See Hunter v. Commissioner of Correction, 271 Conn. 856[, 860 A.2d 700] (2004); Cox v. Commissioner of Correction, 271 Conn. 844[, 860 A.2d 708] (2004); Harris v. Commissioner of Correction, 271 Conn. 808[, 860 A.2d 715] (2004). Petitioner's claims for statutory good time are barred by Tyson v. Commissioner of Correction, 261 Conn. 806[, 808 A.2d 653] (2002), cert. denied sub nom. Tyson v. Armstrong, 538 U.S. 1005, 123 S.Ct. 1914[, 155 L.Ed.2d 836] (2003)." The respondent also filed an affidavit in support of the motion to dismiss, as well as a supporting memorandum of law.
" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Duperry v. Solnit, 261 Conn. 309, 318, 803 A.2d 287 (2002); see also Tyson v. Commissioner of Correction, 261 Conn. 806, 816, 808 A.2d 653 (2002), cert. denied sub nom. Tyson v. Armstrong, 538 U.S. 1005, 123 S. Ct. 1914, 155 L. Ed. 2d 836 (2003). Our review of the Appellate Court's reversal of the habeas court's finding as to whether the date of offense qualifies the petitioner's sentence for good time credit is a mixed question of law and fact.
The petitioner also claims that the respondent's return stated that the "petitioner is left to his proof" as to his claim that good time and presentence credits were part of his plea, a response, according to him, which is not a denial.In a habeas petition, involving an inmate in the state's prisons, there is only one respondent, the commissioner of correction, who may be represented by the attorney general of the state or the chief state's attorney or both. General Statutes §§ 3-125 and 51-277 (c); see Tyson v. Commissioner of Correction, 261 Conn. 806, 807, 808 A.2d 653 (2002), cert. denied sub nom. Tyson v. Armstrong, 538 U.S. 1005, 123 S. Ct. 1914, 155 L. Ed. 2d 836 (2003), Blumenthal v. Barnes, 261 Conn. 434, 449, 804 A.2d 152 (2002). The petitioner believes that there are two respondents, the state and the commissioner of correction, and, therefore, that two responses or returns to the petition were required.
It is clear from a series of Supreme and Appellate Court decisions that a sentence imposed as a result of a violation of probation is a continuation of the original sentence. Tyson v. Commissioner of Correction, 261 Conn. 806, 810 n. 6, 808 A.2d 653 (2002), cert. denied sub nom. Tyson v. Armstrong, 538 U.S. 1005, 123 S.Ct. 1914, 155 L.Ed.2d 836 (2003);State v. Carey, 222 Conn. 299, 306, 610 A.2d 1147 (1992); State v. Smith, 207 Conn. 152, 178, 540 A.2d 679 (1988); Liistro v. Robinson, 170 Conn. 116, 128-29, 365 A.2d 109 (1976); State v. Fuessenich, 50 Conn.App. 187, 191-93, 717 A.2d 801 (1998), cert. denied, 247 Conn. 956, 723 A.2d 818, cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1004, 120 S.Ct. 500, 145 L.Ed. 386 (1999). Upon coming into the department's custody for the Bridgeport and Norwalk VOP charges, petitioner's confinement related back to the original sentence and even the original presentment of the charging document, the information.
Sup. Ct. Conn. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 261 Conn. 806, 808 A. 2d 653.
"Although a habeas court's findings of fact are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard of review, questions of law are subject to plenary review." Tyson v. Commissioner of Correction , 261 Conn. 806, 816, 808 A.2d 653 (2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1005, 123 S.Ct. 1914, 155 L.Ed.2d 836 (2003) ; see also Kaddah v. Commissioner of Correction , 324 Conn. 548, 559, 153 A.3d 1233 (2017).
It is well settled that the determination of a prisoner's release date is not a "static concept" and often requires recalculation by the respondent during the term of a prisoner's sentence. See, e.g., Tyson v. Commissioner of Correction, 261 Conn. 806, 828, 808 A2d 653 (2002), cert, denied sub nom. Tyson v. Armstrong, 538 U.S. 1005, 123 S. Ct. 1914, 155 L. Ed. 2d 836 (2003); see also Rivera v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 254 Conn. 240. As a preliminary matter, we note that the petitioner raises both constitutional and statutorily based claims.
"Although a habeas court's findings of fact are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard of review, questions of law are subject to plenary review." Tyson v. Commissioner of Correction, 261 Conn. 806, 816, 808 A.2d 653 (2002), cert. denied sub nom. Tyson v. Armstrong, 538 U.S. 1005, 123 S. Ct. 1914, 155 L. Ed. 2d 836 (2003). Whether a legislative act applies retroactively is a question of law over which this court has plenary review.
"Although a habeas court's findings of fact are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard of review, questions of law are subject to plenary review." Tyson v. Commissioner of Correction, 261 Conn. 806, 816, 808 A.2d 653 (2002), cert. denied sub nom. Tyson v. Armstrong, 538 U.S. 1005, 123 S. Ct. 1914, 155 L. Ed. 2d 836 (2003).
General Statutes § 18-100d provides: "Notwithstanding any other provision of the general statutes, any person convicted of a crime committed on or after October 1, 1994, shall be subject to supervision by personnel of the Department of Correction or the Board of Parole until the expiration of the maximum term or terms for which he was sentenced." On October 29, 2002, this court issued its decision in Tyson v. Commissioner of Correction, 261 Conn. 806, 808 A.2d 653 (2002), cert. denied sub nom. Tyson v. Armstrong, 538 U.S. 1005, 123 S. Ct. 1914, 155 L. Ed. 2d 836 (2003), in which we concluded that the application of § 18-100d to sentences for offenses committed after the effective date of the statute was not retroactive and, therefore, did not violate the ex post facto clause. Id., 828 n. 24. Subsequently, the respondent in the present case filed a motion to dismiss the petitioner's appeal, arguing that the matter was governed by Tyson.