Opinion
Case No. 20-cv-00364-JSW
2020-11-04
Janet TYLER, Plaintiff, v. TRAVELERS COMMERCIAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant.
Timothy John O'Connor, Timothy O'Connor Law Firm, Elk Grove, CA, for Plaintiff. Kathleen M. DeLaney, Foran Glennon Palandech Ponzi & Rudloff PC, Emeryville, CA, for Defendant.
Timothy John O'Connor, Timothy O'Connor Law Firm, Elk Grove, CA, for Plaintiff.
Kathleen M. DeLaney, Foran Glennon Palandech Ponzi & Rudloff PC, Emeryville, CA, for Defendant.
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS AND DENYING MOTION TO STAY
Re: Dkt. Nos. 25, 30
JEFFREY S. WHITE, United States District Judge
Now before the Court for consideration is the motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by Defendant Travelers Commercial Insurance Company ("Travelers" or "Defendant") and the motion to stay the action filed by Plaintiff Janet Tyler ("Plaintiff"). The Court has reviewed the parties’ papers, relevant legal authorities, and the record in this case, and it finds this matter suitable for disposition without oral argument. See N.D. Civ. L.R. 7-1(b). For the following reasons, the Court HEREBY GRANTS Defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings, and it DENIES Plaintiff's motion to stay.
BACKGROUND
Travelers insured Plaintiff's home located at 14850 Murphy Springs Road, Lower Lake, CA ("Insured Property"), which was destroyed in a fire on September 12, 2015. (Compl. ¶¶ 4-5.) Plaintiff elected to purchase a replacement home in Texas ("Replacement Property") rather than rebuild at the Insured Property. (Id. ¶ 8.) Travelers paid Plaintiff $358,576.81, the actual cash value of Insured Property. (See id. ¶ 20(3).) Plaintiff alleges that she is entitled to $375,446.42, which is the replacement cost of the Insured Property. (Id. ) According to Plaintiff, Travelers improperly measured indemnity based on the Replacement Property rather than the replacement cost of the Insured Property. (Id. ¶ 21.) Plaintiff seeks to recover the difference between the replacement cost of the Insured Property and the amount Travelers paid her. (Id. )
The relevant portion of the policy between Travelers and Plaintiff (the "Policy") provides:
4. Loss Settlement.
***
Covered property losses are settled as follows:
***
b. Buildings under Coverage A or B at replacement cost without deduction for depreciation, subject to the following:
(1) ... we will pay the cost to repair or replace, after application of any deductible and without deduction for depreciation, but not more than the least of the following amounts:
(a) the limit of liability under this policy that applies to the building;
(b) the replacement cost of that part of the building damaged for like construction and use, on the same premises; or
(c) the necessary amount actually spent to repair or replace the damaged building.
***
(4) We will pay no more than the actual cash value of the damage until actual repair or replacement is complete. Once actual repair or replacement is complete, we will settle the loss as noted in b.(1) and b.(2) above.
The Policy is attached as Exhibit 1 to the Complaint. Plaintiff has not provided the entire Policy including the loss settlement section cited by Defendant. Plaintiff, however, does not contest that this is the applicable portion of the Policy or its terms.
Plaintiff filed this action in Lake County Superior Court on December 17, 2020. Plaintiff brings claims for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and declaratory relief. Defendant removed the action to this Court on January 16, 2020. On August 28, 2020, Defendant filed this motion for judgment on the pleadings. Plaintiff opposed the motion and also filed a motion to stay the action pending the resolution of a state court proceeding. Defendant opposed Plaintiff's motion to stay. Although Plaintiff's deadline to submit a reply in support of its motion to stay was October 5, 2020, Plaintiff did not submit a reply.
ANALYSIS
A. Applicable Legal Standard.
Under Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, "[a]fter the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial—a party may move for judgment on the pleadings." A motion for judgment on the pleadings challenges the legal sufficiency of the claims asserted in a complaint. For the purposes of a Rule 12(c) motion, the Court must accept the allegations of the non-moving party as true. Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner and Co., Inc. , 896 F.2d 1542, 1550 (9th Cir. 1990) (internal citations omitted). "Judgment on the pleadings is proper when the moving party clearly establishes on the face of the pleadings that no material issue of fact remains to be resolved and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine Inc. , 867 F.2d 1188, 1192 (9th Cir. 1989) ("The principal difference between motions filed pursuant to Rule 12(b) and Rule 12(c) is the time of filing. Because the motions are functionally identical, the same standard of review applicable to a Rule 12(b) motion applies to its Rule 12(c) analog.")
Generally, a court may not consider any material beyond the pleadings in ruling on a Rule 12(c) motion, but a "court may consider facts that are contained in materials of which the court may take judicial notice." Heliotrope General, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co. , 189 F.3d 971, 981 n.18 (9th Cir. 1999) (internal quotations and citation omitted). A court may also consider documents attached to the pleadings. See Lee v. City of Los Angeles , 250 F.3d 668, 688–89 (9th Cir. 2001). In this regard, a court need not accept as true any allegations that are contradicted by judicially noticeable facts. In re Google Inc. , No. 13-md-2430-LHK, 2013 WL 5423918, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2013) (citing Shwarz v. United States , 234 F.3d 428, 435 (9th Cir. 2000) ). A court is not required to assume the truth of conclusory allegations or of unwarranted inferences. Id. (citations omitted).
B. The Court Grants the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.
1. Breach of Contract
To bring a claim for breach of contract, a plaintiff must show: (1) the existence of a contract; (2) plaintiff's performance or excuse for nonperformance; (3) defendant's breach; and (4) the resulting damages to the plaintiff. Oasis W. Realty, LLC v. Goldman , 51 Cal.4th 811, 821, 124 Cal.Rptr.3d 256, 250 P.3d 1115 (2011). Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot satisfy the third element—breach—because Travelers paid the amount to which Plaintiff is entitled under the Policy.
The Policy sets forth three potential measures of indemnity for the loss of the Insured Property: (1) the policy liability limit, which is $413,446.42; (2) the replacement cost to rebuild on the same premises as the destroyed home, which is $375,446.42; or (3) the necessary amount actually spent to repair or replace the damaged home, which is $358,576.81. In construing a similar policy provision, the court in Conway v. Farmers Home Mut. Ins. Co. , interpreted these measures as follows: "The first measure, of course, limits the amount available for replacement to policy limits, while the second relates to a theoretical or hypothetical measure of loss: that is, the replacement cost of rebuilding the identical structure as one limit of the company's liability ... [T]he third limitation of liability strengthens the requirement that liability of the company does not exist until repair or replacement is made [and] is intended to disallow an insured from recovering, in replacement cost proceeds, any amount other than that actually expended." 26 Cal. App. 4th 1185, 1190, 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 883 (1994). According to the Policy, Plaintiff is entitled to the least of these three amounts. Travelers argues that the amount actually spent to replace the Insured Property is the smallest of the three amounts, so Plaintiff is entitled to that amount under the Policy. Further, because it is undisputed that Travelers paid that amount, Defendant argues that Plaintiff's breach of contract claim must fail.
The policy limit is reported inconsistently across the papers. Plaintiff alleges that the limit is in excess of $413,875.00. (Compl. ¶ 20(4).) Defendant asserts the policy limit is $413,446.00, and, in her opposition, Plaintiff states that the policy limit is $376,250.00. (Opp. at 3(a).) Regardless of the correct amount, neither party argues that Plaintiff is entitled to the policy limit as the proper measure of indemnity for Plaintiff's loss under these circumstances.
Plaintiff does not dispute the relevant terms of the Policy or the three measures of indemnity. According to Plaintiff, however, California Insurance Code section 2051.5 (" Section 2051.5") requires Defendant to pay her the theoretical replacement cost, not the amount actually spent to replace the property. Section 2051.5 provides:
(a) Under an open policy that requires payment of the replacement cost for a loss, the measure of indemnity is the amount that it would cost the insured to repair, rebuild, or replace the thing lost or injured, without a deduction for physical depreciation, or the policy limit, whichever is less. If the policy requires the insured to repair, rebuild, or replace the damaged property in order to collect the full replacement cost, the insurer shall pay the actual cash value of the damaged property, as defined in Section 2051, until the damaged property is repaired, rebuilt, or replaced. Once the property is repaired, rebuilt, or replaced, the insurer shall pay the difference between the actual cash value payment made and the full replacement cost reasonably paid to replace the damaged property, up to the limits stated in the policy.
...
(c) In the event of a total loss of the insured structure, no policy issued or delivered in this state may contain a provision that limits or denies payment of the replacement cost in the event the insured decides to rebuild or replace the property at a location other than the insured premises. However, the measure of indemnity shall be based upon the replacement cost of the insured property and shall not be based upon the cost to repair, rebuild, or replace at a location other than the insured premises.
Cal. Ins. Code § 2051.5, Stats. 2005, c. 448 (S.B. 518) § 2.
Section 2051.5 was amended in 2018, but the parties agree that the 2005 version of Section 2051.5 is applicable here. All citations are to the 2005 version of the statute.
Plaintiff argues that Section 2051.5(c) prohibits an insurer from limiting payment of the replacement cost if the insured decides to rebuild the home at a location other than the insured premises. Plaintiff contends that in these situations the proper measure of indemnity should be the hypothetical replacement cost of the insured premises, not the actual amount spent to rebuild or replace the home. Plaintiff argues that Travelers violated Section 2051.5(c) because it paid the actual cash value of the Insured Property rather than the hypothetical replacement cost.
The Court is not persuaded by Plaintiff's argument. The meaning of a statute "may not be determined from a single word or sentence; the words must be construed in context, and the provisions relating to the same subject matter must be harmonized to the extent possible." Lungren v. Deukmejian , 45 Cal. 3d. 727, 735, 248 Cal.Rptr. 115, 755 P.2d 299 (1988). Plaintiff's cramped reading of Section 2051.5 focuses solely on Section 2051.5(c) and ignores Section 2051.5(a). This is inconsistent with California's rules of statutory interpretation. Id. ("[T]he ‘plain meaning’ rule does not prohibit a court from determining ... whether such a construction of one provision is consistent with other provisions of the statute.").
Examining the statute in its entirety, the Court concludes that Section 2051.5(c) acts as a proviso to Section 2051.5(a). In a situation where the hypothetical replacement cost is the appropriate measure of indemnity, Section 2051.5(c) prevents the insurer from calculating that hypothetical replacement cost based on the cost to replace in some other location as opposed to the cost to replace the destroyed property. However, contrary to Plaintiff's argument, Section 2051.5(c) does not permit the insured to recover the hypothetical replacement cost without regard to the amount that was actually spent to replace the property. Plaintiff's reading of Section 2051.5(c) would effectively eliminate the other measures of indemnity provided for in the Policy any time a homeowner decided to rebuild a home in a different location. See Galusha v. Unigard Ins. Co. , No. C 18-06905 SBA, 2019 WL 8128571, at *4 (N.D. Cal. June 28, 2019), aff'd , 816 F. App'x 46 (9th Cir. 2020) (" Section 2051.5(c) does not mandate that the other measures of indemnity—the policy limit and the amount actually expended—be read out of the Policy.").
The court in Galusha addressed a similar situation. Like Plaintiff here, the Galusha plaintiffs lost their home in a fire and replaced their property with a home in a new location. Id. at *1. Under their insurance policy with Unigard, the plaintiffs were entitled to the least of three amounts: (1) the policy limit; (2) the replacement cost; or (3) the necessary amount actually spent to repair or replace the property. Id. at *2. Unigard paid the plaintiffs $378,972—the amount actually spent to replace their property—which was the least of the three amounts. Id. at *3. The plaintiffs sued Unigard arguing that under Section 2051.5(c) they were entitled to the estimated replacement cost of the destroyed home, which was $494,600.36. Id. The court disagreed. The court found that Unigard's payment of the actual amount spent to replace "in no way ‘limit[ed] or denie[d]’ payment of the replacement cost based on Plaintiffs’ decision to relocate" because "had Plaintiffs built a different dwelling on the same premises , at a cost of $378,972, they would have been entitled to recover the same sum." Id. at *4. The court also found that the plaintiffs incorrectly read Section 2051.5(c) to mandate payment of the "replacement cost" as the measure of indemnity. The court explained that Section 2051.5(c) did not require that the replacement cost shall be the measure of indemnity as the plaintiffs argued, but rather that subsection requires only that the hypothetical replacement cost "shall be based upon the replacement cost of the insured property." Id. at *4 (internal quotation and citation omitted). The court explained that the insured would be entitled to recover the replacement cost "only if it is the smallest of the three measures provided under the Policy. If it is not, the insured is entitled to recover the smaller of the policy limit or the amount actually expended to repair or replace the dwelling." Id. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the plaintiffs’ claim agreeing that Section 2051.5(c) "merely defines how to calculate [the replacement cost] when that is the appropriate measure of recovery." Galusha , 816 F. App'x at 47.
Galusha is instructive. As in Galusha , the Policy here provides for three measures of indemnity. After the Insured Property was destroyed and consistent with the Policy, Travelers paid Plaintiff $358,576.81, the actual cash value of the Insured Property. (See Policy at 15.) Travelers also calculated the hypothetical replacement cost of the Insured Property as $375,446.42. Rather than replace on the same premises, Plaintiff purchased the Replacement Property, and the actual amount Plaintiff spent doing so was not more than $358,576.81. As the Ninth Circuit confirmed in Galusha , Plaintiff is not entitled to receive the replacement cost unless it is the appropriate measure of recovery, i.e. , the smallest of the three measures under the Policy. Here, it is undisputed that is not. Neither the Policy nor Section 2051.5 entitles Plaintiff to receive more than she actually expended to replace her home. See Conway , 26 Cal. App. 4th at 1190, 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 883 ("This third valuation method is intended to disallow an insured from recovering, in replacement cost proceeds, any amount other than that actually expended.")
If Plaintiff had spent more than $358,576.81 on the Replacement Property she would have been entitled to receive the difference between the actual cash value and the actual amount spent to replace under Section 2051.5(a) and the Policy; however, she did not exceed that amount.
Plaintiff argues that Galusha should be disregarded because its holding is unclear. The Court disagrees. There is no ambiguity in Galusha ’s holding: "Contrary to the Galusha's interpretation, Section 2051.5(c) does not state that an insured is entitled to replacement costs; it merely defines how to calculate that measure of indemnity when that is the appropriate measure of recovery. Nothing in section 2051.5(c) prevented Unigard from limiting the Galushas’ reimbursement to their actual expenditures, as set forth in the homeowners insurance policy." 816 F. App'x at 47. The Court finds the reasoning in Galusha applicable and persuasive here.
Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff's breach of contract claim fails because Travelers has paid the amount Plaintiff is entitled to under the Policy. For these reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant's motion for judgment on the breach of contract claim.
2. Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
Defendant argues that Plaintiff's claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing must be dismissed because Travelers paid the full amount to which Plaintiff is entitled under the Policy and because the genuine dispute doctrine precludes a finding of bad faith on the part of Travelers. Because Plaintiff's claim for punitive damages is based on her bad faith claim, Travelers argues that this claim too must be dismissed.
As an initial matter, Plaintiff concedes these arguments by failing to address them in her opposition. Davis v. Einstein Noah Rest. Grp., Inc. , No. 19-cv-00771-JSW, 2019 WL 6835717, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 23, 2019) (citing Ramirez v. Ghilotti Bros. Inc. , 941 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1210 (N.D. Cal. 2013) ); Gordon v. Davenport , No. 08-cv-3341, 2009 WL 322891, at *4 n.4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2009) ("Indeed, plaintiff does not even address his third cause of action in his opposition brief, suggesting that he concedes defendants’ assertion that he fails to state facts giving rise to a claim for relief."), aff'd sub nom. Gordon v. State Bar of Cal. , 369 Fed. App'x. 833 (9th Cir. 2010). Moreover, because Plaintiff's claim for breach of contract and her claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing are based on the same allegation that Travelers refused to properly measure or pay indemnity for the Insured Property, the bad faith claim is duplicative of Plaintiff's contract claim and may be dismissed. Landucci v. State Farm Ins. Co. , 65 F. Supp. 3d 694, 716 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (dismissing breach of implied covenant claim because it was duplicative of breach of contract claim).
Accordingly, the Court concludes that Defendant is entitled to judgment on Plaintiff's claims for breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and punitive damages.
3. Declaratory Relief
Defendant also argues that Plaintiff's claim for declaratory relief fails on the basis that the claim is wholly derivative of Plaintiff's claim for breach of contract. Plaintiff also does not address this argument in her opposition.
"Declaratory relief should be denied when it will neither serve a useful purpose in clarifying and settling the legal relations in issue nor terminate the proceedings and afford relief from the uncertainty and controversy faced by the parties." U.S. v. Washington , 759 F.2d 1353, 1356-57 (9th Cir. 1985). Where a claim for declaratory relief is merely duplicative of other causes of action asserted by a plaintiff, dismissal is proper. See Swartz v. KPMG LLP , 476 F.3d 756, 765-66 (9th Cir. 2007). For that reason, "courts have dismissed companion claims for declaratory relief where the breach of contract claims resolved the dispute completely and rendered additional relief inappropriate." Davis v. Capitol Records, LLC , No. 12-cv-1602, 2013 WL 1701746, at *3-4 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2013) ; see also Essex Marina City Club, L.P. v. Cont'l Cas. Co. , No. 11-408SC, 2011 WL 1753906, at *3-*4 (N.D. Cal. May 9, 2011) (dismissing declaratory relief claim in an insurance breach of contract action where a declaration of the duty owed by the insurer to the insured "add[ed] nothing to the breach-of-contract claim asserted and likely to be resolved in this action"); B & O Mfg., Inc. v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. , No. C 07-02864 JSW, 2007 WL 3232276, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 2007) (dismissing declaratory relief claim that was duplicative of plaintiff's breach of contract claim). But "[d]eclaratory relief is appropriate ... where a breach of contract claim will not settle all of the contractual issues concerning which plaintiff seeks declaratory relief." StreamCast Networks, Inc. v. IBIS LLC , No. CV 05-04239, 2006 WL 5720345, at *3 (C.D. Cal. May 2, 2006) (denying motion to dismiss where declaratory judgment would clarify ongoing contractual obligations).
Plaintiff's claim for declaratory relief is duplicative of the breach of contract claim. The contract claim seeks damages for Travelers’ alleged refusal to pay the replacement cost of the Insured Property based on Section 2051.5(c). The declaratory relief claim seeks a determination of Travelers’ duties under Section 2051.5(c) in order to "direct the parties as to how to proceed with the underlying claim for insurance benefits" in the Policy. (Compl. ¶ 23.) This is duplicative of the issue addressed by Plaintiff's breach of contract claim. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant's motion for judgment as to Plaintiff's declaratory relief claim.
C. The Court Denies the Motion to Stay.
Plaintiff requests a stay of the action pending an appeal before the California State Court of Appeal in a separate proceeding, Westmoreland v. Farmers Insurance. According to Plaintiff, the issue on appeal in Westmoreland is the interpretation of Section 2051.5(c). Plaintiff argues that a stay is appropriate because it would allow the state court to interpret the statute, ensure consistent application of the law, and prevent this court from having to decide a state law as a matter of first impression.
Plaintiff also argues that the case should be stayed because the decision in Galusha is currently on appeal before the Ninth Circuit on petition for panel rehearing. However, the Ninth Circuit panel unanimously voted to deny the petition for panel rehearing on September 21, 2020. Galusha v. Unigard , No. 19-16396, Dkt. No. 51 (9th Cir. 2020).
"The power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to control the disposition of the cases on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants." Landis v. N. Am. Co. , 299 U.S. 248, 254, 57 S.Ct. 163, 81 L.Ed. 153 (1936). A trial court may "find it is efficient for its own docket and the fairest course for the parties to enter a stay of an action before it, pending resolution of independent proceedings which bear upon the case." Dependable Highway Exp., Inc. v. Navigators Ins. Co. , 498 F.3d 1059, 1066 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Leyva v. Certified Grocers of Cal., Ltd. , 593 F.2d 857, 863–64 (9th Cir. 1979) ). A district court can exercise its discretion to stay an action pending the conclusion of an alternative proceeding. See Leyva , 593 F.2d at 863-64. "Where it is proposed that a pending proceeding be stayed, the competing interests which will be affected by the granting or refusal to grant a stay must be weighed." CMAX, Inc. v. Hall , 300 F.2d 265, 268 (9th Cir. 1962). Typically, this balancing test requires the court to consider (1) "the possible damage which may result from the granting of a stay;" (2) "the hardship or inequity which a party may suffer in being required to go forward;" and (3) "the orderly course of justice measured in terms of simplifying or complicating the issues, proof, and questions of law which could be expected to result from a stay." Id. (citing Landis , 299 U.S. at 254-55, 57 S.Ct. 163 ). The party seeking a stay bears the burden of establishing a "clear case of hardship or inequity in being required to go forward" with a lawsuit "if there is even a fair possibility that the stay ... will work damage to some one else." Landis , 299 U.S. at 255, 57 S.Ct. 163.
The Court concludes that the Landis factors weigh against granting Plaintiff's request for a stay. The first factor assesses the possible damage to Travelers from granting a stay. The Ninth Circuit has held that "being required to defend a suit, without more, does not constitute a ‘clear case of hardship or inequity’ within the meaning of Landis. " Lockyer v. Mirant Corp. , 398 F.3d 1098, 1112 (9th Cir. 2005). Moreover, other courts have held that delaying a determination of whether an insurer owes an insured party coverage does not substantially harm the insurer. See Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Omnicell, Inc. , No. 18-CV-05345-LHK, 2019 WL 570760, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2019). However, granting Plaintiff's request for a stay would force Travelers to wait many months to resolve this dispute, which was initiated by Plaintiff. See Landis , 299 U.S. at 255, 57 S.Ct. 163 ("Only in rare circumstances will a litigant in one c[a]se be compelled to stand aside while a litigant in another settles the rule of law that will define the rights of both."). Accordingly, the Court finds that Travelers will face some hardship if the case is stayed.
The second factor assesses the possible harm or prejudice to Plaintiff if this case proceeds without a stay. Plaintiff argues that she would suffer prejudice absent a stay because if Westmoreland finds for the insurer, "Plaintiffs would be greatly prejudiced since their case ... would have been previously dismissed by this [...] Court." (Mot. at 3.) This is an argument of efficiency, not prejudice. Although Plaintiff's counsel is involved in both Westmoreland and Galusha , Plaintiff nevertheless chose to initiate and pursue this action without contemplating the possibility of an appeal in a similar case. In any event, if the Westmoreland case comes out in favor the insured, Plaintiff would not be precluded from appealing this decision. The financial burdens associated with continuing to litigate a case does not constitute prejudice. Beijing Tong Ren Tang (USA), Corp. v. TRT USA Corp. , No. C-09-00882 RMW, 2009 WL 5108578, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2009). The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to establish a "clear case of hardship or inequity," and this factor weighs against a stay.
Finally, the Court considers whether a stay will promote the "orderly course of justice measured in terms of the simplifying or complicating of issues, proof, and questions of law which could be expected to result from a stay." CMAX , 300 F.2d at 268. The Court finds this factor weighs against a stay. Plaintiff suggests that a stay would clarify the issue of Section 2051.5(c) ’s interpretation, but the Court is already guided by the Ninth Circuit's clear rationale on this issue as set forth in Galusha. Plaintiff asks this Court to wait for a decision in Westmoreland appeal without offering any details about when such a decision may come. She offers no specifics regarding that case, the briefing schedule, or when it is scheduled for argument. Staying this case for an indefinite amount of time cuts against the Court's interest in managing its docket efficiently. Accordingly, this factor weighs against a stay. For these reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's motion to stay.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings. The Court DENIES Plaintiff's motion to stay the action. A separate judgment will issue, and the Clerk may close the file.