this case, i.e., Defendant demanding Plaintiff to remove his kufi, which demand led to Plaintiff leaving the courtroom, which led to his arrest, which led to this lawsuit. There is no showing of any reason why, once security concerns are satisfied, an individual may not wear a hat of religious significance in a courtroom. Accepted standards of courtroom etiquette do not necessarily prevail over an individual's exercise of his religion, if the latter does not impact courtroom security or interfere in courtroom procedures.
Defendant moves for summary judgment on several grounds. First, Defendant argues that he is entitled to absolute judicial immunity from suit. Second, in the alternative, Defendant contends that he is entitled to qualified immunity. Third, Defendant claims that Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claims should be dismissed on summary judgment as a matter of law. Fourth, Defendant argues that Plaintiff's Equal Protection claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 can be dismissed on summary judgment. Fifth, Defendant contends that he is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's state law claims.
The Court discusses these arguments seriatim.
A. Absolute Judicial Immunity
Defendant first seeks summary judgment on the ground that he is entitled to absolute judicial immunity. "The proponent of a claim to absolute immunity bears the burden of establishing the justification for such immunity." Antoine v. Byers Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 432, 113 S. Ct. 2167, 2169, 124 L. Ed. 2d 391 (1993). Judicial defendants (typically judges, but not always) are insulated from lawsuits under judicial immunity because of the belief that the public is best served by an independent judiciary, free from fear of vexatious and harassing litigation.
The question before this Court is whether and to what extent judicial immunity applies to a Sheriff's Deputy. "[A] sheriff is only covered by judicial immunity when the action is under direct judicial supervision." Snyder v. Fleming, 102 F. Supp. 2d 592, 596 (M.D. Pa. 2000); see also Hamilton v. Leavy, 322 F.3d 776, 782-83 (3d Cir. 2003) ("[A]ction taken pursuant to a facially valid court order receives absolute immunity from § 1983 lawsuits for damages."). While the issue whether a defendant is entitled to absolute immunity is a question of law, e.g., In re Montgomery County, 215 F.3d 367, 372 (3d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1126, 121 S. Ct. 881, 148 L. Ed. 2d 790 (2001), because of factual uncertainties, whether Defendant acted pursuant to a court directive cannot readily be determined in this case.
During oral argument, Defendant admitted that there was no evidence in the record that Judge Ludgate was actively and directly involved in Plaintiff's removal from her courtroom. Therefore, as the record currently has been developed, the Court cannot conclude as a matter of law that Judge Ludgate — whether verbally or through gesture — specifically directed either Plaintiff to remove his kufi or Defendant to remove Plaintiff if non-compliant.
While Defendant admits that the record does not demonstrate an immediate order from Judge Ludgate dictating Plaintiff's removal, Defendant argues that the evidence indicates an outstanding court directive that compelled Plaintiff's ouster. Defendant has submitted photographs of an easel and posterboard outside Judge Ludgate's courtroom; the posterboard admonishes entrants that certain items are forbidden (e.g., hats, food, and children). (Photograph, Def.'s Ex. B.) Even though Plaintiff testified that "kufi" means "hat" in English (Pl.'s Dep., Pl.'s Ex. A, at 32), Plaintiff denies that his kufi is a regular, routine hat, such as a baseball cap (Id. at 96), and there is no specific evidence in the record that the phrase "no hats" necessarily encompassed a head covering of religious significance, such as kufis, as Plaintiff also testified that he had worn the headgear in Judge Ludgate's courtroom other times without incident (Id. at 30-33, 99). Defendant presents no evidence of custom or usage in this regard. Therefore, even if this Court were to assume that the posted sign reflected Judge Ludgate's standing order to deputies regarding courtroom decorum, the Court cannot conclude as a matter of law that Judge Ludgate's "order" encompassed a head covering of religious significance such as Plaintiff's kufi. There is no evidence that the actions taken by Defendant were contemplated, endorsed, or anticipated by Judge Ludgate. On the present record, the Court hesitates to bestow judicial immunity upon Defendant where the parameters of Judge Ludgate's "order" are factually unclear, especially considering that "[o]fficials who exceed the scope of the order given them are not immunized for conduct outside of the order." Grimm v. County of DuPage, No. 92-C-3726, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 5, 1993).
In his papers, Plaintiff focuses less on whether Defendant acted pursuant to court directive and more on whether Defendant's conduct was sufficiently judicial in nature to warrant judicial immunity. (Pl.'s Br. at 4-6.) "Quasi-judicial absolute immunity attaches when a public official's role is `functionally comparable' to that of a judge. To determine this, a court must consider whether the official acted independently and what procedural safeguards attended his/her decision-making process."Hamilton, 322 F.3d at 785 (citation omitted).
Plaintiff cites cases for his proposition that the enforcement of "court" security is not sufficiently related to the judicial process to insulate Defendant from suit. The Court is not convinced by Plaintiff's citations, as those cases can be distinguished from the facts at hand Plaintiff first citesHuminski v. Rutland County Sheriff's Department, 211 F. Supp. 2d 520 (D. Vt. 2002). In that case, Huminski had sued state judicial officers, a state court clerk, a county sheriff's department, and a county sheriff for violating his rights by causing him to be served with criminal trespass notices prohibiting him from entering all state court facilities or grounds. Id. at 523. The plaintiff had received the notices shortly after he displayed protest signs, critical of a presiding Vermont District Court judge, in a state-owned public parking lot adjacent to the courthouse. Id. The defendants were not entitled to judicial immunity inHuminski because "providing security at a courthouse building is the sort of routine policing activity that takes place at numerous public facilities and government offices; security activities do not resemble an adjudicative or other traditional function of a court or judge." Id. at 534. However, the court drew a distinction between effecting safety generally at a courthouse and ensuring courtroom decorum. The court inHuminski noted the "general rule that judges act in a judicial capacity whenever they order the removal of persons from their courtroom who disrupt or otherwise negatively impact the judicial process." Id. In this case, Defendant detained Plaintiff not as Plaintiff attempted to enter the courthouse or courtroom itself, but because Plaintiff allegedly disrupted the judicial process in Judge Ludgate's courtroom. Huminski therefore can be factually distinguished from this case.
Plaintiff also cites Grimm, supra, for his premise that "providing routine security at the courthouse entrance is not so closely associated with the actual process of adjudication that it warrants extending judicial immunity to the deputies." 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16, at *14. However, like Huminski above, the court in Grimm distinguished between providing general security at the courthouse and inside the courtroom, remarking that judicial immunity is generally available where courtroom discipline is meted out "to ensure the orderly administration of justice and [to] regulate the conduct of persons in [the] courtroom. . . ." Id. at *12-13. The interchange between the parties in the vestibule outside the courtroom still possibly concerned the preservation of courtroom discipline, as Defendant testified that their voices likely carried back into the courtroom, potentially disrupting the proceedings. (Def.'s Aff., Def.'s Ex. B, ¶¶ 11-13.)
Although the Court finds this case distinguishable fromHuminski and Grimm, the Court concludes that while ensuring courtroom decorum generally is considered a judicial act, the factual dispute of what happened outside the courtroom cannot, as a matter of law, immunize Defendant from this litigation.
Cf. Gregory v. Thompson, 500 F.2d 59 (9th Cir. 1974) (holding that a justice of the peace was not entitled to judicial immunity after he forced an observer out of the courtroom, threw him to the floor, jumped on him, and started beating him, all in the interest of preserving courtroom decorum).
It does not appear that Plaintiff claims damages for merely being asked to step outside the courtroom. However, assuming Defendant would be judicially immune in just asking Plaintiff to leave the courtroom, given the factually disparate versions of what happened after Plaintiff's removal from the courtroom, as detailed above, the Court concludes that it cannot grant summary judgment to Defendant on grounds of judicial immunity at this time.
B. Qualified Immunity
Defendant next asserts that he is entitled to qualified immunity against all of Plaintiff's charges. The Court's analysis in this situation follows the two-step framework established inSaucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 121 S. Ct. 2151, 150 L. Ed. 2d 272 (2001). As a threshold matter, a reviewing court must consider whether the facts alleged — when viewed favorably toward Plaintiff — demonstrate that Defendant violated a constitutional right. 533 U.S. at 201. If a constitutional violation could have occurred under the facts alleged, the court then must resolve whether that constitutional right supposedly violated is "clearly established." Id. In order to qualify as a "clearly established" right, the constitutional right must be articulated with enough particularity and specificity such that "it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted." Id. Whether the constitutional right is "clearly established" and whether the officer acted unreasonably given the factual situation are objective inquiries, to be decided by the Court as a matter of law. See, e.g., Doe v. Groody, 361 F.3d 232, 238 (3d Cir. 2004).
When the facts of the case are viewed most favorably toward the harmed party, Defendant approached Plaintiff in the courtroom and twice demanded, "Remove that from your head." (Pl.'s Dep., Pl.'s Ex. A, at 36.) Plaintiff responded, "I'll explain to you outside in the vestibule." (Id. at 37.) Plaintiff and Defendant then left the courtroom for the anteroom, at Plaintiff's suggestion, where Plaintiff explained, "I wear this for religious reasons and I'm required to wear this and this is my right, religious right, to wear this." (Id.) According to Plaintiff, Defendant belligerently and persistently badgered Plaintiff to remove his kufi despite Plaintiff's calmed, rational efforts to convey the religious significance of his headgear.
The Court has reviewed a number of decisions adjudicating civil rights suits arising out of an individual being required or requested to remove clothing with religious significance in a courtroom. It does not appear that the United States Supreme Court or the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has dealt with the issue presently before the Court. Although the cases discussing this issue are few in number, the holdings are consistent, like the ongoing leitmotif of an opera, and do not support Defendant's claim of qualified immunity. Instead, the cases hold that once a court's reasonable needs for security and decorum are met, an individual who holds sincere religious beliefs cannot be precluded from wearing a head covering with religious significance in a courtroom.
There are many reported cases on the propriety of prison regulations restricting the wearing of hats. Chief Judge Lord of this Court granted an injunction against broad regulations prohibiting the wearing of hats in a prison setting. St. Claire v. Cuyler, 481 F. Supp. 732 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (granting an injunction against certain regulations that prohibited the wearing of most hats, including kufis, in prison). The Third Circuit overruled that decision, finding that the challenged regulations were justified by considerations of security, and that the plaintiff had failed to prove by substantial evidence that the security concerns were unreasonable or exaggerated. St. Clare v. Cuyler, 634 F.2d 109, 116 (3d Cir. 1980). In Muslim v. Frame, 897 F. Supp. 215 (E.D. Pa. 1995), a plaintiff-prisoner claimed that headgear restrictions violated his constitutional rights because they restricted him from wearing his kufi. Judge Pollak granted summary judgment on grounds of qualified immunity as to damages, but allowed the plaintiff to reinstate his claim for injunctive relief. Id. In Lloyd-El v. Meyer, No. 87-C-9349, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1911 (N.D. Ill. 1990), the court found that prisoners-plaintiffs could wear the kufi only in the privacy of their cells and while attending their religious services. Following a non-jury trial, the court concluded that a regulation not allowing a kufi to be otherwise worn in a prison was not unreasonable and not a violation of plaintiff's First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Id.
Several cases, which although not cited by either of the parties, deal specifically with restrictions on the wearing of head coverings of religious significance in a courtroom. In a 1978 decision by the Supreme Court of Rhode Island, In Re Palmer, 386 A.2d 1112 (R.I. 1978), the court reversed a finding of contempt of court and held that it was an improper invasion of the right of free exercise of religion of a Sunni Muslim not to be allowed to wear a skullcap in a courtroom. The presiding judge advised the petitioner that he did not allow men to wear head covers of any kind in the courtroom, and requested the petitioner to either remove the skullcap or leave the courtroom. Id. at 1113. The petitioner "made several abortive efforts" to explain his religious beliefs that required him to wear the skullcap, but the trial justice made no attempt to inquire into the nature or sincerity of those beliefs. Id. at 1114. The appellate court criticized the trial judge for not making an inquiry to determine that the petitioner's beliefs were sincerely held and whether they precluded the petitioner from removing the cap in court, holding that "in failing to do so the trial judge unjustifiably infringed upon the religious freedoms granted to petitioner and to all citizens by the free exercise clause of the First Amendment." Id.
The court in Palmer relied on Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 83 S. Ct. 1790, 10 L. Ed. 2d 965 (1963), which held that when an individual shows that the state has interfered with an action of a sincere religious nature, the state must establish that there was a compelling state interest in the regulation and that such an interest could not be promoted by a less restrictive means. The court in Palmer noted that the petitioner was not allowed to show that his wearing the skullcap was sincerely religious in nature, and concluded, "[W]e do wish to make it clear that if [the] petitioner or any other individual in the exercise of sincere religious beliefs allegedly affronts the dignity of a court by virtue of his physical appearance, then that person is entitled to show the court that he is sincere and bona fide in his belief." 386 A.2d at 256. Acknowledging that courts have an interest in maintaining dignity and decorum by establishing various rules to cover the conduct of participants, the court nonetheless relied on Sherbert for the rule that:
restrictions on religious practices are permissible only where the practices threaten public safety, peace, or order. We do not believe that wearing a prayer cap in court threatens these benchmarks enumerated in Sherbert. Thus assuming that the petitioner's beliefs are sincere, the state would bear a heavy burden of establishing how such actions threaten any compelling interest that the state may have in maintaining decorum in the courtroom.Id. at 256-57.
McMillan v. State, 265 A.2d 453 (Md. 1970), applied theSherbert analysis to reverse the contempt citation of a defendant in a criminal case who refused to remove a prayer cap in court because the trial judge did not first inquire into the nature and sincerity of the religious beliefs which compelled the defendant to wear the prayer cap despite the judge's warnings.
In Atkin v. Parana, No. CIV-86-1075E, 1987 WL 16459 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 1, 1987), Judge Elfvin denied a motion to dismiss a complaint where the plaintiff, an observant Jew, had asserted that the defendant police officer violated his civil rights by arresting him when he was not allowed to cover his head in a Buffalo, New York courthouse. The plaintiff had also alleged that the presiding judge had no objection to persons wearing a hat in the courtroom for religious purposes. In denying dismissal on grounds of qualified immunity, the court held:
According to the allegations of the plaintiff, the defendants were aware of both the religious nature of the hat and that the judge had acquiesced in the plaintiff's wearing of it. Under such circumstances, it cannot be said that the defendants did not and should not have known that the plaintiff's right to the free exercise of religion was violated by the forced removal of his hat. Similarly, the defendants could not maintain in good faith that they were ignorant of any violation of the plaintiff's rights as they allegedly brutally beat him while he was unable to resist.Id. at *1.
In Spanks-El v. Finley, No. 85-C-9259, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3374 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 23, 1987), Judge Getzendanner granted summary judgment for defendants where the plaintiff, who practiced the religious faith of Islam, refused to briefly remove a fez, a small hat which he wore on his head at all times as a religious symbol, upon seeking entry into a courtroom. The courthouse officers wanted the plaintiff to remove the fez briefly so they could ascertain that no weapons or contraband was under the fez. The plaintiff was denied access to the courtroom and claimed that he suffered financial loss when a trial judge in a will contest ruled against him due to his inability to be present in the courtroom to give testimony. The court denied the plaintiff's claim of denial of First Amendment exercise of religion as follows:
It is well settled that although one's first amendment freedom to believe in religion of choice is absolute, the freedom to exercise that religion is not. When the freedom to act in accordance with one's religious convictions conflicts with some important state interest, a court must determine (a) whether the state's proffered purpose is sufficiently compelling, and (b) whether the manner chosen to achieve that goal is the least restrictive means for doing so.Id. at *4 (citations omitted).
Judge Getzendanner then determined that the state interest of having safe and secure courtrooms, court personnel and litigants, was sufficient to overcome the plaintiff's refusal to remove his fez for a few minutes for purposes of the security check. The plaintiff had argued that the state could used have used a magnetometer or head scanner, but the court rejected this argument, as follows:
Although plaintiff presents no actual evidence of the extent to which these "less intrusive" techniques are utilized by the courts, this court will assume that some courts have indeed used them. Even so, the availability of these techniques surely does not mean that they are as effective in detecting breaches of courthouse security as a court might prefer, and is entitled to expect, a security technique to be. Indeed, it is readily apparent that not all securitybreaching items, such as a plastic gun or bomb, are detectable by a magnetometer. Furthermore, while a hand-scanner might be useful in detecting the presence of some objects under a hat, it simply cannot provide courthouse deputies with the same assurance of safety that comes with a direct, visual inspection of the interior of a hat. True, the alternative techniques plaintiff suggests are less intrusive. But so long as they are not as effective as visual inspections (and, not surprisingly, plaintiff has not attempted to show that they are), and so long as courts have a compelling interest in maintaining, as far as is possible, security from danger, the state is entitled to ask that persons seeking courthouse access submit to a brief inspection of those personal articles that reasonably pose a security risk. That includes plaintiff's fez. Accordingly, as sensitive as this court is to the need to protect the right of an individual to freely exercise her or his religion of choice, that right must give way to the state's compelling interest in maintaining courtroom safety.Id. at *8-9.
In La Rocca v. Lean, 338 N.E.2d 606 (N.Y. 1975), the Court of Appeals of New York, per Chief Judge Breitel, held that the trial court did not violate the first amendment rights of a priest, who was also defense counsel in a criminal jury trial, when the court precluded the priestattorney from wearing his religious garb during the trial. The appellate court concluded that the state's interest in a fair trial outweighed the limitation on the priest's freedom of religion. Id.
Based on these precedents, and considering that this matter is now on summary judgment in which the plaintiff is entitled to factual inferences in his favor, Defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity. According to Plaintiff, Defendant was aware of the religious significance of Plaintiff's kufi. (Pl.'s Dep., Pl.'s Ex. A, at 37.) Defendant therefore did know (or should have known) that Plaintiff's right to the free exercise of religion would be violated by the forced removal of his kufi.
Nor does Defendant exactly dispute that he was aware of the religious significance of Plaintiff's kufi. Even though Defendant contends that Plaintiff was disruptive during the entire interchange between the parties, Defendant testified that Plaintiff informed him that his "constitutional rights" were being violated. (Def.'s Aff., Def.'s Ex. B, ¶¶ 11, 13.)
Plaintiff does cite Abbott v. Smaller, No. 88-2800, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11961, at *12 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 5, 1990), where, following a non-jury trial, Judge Shapiro held, "[A prison guard's] refusal to allow [a prisoner] to eat dinner unless he removed his kufi was unreasonable and arbitrary." Id. at *12. The court concluded that it was clearly established that "actions by prison officials that encroach on [an] inmate's first amendment rights are permissible only if reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest." Id. at *13. Because the prison guard should have known that the prison kufi regulation incorporated any legitimate penological interest, the defendant should have permitted the prisoner to wear his kufi, and qualified immunity was denied. Id. The court awarded plaintiff compensatory damages of $100 and punitive damages of $100 for the kufi incident. Id. at *13-14.
Defendant contends that he is entitled to qualified immunity because in arresting Plaintiff for disorderly conduct, he acted in good faith to effect state law prohibiting unruly, disruptive behavior in state courthouses. See 16 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2329. In this case, given that the parties dispute several material facts related to Defendant's justification for removal and arrest, the Court concludes that it cannot decide as a matter of law that Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity. "Summary judgment is appropriate if no reasonable juror could conclude that [Plaintiff's] clearly established rights were violated." Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 786 (3d Cir. 2000);cf. Orsatti v. N.J. State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 483 (3d Cir. 1995) ("When the material facts are not in dispute, the district court may decide whether a government official is shielded by qualified immunity as a matter of law.").
Plaintiff notes that while Defendant cites 16 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2329 as the statutory provision under which Plaintiff was charged, the non-traffic citation actually filed in this case clearly states that Plaintiff was cited for violating 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5503, which defines disorderly conduct. However, because of the factual disagreement surrounding Plaintiff's arrest, as detailed in the main text, determining the state statute for which Defendant cited Plaintiff is not crucial to the disposition of the Motion.
The Court recognizes that its decision to deny Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment implicates the collateral order doctrine. An order denying summary judgment can be immediately appealed so long as: (1) the defendant is a public official who asserts a qualified immunity defense, and (2) the issue on appeal is whether the facts as alleged by the plaintiff demonstrate a violation of clearly established federal law, and not which facts the plaintiff might or might not prove at trial. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 528, 105 S. Ct. 2806, 86 L. Ed. 2d 411 (1985); see also Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 307, 115 S. Ct. 2151, 132 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1995) (holding that the collateral order doctrine does not permit an appeal from such an order where the issue on appeal is "whether or not the evidence in the pretrial record [is] sufficient to show a genuine issue of fact for trial."
In interpreting Johnson, the Third Circuit held:
[I]f a defendant in a constitutional tort case moves for summary judgment based on qualified immunity and the district court denies the motion, [an appellate court] lack[s] jurisdiction to consider whether the district court correctly identified the set of facts that the summary judgment record is sufficient to prove; but [the appellate court] possess[es] jurisdiction to review whether the set of facts identified by the district court is sufficient to establish a violation of clearly established constitutional right. Ziccardi v. City of Philadelphia, 288 F.3d 57, 61 (3d Cir. 2002).
C. Fourth Amendment Claims
1. Malicious Prosecution
Pursuant to Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 114 S. Ct. 807, 127 L. Ed. 2d 114 (1994), a malicious prosecution claim pursuant to Section 1983 cannot be based upon substantive due process considerations, but on a provision of the Bill of Rights that provides "an explicit textual source of constitutional protection." Id. at 272. The Third Circuit has held that in order to prevail on a Section 1983 malicious prosecution claim, Plaintiff must establish the following elements:
(1) Defendant initiated a criminal proceeding;
(2) The criminal proceeding ended in Plaintiff's favor;
(3) The proceeding was initiated without probable cause;
(4) Defendant acted maliciously or for a purpose other than bringing Plaintiff to justice; and
(5) Plaintiff suffered deprivation of liberty consistent with the concept of seizure as a consequence of a legal proceeding.Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 521 (3d Cir. 2003).
The parties dispute whether Plaintiff can "show that he suffered a seizure as a consequence of a legal proceeding."Gallo v. City of Philadelphia, 161 F.3d 217, 222 (3d Cir. 1998). In Gallo, the plaintiff's post-indictment liberty was limited as follows: he had to post a $10,000 bond; he had to attend all court hearings including his trial and arraignment; he was required to contact Pretrial Services on a weekly basis; and he was prohibited from traveling outside New Jersey and Pennsylvania. Id. Although it was a "close question," the Third Circuit concluded that these restrictions on the plaintiff's liberty constituted "a seizure as a consequence of a legal proceeding."Id.
"[P]rosecution without probable cause is not, in and of itself, a constitutional tort." Id. This Court has held that "[a]bsent any constitutionally significant pre-trial restraints on [the] plaintiff's liberty, the weight of federal authority holds that a person may not maintain a § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution under the Fourth Amendment." Russoli v. Salisbury Township, 126 F. Supp. 2d 821, 853-54 (E.D. Pa. 2000). In this case, Plaintiff was subject to certain restraints on his liberty between the time Defendant escorted him from Judge Ludgate's courtroom to his appearance, two hours later, before a District Judge to discuss an outstanding warrant for Plaintiff's arrest. (Pl.'s Dep., Pl.'s Ex. A, at 50-57.)
However, Plaintiff asserts that his prosecution for disorderly conduct specifically was perpetuated maliciously. (Compl. ¶¶ 12, 31-35.) The Court therefore focuses not on what transpired at the courthouse the afternoon that Plaintiff was initially detained, but instead reviews those restrictions, if any, placed on Plaintiff prior to his disorderly conduct hearing, particularly any restrictions imposed to guarantee his appearance at the second hearing. Unlike the plaintiff in Gallo, the record contains no evidence that Plaintiff's appearance at his disorderly conduct hearing was secured by means of bail, a warrant, incarceration, or restrictions on his travel. See also Mantz v. Chain, 239 F. Supp. 2d 486 (D.N.J. 2002). Plaintiff's continued detention at the courthouse was in response to an apparently outstanding arrest warrant, and was unrelated to Plaintiff's conduct before Judge Ludgate or his aborted disorderly conduct hearing. While Gallo does not address whether the issuance of a citation and the attendant obligation to appear in court qualifies as a "constitutionally significant seizure," this Court does not believe that the summons Plaintiff received at home that required him to appear in court on a specific date constitutes a "seizure" under the Fourth Amendment. Mantz, 239 F. Supp. 2d at 503-04. Defendant accordingly is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's malicious prosecution claim.
The Court notes that the petitioner in Albright, supra, had been incarcerated and released on bail pending trial. 510 U.S. at 271. Plaintiff can point to no evidence in the record indicating a comparable restriction of his liberty.
2. False Arrest and False Imprisonment Under Section 1983
Plaintiff claims that Defendant, "acting within the scope of his employment, under the color of state law, intentionally caused the false arrest . . . without probable cause, without privilege and against the plaintiff's will . . . [in] violat[ion of] the plaintiff's rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment. . . ." (Compl. ¶ 19.) An arrest violates the Fourth Amendment where it is not supported by probable cause. E.g., Orsatti, 71 F.3d at 484. Probable cause exists where the "facts and circumstances [are] sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the [suspect] had committed or was committing an offense." Sharrar v. Felsing, 128 F.3d 810, 818 (3d Cir. 1997).
"A false imprisonment claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is based on the Fourteenth Amendment protection against deprivations of liberty without due process of law." Groman v. Township of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 636 (3d Cir. 1995). "[W]here the police lack probable cause to make an arrest, the arrestee has a claim under § 1983 for false imprisonment based on a detention pursuant to that arrest." Id.
Generally, "the question of probable cause in a section 1983 damage suit is one for the jury." Montgomery v. De Simone, 159 F.3d 120, 124 (3d Cir. 1998). A district court may enter summary judgment, though, should it conclude "that probable cause did exist as a matter of law if the evidence viewed most favorably to Plaintiff, reasonably would not support a contrary factual finding." Sherwood v. Mulvihill, 113 F.3d 396, 401 (3d Cir. 1997). The Court cannot conclude that Defendant had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for disorderly conduct, as the evidence of record, when viewed most favorably to Plaintiff, indicates that Plaintiff responded calmly and rationally to Defendant's questions inside and outside Judge Ludgate's courtroom. Therefore, the Court concludes that Defendant is not entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's false arrest and false imprisonment claims under Section 1983.
D. Equal Protection
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant's actions constitute a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Plaintiff, a Muslim and an African-American, alleges that "[t]he acts of the defendant were motivated by discriminatory animus and defendant's desire to injure, oppress, intimidate and treat the plaintiff disparately because of his national origin, ethnicity, religion and/or race." (Compl. ¶ 24.) However, although his brief in opposition discussed Plaintiff's Equal Protection claim solely with regard to religious discrimination (Pl.'s Br., Docket No. 16, at Part III.E), Plaintiff alleged racial discrimination in his deposition. Section 1981 states, in pertinent part:
As there are two Parts III.E in Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition, the Court specifies that it refers to the subsection labeled "Plaintiff's Equal Protection claim should not [be] dismissed on summary judgment."
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.42 U.S.C. § 1981(a). For summary judgment purposes, Section 1981 claims alleging discriminatory intent follow the Title VII discrimination burden-shifting standard. Chauhan v. M. Alfieri Co., 897 F.2d 123, 126 (3d Cir. 1990). To establish his prima facie case, Plaintiff is required to establish the following elements:
(1) that Plaintiff is a member of a religious minority;
(2) that Defendant intended to discriminate against him on that basis; and
(3) that Defendant's discriminatory conduct abridged any right enumerated in Section 1981.Ackaa v. Tommy Hilfiger Co., No. 96-8262, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3570, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 24, 1998). Should Plaintiff establish his prima facie case, Defendant then is required to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory justification for his conduct.Id. Plaintiff bears the ultimate burden to produce evidence indicating that Defendant's justification is pretextual. Id.
Preliminarily, the Court concludes that Plaintiff satisfactorily demonstrates for trial the first element of his prima facie case (i.e., Plaintiff is a member of a racial and religious minority). The crucial question is whether Plaintiff can demonstrate that Defendant intended to discriminate on the basis of race or religion. Should he produce evidence of racial or religious animus, Plaintiff would satisfy the third element insofar that he alleges he was denied "like punishment."
The Court concludes that the evidence of record suggests that whether Defendant acted pursuant to religious animus remains in genuine dispute among the parties. As to religion, Plaintiff points out that he wore his kufi in a courtroom on other occasions, and saw a courtroom security officer wear a kufi in the courthouse. (Pl.'s Dep., Pl.'s Ex. A, at 30-33, 96, 99, 115-16.) The Court concludes that Plaintiff has adduced sufficient evidence for trial concerning Defendant's familiarity with the religious significance of the head covering, such that a reasonable jury might agree with Plaintiff's contention that Defendant intentionally approached him because of his kufi.
Following the burden-shifting analysis, Defendant would argue that Plaintiff's alleged disorderliness in court justified his action; as stated above in the Court's discussion on probable cause, whether Defendant's justification is pretextual remains genuinely disputed among the parties.
As to race, Plaintiff admitted that Defendant never said anything that had racial overtones (Id. at 101), and that, in response to Defendant's Interrogatories, Plaintiff does not know what motivated Defendant's actions (Def.'s Ex. D, at 12). When asked the justification for his allegations of racial animus, Plaintiff explained as follows:
I say that, the race, is because he said that he was having a bad day, right? Now, that day — because my niece wasn't in there — and I know who was in the courtroom and, you know what I mean, because I had a view like this [indicating] and I truly believe my eyes was [sic] not deceiving me — I was the only black person that walked through that room. You know what I mean?
(Pl.'s Dep., Pl.'s Ex. A, at 101-02) (emphasis added). Because Plaintiff did not continue his allegations of racial discrimination in his brief, and because this testimony alone cannot support an inference that Defendant purposely targeted Plaintiff on the basis of his race, the Court concludes that the only Section 1981 issue remaining for trial concerns religious discrimination. But cf. Ackaa, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3570, at *9-13 (denying summary judgment where plaintiffs accused of shoplifting testified that Tommy Hilfiger security guards paid particularly close attention to them because they were the only black customers in the store).
Therefore, Plaintiff's Equal Protection claim under Section 1981 survives summary judgment to the extent that it asserts religious discrimination.
E. State Law Claims
1. Official Immunity
As an individual police officer, Defendant ordinarily would be immune from Plaintiff's state law claims under Pennsylvania's Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 8541et seq. Those subsections of particular interest to this case are Section 8546 and Section 8550. Section 8546 states, in pertinent part:
In any action brought against an employee of a local agency for damages on account of an injury to a person or property based upon claims arising from, or reasonably related to, the office or the performance of the duties of the employee, the employee may assert on his own behalf, or the local agency may assert on his behalf:
(1) Defenses which are available at common law to the employee.
(2) The defense that the conduct of the employee which gave rise to the claim was authorized or required by law, or that he in good faith reasonably believed the conduct was authorized or required by law.42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8546 (emphasis added). Section 8550 states, in relevant part:
In any action against a local agency or employee thereof for damages on account of an injury caused by the act of the employee in which it is judicially determined that the act of the employee caused the injury and that such act constituted a crime, actual fraud, actual malice, or willful misconduct, the provisions of section . . . 8546 (relating to defense of official immunity) . . . shall not apply.42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8550.
Because the evidence presents a genuine issue regarding whether Defendant acts constituted "willful misconduct," the Court concludes that Defendant is not entitled to official immunity under Pennsylvania law. "The conduct of a police officer will only constitute `willful misconduct' if the officer committed `misconduct which the perpetrator recognized as misconduct and which was carried out with the intention of achieving exactly that wrongful purpose.'"Waldon v. Borough of Upper Darby, 77 F. Supp. 2d 655, 658 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (quoting Africa v. City of Philadelphia, 938 F. Supp. 1264, 1273 (E.D. Pa. 1996)). Having credited Plaintiff's version of the facts, for purposes of this Motion, and considering Plaintiff's testimony that Defendant apologetically attributed his actions to a "bad day" (Pl.'s Dep., Pl.'s Ex. A, at 80-81, 100-01), the Court believes there is sufficient evidence for trial indicating that Defendant recognized his actions were misconduct and that Defendant carried out his actions with the intention of achieving that wrongful purpose.
2. Malicious Prosecution
In order to satisfy his prima facie case for malicious prosecution under Pennsylvania law, Plaintiff needs to prove the following elements:
(1) Defendant initiated a criminal proceeding;
(2) Without probable cause;
(3) With malice;
(4) Which was subsequently terminated in Plaintiff's favor.E.g., Russoli v. Salisbury Township, 126 F. Supp. 2d 821, 870 (E.D. Pa. 2000). While the issue of probable cause in malicious prosecution cases typically is reserved for the court and not the jury, e.g., id. at 871; Simpson v. Montgomery Ward Co., 46 A.2d 674, 675-76 (Pa. 1946), "when the probable cause determination depends upon disputed issues of fact, the court should submit the factual disputes to the jury, and then make the probable cause determination based upon the jury's findings."Russoli, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 871.
As the Court has concluded above, because of factual disputes that cannot be resolved at this time, the Court cannot determine, as a matter of law, whether Defendant had probable cause to initiate proceedings against Plaintiff. Defendant accordingly is not entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's malicious prosecution claim under state law.
IV. Conclusion
Once it has been determined, by the jury's answers to specific interrogatories at trial, which litigant's version of the events of January 22, 2003 are worthier of belief, certain legal conclusions will become apparent in this case. Because of these genuine issues of material fact, the Court will largely deny Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, but will grant Plaintiff's Section 1983 Malicious Prosecution claim, as the Court concludes no genuine issue remains for trial.
An appropriate Order follows.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 13th day of August, 2004, upon consideration of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 9), it is hereby ORDERED that Defendant's Motion is GRANTED IN PART (as to Plaintiff's Section 1983 Claim of Malicious Prosecution) and DENIED IN PART (as to all other claims).Trial will begin on September 13, 2003 in Courtroom 17B. Points for charge, proposed jury interrogatories, and any Motions in Limine shall be filed no later than September 9, 2003.