Opinion
C. A. 9:22-cv-01544-MGL-MHC
07-17-2023
Larry James Tyler, Plaintiff, v. James Hudson and Diann Wilks, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Molly H. Cherry, United States Magistrate Judge
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed this action, alleging a violation of his constitutional rights with respect to his medical care. This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment as to Defendant Diann Wilks (“Motion”). ECF No. 34. For the reasons that follow, the undersigned recommends that Plaintiff's Motion be denied, and this action dismissed.
All pretrial proceedings in this case were referred to the undersigned pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(e) (D.S.C.), and this Report and Recommendation is entered for review by the District Judge.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff seeks a default judgment against Defendant Wilks for her failure to answer or otherwise respond to Plaintiff's Complaint. Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on May 13, 2022. ECF No. 1. On June 17, 2022, the Court directed Defendants to file an answer to the Complaint or otherwise plead. ECF No. 5 at 2. After process was served, Defendant Hudson responded to the Complaint. ECF No. 14. Defendant Wilks did not.
On October 6, 2022, the Court sought a status report from Plaintiff as to Defendant Wilks, because she appeared to have been served with the Complaint on July 15, 2022, but had not made an appearance in the action. ECF No. 28. On October 14, 2022, Plaintiff requested entry of default against Defendant Wilks, ECF No. 35, which was subsequently entered by the Clerk on October 26, 2022, ECF No. 36.
Plaintiff filed a Motion for Default Judgment against Defendant Wilks on October 14, 2022. ECF No. 34. A copy of the Motion for Default Judgment was mailed to Defendant Wilks on November 4, 2022, at the same address where the Complaint was served on her. ECF Nos. 39, 41. Defendant Wilks has not filed any response to the Complaint, the Request for Entry of Default, or the Motion for Default Judgment.
On April 24, 2023, Plaintiff filed another Request for Entry of Default and Judgment against Defendant Wilks. ECF No. 79. On May 3, 2023, Defendant Hudson filed a Response in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment, ECF No. 81, and Plaintiff filed a Motion to Dismiss the Response, ECF No. 82. Defendant Wilks did not file any response to these pleadings.
DISCUSSION
Once entry of default has been entered pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(a), Rule 55(b) permits entry of default judgment against properly served defendants who failed to file responsive pleadings. In determining whether to enter judgment on the default, “[t]he court must . . . determine whether the well-pleaded allegations in [Plaintiff's] complaint support the relief sought in this action.” Ryan v. Homecomings Fin. Network, 253 F.3d 778, 780 (4th Cir. 2001); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(b)(6) (“An allegation - other than one relating to the amount of damages -is admitted if a responsive pleading is required and the allegation is not denied.”). Additionally, “[i]f the court finds that liability is established, it must then determine damages.” J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Romenski, 845 F.Supp.2d 703, 706 (W.D. N.C. 2012). In its findings, “[t]he court must make an independent determination regarding damages, and cannot accept as true factual allegations of damages.” Id.
A. Allegations in Complaint
Plaintiff's Complaint alleges the following pertinent facts: Around April 4th, Plaintiff woke with pain in his thumb and was unable to bend it. ECF No. 1 at 6. A few days later, Defendant Wilks looked at Plaintiff's thumb, observing it was swollen and could not be bent, and told Plaintiff that it was arthritis or gout. Id. She gave him medicine the next day, for five days only. Id. After four weeks, with no relief from the pain in his thumb, Plaintiff had another nurse look at his thumb, and she told him it was “trigger finger” that would require surgery. Id. Defendants Wilks and Hudson would not give the order for Plaintiff to go to a hospital for surgery because of the expense. Id. Plaintiff asked Defendant Wilks for a doctor's order to not use his hand until his thumb is repaired, but she refused to do it. Id. No kind of pain medication Plaintiff has been given, which is very little, dulls the pain in his thumb. Id.
B. Effect of Default
The undersigned finds that Defendant Wilks' failure to answer or otherwise defend against well-pled allegations in Plaintiff's Complaint means those allegations are deemed admitted. Ryan, 253 F.3d at 780. However, the defendant is not deemed to have admitted conclusions of law and the entry of “default is not treated as an absolute confession by the defendant of his liability and of the plaintiff's right to recover.” Id. (citation omitted); see also Romenski, 845 F.Supp.2d at 705. Thus, it is for the Court to determine whether the facts, as alleged, support Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment and the relief sought. See Ryan, 253 F.3d at 780; Romenski, 745 F.Supp.2d at 705.
C. Section 1983 Claim
Plaintiff has sued Defendant Wilks in her individual capacity, alleging a violation of his constitutional rights for deliberate indifferent to his medical needs, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See ECF No. 1 at 4-7. To state a § 1983 claim, Plaintiff must demonstrate that Defendant Wilks, acting under color of state law, deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Mentavlos v. Anderson, 249 F.3d 301, 310 (4th Cir. 2001).
Even though Defendant Wilks is apparently employed by Hartsville Medical Enrichment Services, LLC (“HMES”), which is a private company that provides medical services at the Darlington County Detention Center (“DCDC”), individual employees of medical companies providing contract medical care have been found to be “public officials” for purposes of § 1983 lawsuits. See, e.g., Womble v. Williams, No. CV 9:18-2625-MBS-BM, 2019 WL 8375941, at *4 n.6 (D.S.C. Oct. 16, 2019) (noting private physicians contracted by the State to provide medical care to prisoners were state actors for purposes of § 1983), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV 9:18-2625-MBS, 2020 WL 702752 (D.S.C. Feb. 12, 2020).
Plaintiff asserts that his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights have been violated. Plaintiff's sentence for his underlying conviction has been served, such that Plaintiff remains incarcerated because of his refusal to comply with the Sexually Violent Predator Act's requirements. ECF No. 84-1, Plaintiff's Dep. 31:10-32:2. Assuming that, at this point, Plaintiff would be entitled to the status of a civilly committed inmate (as opposed to a convicted prisoner), his custody status, as such, would most closely resemble that of a pretrial detainee. See Tyler v. Coe, No. CV 9:16-2711-MGL-BM, 2017 WL 1102817, at *4 (D.S.C. Mar. 9, 2017) (noting civilly committed persons are treated as pretrial detainees (citing Lingle v. Kibby, 526 F. App'x. 665, 667 (7th Cir. Apr. 15, 2013))), report and recommendation adopted, No. 9:16-CV-02711-MGL, 2017 WL 1094257 (D.S.C. Mar. 23, 2017); Valbert v. S.C. Dep't. of Mental Health, No. 9:12-CV-01973-RBH, 2013 WL 4500455, at *9 (D.S.C. Aug. 20, 2013) (noting same); Treece v. McGill, No. 3:08-03909-DCN, 2010 WL 3781695, at *4 (D.S.C. Sept. 21, 2010) (“A civilly committed individual under the SVPA most closely resembles the custody status of a pre-trial detainee.”). Accordingly, Plaintiff's medical claims are evaluated under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Tyler, 2017 WL 1102817, at *4 (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535, n.16 (1979)), adopted, 2017 WL 1094257; see also Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 265 (2001) (“[D]ue process requires that the conditions and duration of confinement under the [Sexually Violent Predator] Act bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which persons are committed”). Regardless however whether Plaintiff's claims are found under the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment, the analysis is generally the same. See Belcher v. Oliver, 898 F.2d 32, 34 (4th Cir. 1990) (“The Fourteenth Amendment right of pretrial detainees, like the Eighth Amendment right of convicted prisoners, requires that government officials not be deliberately indifferent to any serious medical needs of the detainee.”); Brown v. Harris, 240 F.3d 383, 388 (4th Cir. 2001) (stating that whether the plaintiff is a pretrial detainee or a convicted prisoner, the “standard in either case is the same-that is, whether a government official has been ‘deliberately indifferent to any [of his] serious medical needs'” (quoting Belcher, 898 F.2d at 34)).
1. Constitutional Claim
To sustain his constitutional claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff must make (1) a subjective showing that Defendant Wilks was deliberately indifferent to his medical needs and (2) an objective showing that those needs were serious. Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 241 (4th Cir. 2008) (noting a “plaintiff must demonstrate that the officers acted with ‘deliberate indifference' (subjective) to the inmate's ‘serious medical needs' (objective)”); see also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (to state an Eighth Amendment claim, “a prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence [1] deliberate indifference to [2] serious medical needs” (emphasis added)).
The subjective prong of deliberate indifference is a “very high standard” and merely negligent behaviors do not meet the subjective mens rea requirement. Young v. City of Mount Ranier, 238 F.3d 567, 575-76 (4th Cir. 2001). The Fourth Circuit has recognized two different aspects of an official's state of mind that must be shown to satisfy the subjective prong in this context: “First, actual knowledge of the risk of harm to the inmate is required” and, second, “the officer must also have recognized that [her] actions were insufficient to mitigate the risk of harm to the inmate arising from his medical needs.” Iko, 535 F.3d at 241 (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837 (“[A] prison official cannot be found liable . . . for denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.”).
As to the objective prong, a “serious medical need is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention.” Heyer v. United States Bureau of Prisons, 849 F.3d 202, 210 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Iko, 535 F.3d at 241).
Here, there is no evidence before the Court that any physician has diagnosed Plaintiff's thumb as mandating treatment. Moreover, based upon the allegations in the Complaint, the undersigned cannot conclude that “even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention” for Plaintiff's thumb. See id. Nevertheless, for purposes of Plaintiff's Motion, the undersigned assumes Plaintiff's thumb pain constitutes an objectively serious medical condition. However, Plaintiff has failed to identify facts or other evidence in the record that supports a § 1983 action against Defendant Wilks regarding the subjective component of his constitutional claim.
As noted above, to prove deliberate indifference, Plaintiff must show Defendant Wilks knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to his health and safety. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Under this standard, “mere disagreements between an inmate and a physician over the inmate's proper medical care are not actionable absent exceptional circumstances.” Scinto, 841 F.3d at 225 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, despite Plaintiff's allegation in his Complaint that Defendant Wilks refused to give an order to take Plaintiff to the hospital for surgery, which is a fact deemed as true, there is no evidence that Defendant Wilks denied or refused to give him appropriate medical treatment for his thumb. Indeed, Plaintiff alleges in his Complaint that Defendant Wilks diagnosed his thumb as arthritis or gout and provided treatment for it. ECF No. 1 at 6. Plaintiff appears to disagree with the diagnosis of arthritis and the course of treatment provided. Specifically, based upon the allegations in the Complaint, Plaintiff believes, instead, that he may have “trigger finger” and that he needs surgery.
However, a “difference of opinion regarding the diagnosis and treatment provided by SCDC does not rise to a constitutional violation.” Broach v. Ozmint, No. CA 0:08-3471-HMH-PJG, 2009 WL 1956699, at *5 (D.S.C. July 7, 2009); see also Jackson v. Lightsey, 775 F.3d 170, 178 (4th Cir. 2014) (noting that the Fourth Circuit has consistently found disagreements between an inmate and a physician over the inmate's proper medical care “fall[s] short of showing deliberate indifference”); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 849 (4th Cir. 1985) (“Disagreements between an inmate and a physician over the inmate's proper medical care do not state a § 1983 claim[.]”); Randall v. Wyrick, 642 F.2d 304 (8th Cir.1981) (finding that a prison's refusal to allow a prisoner access to a chiropractor to relieve pain did not constitute deliberate indifference, but rather was merely a difference of opinion as to the most desirable treatment).
Notably, notwithstanding the admissions gleaned from Plaintiff's Complaint, Plaintiff “has presented no medical opinion that the treatment he is currently receiving is inadequate or improper.” See Broach, 2009 WL 1956699, at *5 n.2. (emphasis in original); see also Green v. Senkowski, 100 Fed. App'x 45, 47 (2d Cir. 2004) (unpublished) (finding that a plaintiff's selfdiagnosis unsupported by any medical evidence in the record was insufficient to defeat summary judgment on a deliberate indifference claim). Plaintiff has not provided or pointed to any evidence that contradicts the medical testimony in the record that he has received full and adequate treatment for his thumb.
To the extent Plaintiff maintains more should have been done as to his thumb, that is not a cognizable claim under § 1983. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 107-08 (reasoning that merely contending that more should have been done by the way of diagnosis and treatment failed to state a cognizable § 1983 claim and noting a medical decision to not pursue an avenue of treatment does not represent cruel and unusual punishment); Wright v. Ozmint, No. CA 2:07-2515-JFA-RSC, 2008 WL 4542915, at *4 (D.S.C. Oct. 7, 2008) (“The mere failure to treat all medical problems to a prisoner's satisfaction, even if actual medical malpractice is involved, is insufficient to support a claim under § 1983.”). Indeed, under the Constitution, Plaintiff is entitled to receive adequate medical care, not the medical care of his choosing. Kinloch v. Myers, No. 2:15-CV-00702-MBS-MGB, 2017 WL 9471789, at *17 (D.S.C. July 27, 2017) (“[A] prisoner is not entitled to choose his course of medical treatment.” (citation omitted)), report and recommendation adopted in part, No. CV 2:15-0702-MBS, 2017 WL 4276903 (D.S.C. Sept. 27, 2017); see also Jackson v. Fair, 846 F.2d 811, 817 (1st Cir. 1988) (“Although the Constitution does require that prisoners be provided with a certain minimum level of medical treatment, it does not guarantee to a prisoner the treatment of his choice.”). Thus, Plaintiff has not shown Defendant Wilks was deliberately indifferent to his medical care.
Moreover, the undersigned recommended granting summary judgment to Defendant Hudson, finding that Plaintiff did not present a cause of action or right of recovery against Defendant Hudson. ECF No. 96. Here, Plaintiff's allegations are that Defendants Wilks and Hudson would not give the order for Plaintiff to go to a hospital for surgery because of the expense. ECF No. 1 at 6. “Where the liability is joint and several or closely interrelated and a defending party establishes that plaintiff has no cause of action or present right of recovery, this defense generally inures also to the benefit of a defaulting defendant.” Accardi v. Coley, No. 5:20-CT-3093-FL, 2021 WL 4591682, at *3 (E.D. N.C. Sept. 17, 2021) (quoting U.S. ex rel. Hudson v. Peerless Ins. Co., 374 F.2d 942, 945 (4th Cir. 1967)), aff'd, No. 21-7409, 2021 WL 6067227 (4th Cir. Dec. 20, 2021). Plaintiff's allegations against Defendant Wilks regarding the denial of surgery for his hand are closely interrelated to the claims Plaintiff made against Defendant Hudson. Accordingly, Defendant Wilks is entitled to the same defense of failure to state a claim raised by Defendant Hudson.
2. Qualified Immunity
Defendant Wilks is also entitled to qualified immunity from Plaintiff's claim. The doctrine of qualified immunity offers some protection to a government employee being sued in her individual capacity, as is the case with Defendant Wilks here. The Supreme Court has held that “[g]overnment officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); Renn by and Through Renn v. Garrison, 100 F.3d 344, 349 (4th Cir. 1996).
“The threshold inquiry a court must undertake in a qualified immunity analysis is whether a plaintiff's allegations, if true, establish a clear constitutional violation.” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 736 (2002). If a violation of a constitutional right in fact exists, qualified immunity nonetheless shields a prison official from liability, unless the violation was of a “clearly established right of which a reasonable person would have known.” Wilson v. Kittoe, 337 F.3d 392, 397 (4th Cir. 2003) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
As set forth in detail above, Plaintiff has failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact on any of his allegations of constitutional violations. Because Defendant Wilks did not violate Plaintiff's constitutional rights, she is also shielded from liability by qualified immunity.
RECOMMENDATION
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends that Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment be DENIED and the claims against Defendant Wilks DISMISSED.
The parties are directed to the next page for their rights to file objections to this recommendation.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).