Opinion
05-22-00163-CV
06-22-2022
SALLY TYE F/K/A SALLY S. SHUFFIELD, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS CO-TRUSTEE OF THE SHUFFIELD LIVING TRUST, Appellant v. RODNEY M. SHUFFIELD, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS CO-TRUSTEE OF THE SHUFFIELD LIVING TRUST, Appellee
On Appeal from the 380th Judicial District Court Collin County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 380-02071-2020
ORDER
KEN MOLBERG, JUSTICE
This is an appeal from the trial court's February 3, 2022 order granting appellee's traditional motion for summary judgment and confirming arbitration awards ("Summary Judgment Order"). Before the Court are appellee's motion to determine jurisdiction and appellant's response. Appellee questions whether the Summary Judgment Order is final in light of an order referencing pending claims and signed the same day as, but after, the Summary Judgment Order.
To be final for purposes of appeal, an order or judgement must dispose of all parties and all claims. See Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001). A presumption exists that an order or judgment rendered after a bench or jury trial is final, but no similar presumption exists for an order or judgment rendered without a conventional trial on the merits, as here. See id. at 199-200. Rather, an order or judgment rendered without a conventional trial on the merits is final only if it actually disposes, or "clearly and unequivocally" states it disposes, of all claims and all parties. See id. at 205. No specific words are required, but the Texas Supreme Court has noted that a trial court could express its intent to render a final order or judgment by including a statement that the order or judgment "finally disposes of all parties and all claims and is appealable." See id. at 206; see also Bella Palma, LLC v. Young, 601 S.W.3d 799, 801 (Tex. 2020) (per curiam) ("[A] trial court may express its intent to render a final judgment by describing its action as (1) final, (2) a disposition of all claims and parties, and (3) appealable.").
Relevant to appellee's motion, the Summary Judgment Order recites, in part, as follows:
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that (i) Sarah Stephens' Arbitration Award and Determination, delivered on August 7, 2019, (ii) Sarah Stephens' Second Arbitration Award and Determination, delivered on November 5, 2019, and (iii) the Modification of the First Arbitration Ruling, delivered on December 20, 2019, are all hereby in all things confirmed and incorporated herein as the final judgment of the Court, shall have res judicata effect and are fully and completely enforceable
and that all Parties are entitled to recover based upon them and shall have their execution.
***
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the orders contained in this Judgment represent a Final Judgment of this Court and are final and appealable.
The order that appellee mentions in his motion and references pending claims is the trial court's order sustaining appellee's objection to jury trial, striking jury demand and abating claims subject to ADR Provision of Trust ("Abatement Order"). This order recites, in relevant part, as follows:
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any counterclaims of [appellant] pending in this matter that were not (a) considered and resolved by the arbitration that resulted in the Arbitration Awards or (b) required to be brought and considered as a part of the arbitration that resulted in the Arbitration Awards are hereby abated pending the Parties' compliance with the ADR Provision of the Shuffield Living Trust and further order of this Court.
The order defines "Arbitration Awards" to "mean[] and include[]:" (i) Sarah Stephens' Arbitration Award and Determination, dated August 7, 2019, (ii) Sarah Stephens' Second Arbitration Award and Determination, dated November 4 [sic], 2019, and (iii) the Modification of First Arbitration Ruling, dated December 20, 2019-the same awards and ruling referenced in the Summary Judgment Order.
Appellee notes in his motion that the Summary Judgment Order does not state "anywhere" that it "disposes of all parties and claims," and given that the Abatement Order references pending counterclaims, asserts that, as a result, it may not be final and appealable. While the Summary Judgment Order does not state that it "disposes of all parties and claims," such language is not required. See Bella Palma, 601 S.W.3d at 801. Rather, the order must simply reflect an intent to dispose of all claims and parties. See Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 206. We conclude the order does so.
As quoted above, the Summary Judgment Order states that the awards and modification ruling "shall have res judicata effect." This language reflects an intent to dispose of all claims and parties. Res judicata, or claim preclusion, forecloses relitigation of finally-adjudicated claims or claims that arise out of the same subject matter and could have been litigated in the first action. Njuku v. Middleton, 20 S.W.3d 176, 178 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2000, pet denied). To have "res judicata effect," an order or judgment must be final. See Amstadt v. U.S. Brass Corp., 919 S.W.2d 644, 652 (Tex. 1996); see also Starnes v. Holloway, 779 S.W.2d 86, 93 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, writ denied) ("An interlocutory judgment or order cannot operate as res judicata.").
We conclude the appealed Summary Judgment Order is final and leaves no claims pending. The Order Abating Claims, referencing "any counterclaims . . . pending in this matter," does not alter the Summary Judgment Order's finality.
Having suspended the deadline for appellant to file her brief on the merits while we determined appellee's motion, we ORDER the brief be filed no later than July 22, 2022.