Tyner v. State

7 Citing cases

  1. Wright v. State

    358 Ga. App. 798 (Ga. Ct. App. 2021)   Cited 1 times
    Holding that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to consider defendant's statements "I got a right to an attorney Still got a right to an attorney" to be a request for counsel

    (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Tyner v. State , 334 Ga. App. 890, 894 (1), 780 S.E.2d 494 (2015), quoting Wilkerson v. State , 286 Ga. 201, 204 (2) (b), 686 S.E.2d 648 (2009). Wright made a post-waiver request for counsel during voir dire when he stated, "I got a right to an attorney.

  2. Pugh v. State

    347 Ga. App. 710 (Ga. Ct. App. 2018)   Cited 5 times

    Tyner v. State , cited by Pugh, is inapposite. 334 Ga. App. 890, 894-895, 780 S.E.2d 494 (2015). In Tyner , appointed counsel represented the defendant in pre-trial proceedings and throughout trial.

  3. Bland v. State

    363 Ga. App. 268 (Ga. Ct. App. 2022)   Cited 2 times

    See Gobert v. State , 311 Ga. 305, 310 (2), 857 S.E.2d 647 (2021) (proceeding at which the jury composition is changed is a critical stage at which the defendant is entitled to be present); Brewner v. State , 302 Ga. 6, 11 (II), 804 S.E.2d 94 (2017) (defendant has the right to be present during a colloquy between the trial judge and a juror). Other critical stages of the trial which were held in Bland's absence included the court's dismissal of a second juror and apparent replacement of the two dismissed jurors with alternate jurors, see Gobert , supra (changing composition of the jury a critical stage); the court's various colloquies with and instructions to individual jurors, see Brewner , supra (trial court's colloquy with juror a critical stage); the closing arguments of the attorneys, see Tyner v. State , 334 Ga. App. 890, 895 (1), 780 S.E.2d 494 (2015) (closing argument is a critical stage of a trial); and the return of the verdict, see Tyner , supra (receiving jury verdict is a critical stage of a trial). The state argues that the trial court properly relied upon Hunter , supra, to find that Bland had waived his right to be present at those critical stages of his trial.

  4. Strozier v. State

    347 Ga. App. 797 (Ga. Ct. App. 2018)

    And the denial of the right to counsel is a structural Sixth Amendment violation that requires reversal. See Tyner v. State , 334 Ga. App. 890, 895-896 (1), 780 S.E.2d 494 (2015) (structural error where court denied defendant’s request for counsel during trial); see also Berry v. State , 282 Ga. 376, 378 (3), 651 S.E.2d 1 (2007) ; Lynch v. State , ––– Ga. App. ––––, ––– S.E.2d ––––, 2018 WL 4233545 (Case No. A18A1013, decided Sept. 6, 2018). Structural errors "include the denial of counsel, the denial of the right of self-representation, the denial of the right to public trial, and the denial of the right to trial by jury by the giving of a defective reasonable-doubt instruction."

  5. Martin-Argaw v. State

    343 Ga. App. 864 (Ga. Ct. App. 2017)   Cited 12 times
    Affirming defendant's conviction of attempted murder because "[t]he evidence in this case showed that [the defendant] had expressly asked the undercover officer—whom he believed to be a [hitman]—to kill three people; that he had given the [hitman] specific information about the three people to help him accomplish this purpose; that he had agreed to pay a negotiated price for the hit; that he had discussed the logistics of making the payment; and that he had responded affirmatively when the [hitman] made it clear that [the defendant] did not need to do anything else before the hit occurred"

    This determination depends on the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case, Taylor v. Ricketts , 239 Ga. 501, 503, 238 S.E.2d 52 (1977), and in making this determination, "a trial judge must investigate as long and as thoroughly as the circumstances of the case before [her] demand." Tyner v. State , 334 Ga. App. 890, 893 (1) n. 3, 780 S.E.2d 494 (2015) (citation and punctuation omitted). The trial judge is not required to use any particular language in making the defendant aware of his right to counsel and the dangers of self-representation.

  6. Martin-Argaw v. State

    A17A1107 (Ga. Ct. App. Oct. 13, 2017)

    This determination depends on the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case, Taylor v. Ricketts, 239 Ga. 501, 503 (238 SE2d 52) (1977), and in making this determination, "a trial judge must investigate as long and as thoroughly as the circumstances of the case before [her] demand." Tyner v. State, 334 Ga. App. 890, 893 (1) n. 3 (780 SE2d 494) (2015) (citation and punctuation omitted). The trial judge is not required to use any particular language in making the defendant aware of his right to counsel and the dangers of self-representation.

  7. State v. Hightower

    361 Or. 412 (Or. 2017)   Cited 39 times
    Recognizing that "legal determinations that are predicates for the exercise of discretion are reviewed for errors of law"

    have commenced"); People v. Lynch, 50 Cal.4th 693, 722, 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 63, 237 P.3d 416, 437 (2010) (abuse of discretion standard for motion made after trial begins); People v. Vialpando, 954 P.2d 617, 620 (Colo.App. 1997) (if request is not made in a timely fashion, court must "determine whether the request is made for purposes of delay or to gain tactical advantage, and whether the lateness of the request may hinder the administration of justice"); State v. Pires, 310 Conn. 222, 253, 77 A.3d 87, 107 (2013) (abuse of discretion standard); Williams v. State, 56 A.3d 1053, 1055-56 (Del. 2012) ("After a trial has begun, the right of self-representation may be curtailed, and the trial judge considering the motion must weigh the legitimate interests of the defendant against the prejudice that may result from the potential disruption of the proceedings already in progress."); McCray v. State, 71 So.3d 848, 870 (Fla. 2011) (abuse of discretion standard for motion made after trial begins); Tyner v. State, 334 Ga.App. 890, 893, 780 S.E.2d 494, 498 (2015) (allowing self-representation mid-trial if waiver of right to counsel is knowing and voluntary); State v. Reber, 138 Idaho 275, 278, 61 P.3d 632, 634-35 (Ct. App. 2002) (abuse of discretion standard); People v. Burton, 184 Ill.2d 1, 24, 234 Ill.Dec. 437, 703 N.E.2d 49, 60 (1998) (same); Stroud v. State, 809 N.E.2d 274, 279 (Ind. 2004) (holding that "request [to proceed pro se ] must be clear and unequivocal, and it must be [made] within a reasonable time prior to the first day of trial"); State v. Wehr, 852 N.W.2d 495, 501 (Iowa Ct. App. 2014) (request made prior to the jury being impaneled was timely); State v. Collins, 257 Kan. 408, 415, 893 P.2d 217, 221 (1995) (abuse of discretion standard for motion made after trial began); Swan v. Com, 384 S.W.3d 77, 94 (Ky. 2012) (request made one week before trial was timely); State v. Brown, 342 Md. 404, 415, 676 A.2d 513, 518 (1996) (abuse of discretion standard); Com v. Chapman, 8 Mass.App.Ct. 260, 265, 392 N.E.2d 1213, 1217 (1979) (request