Opinion
Civil Action No. 98-2972 (NHP)
July 14, 2000
Patricia M. Franklin, for Plaintiff.
Anthony J. Labruna, Jr., Assistant. U.S. Attorney ROBERT J. CLEARY, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Attorneys for Defendant.
THE ORIGINAL OF THIS LETTER OPINION IS ON FILE WITH THE CLERK OF THE COURT
Dear Counsel:
Plaintiff Hurley Tyson brings this action before the Court seeking to overturn the final determination of the Commissioner of Social Security denying Plaintiff's claim for disability insurance benefits and Supplemental Security Income under the Social Security Act. This matter was resolved without oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78. For the following reasons, the Commissioner's decision is hereby affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff, Hurley Tyson ("Plaintiff"), filed an application for Supplemental Security Income Benefits on March 15, 1994, alleging disability due to back problems, problems with alcohol, and arthritis on his left side. Plaintiff's application for benefits was initially denied and was denied upon reconsideration as well.
Plaintiff then requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"). A hearing was held before ALJ Gerald J. Ryan on November 30, 1995. Based upon the application filed by Plaintiff on February 23, 1994, ALJ Ryan determined, on February 19, 1997, that Plaintiff was not entitled to a period of disability or disability insurance benefits. In that decision, the ALJ found that: (1) Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since February 23, 1994; (2) the medical evidence established that Plaintiff did have severe impairments, namely an organic mental disorder and back pain, but they did not meet the criteria of any of the impairments listed in Appendix 1, Subpart P Regulations No. 4; (3) Plaintiff's statements regarding his impairments and their impact on his ability to work are not entirely credible based on Plaintiff's description of his lifestyle and activities and the examining Practitioner's reports; (4) Plaintiff still possesses the capacity to perform medium work and that capacity is only minimally reduced by Plaintiff's organic mental disorder; (5) Plaintiff was not required to lift more than fifty pounds in his past work as a maintenance worker; (6) Plaintiff's past work as a maintenance employee did not require him to perform work that is precluded by Plaintiff's medically determined impairments; (7) Plaintiff's impairments do not prevent him from performing his past relevant work; and (8) Plaintiff has not been under a disability at any time through the date of the decision, as defined by the Social Security Act.
The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for a review on April 25, 1998. Plaintiff then filed the instant appeal with the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey on August 18, 1999.
DISCUSSION
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and 1383(c)(3). This Court must affirm the Commissioner's findings if they are supported by substantial evidence.See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence has been defined as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1979) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)).
In order to claim Social Security benefits, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he is unable to:
engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medical determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months. . . .42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A).
A plaintiff is considered to be under a disability only if:
his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy. . . .42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B).
A five step analysis is used to determine whether a disability exists. The Commissioner first determines whether the claimant is engaged in any substantial gainful activity, and if he is, he will automatically be found not disabled. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(b). The Commissioner then determines whether the claimant has any impairments that limit his ability to do basic work activities. If there are no such limitations, then the claim will be denied. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c). When impairments exist, the Commissioner then determines if the claimant has any impairment that is listed in Appendix 1 of the regulations. A claimant that has any of the listed impairments will be found disabled.See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920. Where the claimant does not have a listed impairment, the Commissioner then determines whether the claimant has the capacity to perform his past relevant work. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(e). When it is determined that the claimant is unable to perform past relevant work, the Commissioner considers the claimant's functional capacity along with his age, education, and past work experience to determine if he can perform other work in the national economy. If he is unable to do other work, then the Commissioner will find him disabled.See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(f). The claimant has the burden of proof for all but the last inquiry. See Doak v. Heckler, 790 F.2d 26, 28 (3d Cir. 1986).
In this case, the ALJ found that Plaintiff retained the residual capacity to perform past relevant work as a maintenance employee. See Transcript ("Tr.") at 20. As a result, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was not disabled. Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ erroneously described his employment as janitorial rather than maintenance. While an ALJ should not broadly characterize a claimant's past employment, there is substantial evidence that Plaintiff's past job was consistent with that of a janitor. See Jones v. Chater, 86 F.3d 823, 826 (8th Cir. 1996). At his hearing, Plaintiff stated that he did janitorial work. See Tr. at 34. Further, Plaintiff's description of his past job duties of cleaning bathrooms, throwing out garbage, and cleaning and polishing floors is consistent with The Dictionary of Occupational Titles ("DOT") description of janitorial work. See DOT Code 382.664-010 (4th ed. 1991). Therefore, Plaintiff's claim that the ALJ mischaracterized his past relevant work is meritless.
Plaintiff next asserts that the ALJ committed a legal error when he found that Plaintiff is capable of performing his past job. Plaintiff claims that the ALJ erred by defining his past work generically rather than specifically. Plaintiff's contention is without merit. The standard of eligibility for benefits uses a broad construction of past work. See Jock v. Harris, 651 F.2d 133, 135 (2d Cir. 1981). When attempting to establish that a disability exists, a plaintiff must show that he is "unable to return to his former type of work." See Id. (emphasis in original). Therefore, the ALJ did not commit an error by finding that Plaintiff was capable of performing his past job as defined generically.
Plaintiff also asserts that his impairments are a disability and that the ALJ's findings were not supported by substantial evidence. Plaintiff claims that the ALJ incorrectly disregarded the medical reports of Dr. Tabbanor and failed to explain why he disregarded them. The record indicates, however, that the ALJ did discuss the medical reports and concluded that they were solely based on Plaintiff's subjective answers.See Tr. at 19. Although subjective statements made by the Plaintiff must be accorded appropriate weight, those statements need not be accepted alone as establishing a disability. See Karp v. Schweiker, 539 F. Supp. 217, 219 (N.D.Cal. 1982). In considering subjective complaints of pain, the ALJ has discretion in evaluating the credibility of a claimant. See Edwards v. Commissioner of Social Security, 989 F. Supp. 657, 660 (D.N.J. 1998), aff'd, 166 F.3d 1205 (3d Cir. 1998); Brown v. Schweiker, 562 F. Supp. 284, 287 (E.D.Pa. 1983) (citing Bolton v. Secretary of HHS, 504 F. Supp. 288 (E.D.N Y 1980)). Accordingly, the ALJ must view the complaints in light of the medical evidence in the record. See Edwards, 989 F. Supp. at 660; Schweiker, 562 F. Supp. at 287. There must be objective medical evidence that supports the claimant's complaints of pain. The ALJ did not disregard the medical reports completely. He found that Plaintiff did have an organic mental disorder, but that Plaintiff's ability to perform work was only minimally diminished. See Tr. at 17. This finding is supported by substantial evidence, such as the reports that Plaintiff got along well with people, that he could order his own affairs, and that his mental functions were at a high level.
Plaintiff also asserts that the ALJ was incorrect in finding that his responses to the questionnaires indicated an ability to return to work. Plaintiff argues that he is unable to return to work, as evidenced by the fact that maids did the chores at the Lincoln Hotel, that he did not cook because of his left hand, and that he did not go out much because he gets light headed. See Tr. at 36, 37, 129. The ALJ, however, found that Plaintiff's daily activities required the ability to walk, sit, and stand for extended periods. See Tr. at 19. This finding was supported by evidence that Plaintiff was able to take care of his personal needs, do laundry, use public transportation, fish for recreation and visit friends and relatives. See Tr. at 18. Because the Commissioner's findings are supported by substantial evidence, they will be affirmed.
Finally, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ mischaracterized Plaintiff's ability to concentrate. Plaintiff asserts that he informed the judge of his problems with concentration. See Tr. at 46. The ALJ, however, found that Plaintiff's concentration problem does not prevent him from returning to past relevant work. This finding is supported by evidence that the Plaintiff does have the ability to concentrate. Plaintiff himself indicated that he did not have any trouble concentrating. See Tr. at 130. Plaintiff further stated that his mental condition was "very stable." See Tr. at 133. The information provided by Plaintiff establishes substantial evidence to support the Commissioner's finding that the Plaintiff was not disabled.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, and on the basis of the record as a whole, this Court finds that the Commissioner's determination that Plaintiff is not entitled to disability insurance benefits or SSI under the Social Security Act is supported by substantial evidence and is hereby AFFIRMED.
An appropriate Final Order accompanies this Letter Opinion.