APPENDIX. Alderman v. State, 254 Ga. 206 ( 327 S.E.2d 168) (1985); Conner v. State, 251 Ga. 113 ( 303 S.E.2d 266) (1983); Smith v. State, 249 Ga. 228 ( 290 S.E.2d 43) (1982); Krier v. State, 249 Ga. 80 ( 287 S.E.2d 531) (1982); Cunningham v. State, 248 Ga. 558 ( 284 S.E.2d 390) (1981); Brown v. State, 247 Ga. 298 ( 275 S.E.2d 52) (1981); High v. State, 247 Ga. 289 ( 276 S.E.2d 5) (1981); Strickland v. State, 247 Ga. 219 ( 275 S.E.2d 29) (1981); Tyler v. State, 247 Ga. 119 ( 274 S.E.2d 549) (1981); Cape v. State, 246 Ga. 520 ( 272 S.E.2d 487) (1980); Thomas v. State, 245 Ga. 688 ( 266 S.E.2d 499) (1980); Hardy v. State, 245 Ga. 272 ( 264 S.E.2d 209) (1980); Hamilton v. State, 244 Ga. 145 ( 259 S.E.2d 81) (1979); Bowen v. State, 244 Ga. 495 ( 260 S.E.2d 855) (1979); Johnson v. State, 242 Ga. 649 ( 250 S.E.2d 394) (1978); Alderman v. State, 241 Ga. 496 ( 246 S.E.2d 642) (1978); Morgan v. State, 241 Ga. 485 ( 246 S.E.2d 198) (1978); Blake v. State, 239 Ga. 292 ( 236 S.E.2d 637) (1977); Dix v. State, 238 Ga. 209 ( 232 S.E.2d 47) (1977); Harris v. State, 237 Ga. 718 ( 230 S.E.2d 1) (1976). SMITH, Presiding Justice.

Cases selected for comparison included those involving a death sentence or those involving a life sentence for domestic homicides, that is where the victim was a girl friend, spouse, or ex-spouse of the perpetrator, or a relative of the girl friend, spouse, or ex-spouse. As we noted in Tyler v. State, 247 Ga. 119 ( 274 S.E.2d 549) (1981), and Gilreath v. State, supra, "Although lesser sentences than death are frequently imposed in domestic murder cases, it does not follow that the death penalty would not be authorized for the murder of one spouse by another under any circumstances. [Cites omitted.] Some of the more vile, horrible or inhuman homicides have been perpetrated by family members against one another." Tyler v. State, supra at 126.

Cases selected for comparison include those involving a death sentence or those involving a life sentence for domestic homicides, that is, where the victim was a girlfriend, spouse or ex-spouse of the perpetrator or a relative of the girlfriend, spouse or ex-spouse. As we noted in Tyler v. State, 247 Ga. 119, 126 ( 274 S.E.2d 549) (1981), "although lesser sentences than death are frequently imposed in domestic murder cases, it does not follow that the death penalty would not be authorized for the murder of one spouse by another under any circumstances," citing Dix v. State, 238 Ga. 209 ( 232 S.E.2d 47) (1977). Some of the most vicious homicides have been perpetrated by family members against one another.

Moreover, we previously have considered statements like those Detective McGowan made urging Dawson to explain his side of the story—for example, suggesting that Camara's death may not have been intentional, and was instead a mistake or an accident—and concluded that such statements are permissible. See, e.g., Pittman v. State , 277 Ga. 475, 477, 592 S.E.2d 72 (2004) ("The detective's suggestion that [the accused] may not have intended to kill the victim did not amount to a hope of benefit."); Tyler v. State , 247 Ga. 119, 122, 274 S.E.2d 549 (1981) (agent's statement, "I told [the accused] that the best thing, if she had anything to do with it, was to go ahead and get it off her chest; that sometimes people did things for various reasons; sometimes it's self-defense just various reasons," was not an impermissible hope of lighter punishment because "[f]or an officer to advise an accused that it is always best to tell the truth will not, without more, render a subsequent confession inadmissible under [former OCGA § 24-3-50 ’s predecessor statute]") (citation and punctuation omitted). Indeed, many of Detective McGowan's statements are similar to those a detective made in Johnson v. State , 295 Ga. 421, 761 S.E.2d 13 (2014), warning the accused not to lie because the detective knew the accused was at the crime scene; that the detective wanted to hear the accused's side of the story and version of events; and that he could "get up and walk out this door and send your a** to the county jail and change this charge from aggravated assa

The detective's suggestion that Pittman may not have intended to kill the victim did not amount to a hope of benefit. Tyler v. State, 247 Ga. 119, 122 (2) ( 274 S.E.2d 549) (1981). State v. Ritter, 268 Ga. 108 ( 485 S.E.2d 108) (1997), cited by Pittman is inapposite.

This Court has held repeatedly that such admonitions to tell the truth will not invalidate a confession. Lee v. State, 270 Ga. 798, 800 (2) ( 514 S.E.2d 1) (1999); Gilliam v. State, 268 Ga. 690, 692 (3) ( 492 S.E.2d 185) (1997); Duke v. State, 268 Ga. 425, 426 (2) ( 489 S.E.2d 811) (1997); Henry v. State, 265 Ga. 732, 736 (4) (c) ( 462 S.E.2d 737) (1995); Kettman v. State, 257 Ga. 603, 607 (10) ( 362 S.E.2d 342) (1987); Cooper v. State, supra at 235 (2);Whittington v. State, 252 Ga. 168, 176 (6) ( 313 S.E.2d 73) (1984);Caffo v. State, 247 Ga. 751, 755 (3) ( 279 S.E.2d 678) (1981); Tyler v. State, 247 Ga. 119, 121 (2) ( 274 S.E.2d 549) (1981); Fowler v. State, 246 Ga. 256, 258 (4) ( 271 S.E.2d 168) (1980). "The fact that a confession has been made under a spiritual exhortation, a promise of secrecy, or a promise of collateral benefit shall not exclude it."

We have also held that "`[f]or an officer to advise an accused that it is always best to tell the truth will not, without more, render a subsequent confession inadmissible under [OCGA § 24-3-50].'" Caffo, supra, 247 Ga. at 757, quoting Tyler v. State, 247 Ga. 119, 122 ( 274 S.E.2d 549) (1981). We conclude that the statements by the officers which are in question were not an impermissible inducement or hope of benefit.

Appellant was offered hope of benefit for producing a valid alibi, not a statement. We find no error. Tyler v. State, 247 Ga. 119, 122 ( 274 S.E.2d 549) (1981). 8. Appellant finally contends that the trial court improperly admitted evidence of his "prior bad acts."

APPENDIX.Conner v. State, 251 Ga. 113 ( 303 S.E.2d 266) (1983); Smith v. State, 249 Ga. 228 ( 290 S.E.2d 43) (1982); Krier v. State, 249 Ga. 80 ( 287 S.E.2d 531) (1982); Cunningham v. State, 248 Ga. 558 ( 284 S.E.2d 390) (1981); Brown v. State, 247 Ga. 298 ( 275 S.E.2d 52) (1981); High v. State, 247 Ga. 289 ( 276 S.E.2d 5) (1981); Strickland v. State, 247 Ga. 219 ( 275 S.E.2d 29) (1981); Tyler v. State, 247 Ga. 119 ( 274 S.E.2d 549) (1981); Nelson v. State, 247 Ga. 172 ( 274 S.E.2d 317) (1981); Cape v. State, 246 Ga. 520 ( 272 S.E.2d 487) (1980); Thomas v. State, 245 Ga. 688 ( 266 S.E.2d 499) (1980); Hardy v. State, 245 Ga. 272 ( 264 S.E.2d 209) (1980); Hamilton v. State, 244 Ga. 145 ( 259 S.E.2d 81) (1979); Bowen v. State, 244 Ga. 495 ( 260 S.E.2d 855) (1979); Johnson v. State, 242 Ga. 649 ( 250 S.E.2d 394) (1978); Alderman v. State, 241 Ga. 496 ( 246 S.E.2d 642) (1978); Morgan v. State, 241 Ga. 485 ( 246 S.E.2d 198) (1978); Blake v. State, 239 Ga. 292 ( 236 S.E.2d 637) (1977); Dix v. State, 238 Ga. 209 ( 232 S.E.2d 47) (1977); Harris v. State, 237 Ga. 718 ( 230 S.E.2d 1) (1976). DECIDED FEBRUARY 28, 1985 — REHEARING DENIED MARCH 28, 1985.

Under these circumstances, we will not countenance — on appeal — Moon's suggestion that the trial court's admission of the statements was error. Brawner v. State, 250 Ga. 125, 126 ( 296 S.E.2d 551) (1982); Tyler v. State, 247 Ga. 119, 122 ( 274 S.E.2d 549) (1981); Wisecup v. State, 157 Ga. App. 853 (2) ( 278 S.E.2d 682) (1981). 3. Moon's remaining enumerations, relating to the court's initial instructions, the additional instructions given at the request of the jury, and the want of an instruction on voluntary manslaughter, were waived for lack of timely request, objection, or reservation.