Appellant did not exhaust her administrative remedies as she was required to do. Texas Catastrophe Property Insurance Assoc. v. Miller, 625 S.W.2d 343, 347 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, writ dism'd w.o.j.). Appellant may not bypass the administrative review process mandated by the statute under which she procured her TCPIA policy.

Prior to the amendment of Article 21.49 in 1991, the Travis County venue provision was held to be mandatory. Texas Catastrophe Property Ins. Ass'n v. Miller, 625 S.W.2d 343, 347 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, writ dism'd w.o.j.). Malley contends that in its current form, however, Section 9A of Article 21.49 describes permissive venue.

Id. at 646. Thus, under the TCPIA, the district court has no jurisdiction until administrative remedies are exhausted. See, e.g., Rowden v. Texas Catastrophe Property Ass'n, 677 S.W.2d 83 (Tex.App. — Corpus Christi 1984, no writ); Texas Catastrophe Property Ass'n v. Miller, 625 S.W.2d 343 (Tex.App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, writ dism'd). Furthermore, statutory causes of action for deceptive insurance practices, like Stephanou's, are not exempt from the TCPIA's administrative review process.

Id. at 647. The Saida opinion thus affirms this court's holding in Texas Catastrophe Property Insurance Association v. Miller, 625 S.W.2d 343, 347 (Tex.Civ.App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, writ dism'd w.o.j.) that the procedure for appeal detailed in the Act is mandatory. In light of the supreme court's ruling, Appellant's argument that the trial court has jurisdiction over her petition is clearly without support.

Code Ann. art. 21.49, § 9 (Vernon Supp. 1992). Texas Catastrophe Prop. Ins. Ass'n v. Miller, 625 S.W.2d 343, 346 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, writ dism'd); see also Rowden v. Texas Catastrophe Prop. Ins. Ass'n, 677 S.W.2d 83, 89 (Tex.App. — Corpus Christi 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Functions like those exercised by CATPOOL are delegated by the Texas Legislature to state administrative bodies to further public purposes; they are not granted to private entities representing private interests.

Hence, Holiday Inn now brings this appeal. In holding that it had no jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute between Holiday Inn and TexCat, the District Court relied on an interpretation of Art. 21.49 which was announced in the case of Texas Catastrophe Property Insurance Association v. Miller, 625 S.W.2d 343 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston 1981, writ dismissed w.o.j.). In Miller, a party insured by TexCat attempted to sue the insurer in Harris County, Texas.

Other Texas appeals courts have held similar to the holding this Court reaches today. See, e.g., Montgomery v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 923 S.W.2d 147, 151 (Tex.App.-Austin 1996, no writ) (holding that exhaustion is not required because the administrative system was not authorized to adjudicate the extra-contractual claims); Rowden v. Texas Catastrophe Property Ins. Ass'n, 677 S.W.2d 83, 84 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Texas Catastrophe Property Ins. Ass'n v. Miller, 625 S.W.2d 343 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, writ dism'd w.o.j.). Enforcing exhaustion of all claims arising from a workers' compensation grievance under the administrative system in not the best way to uphold the legislative purposes of the TWCC.

In Saida II, the Austin court of appeals expressly disagreed with the way in which two other courts of appeals had addressed the matter, namely Rowden v. Texas Catastrophe Property Ass'n, 677 S.W.2d 83 (Tex.App. — Corpus Christi 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.), and Texas Catastrophe Property Ass'n v. Miller, 625 S.W.2d 343 (Tex.App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, writ dism'd). Council of Co-Owners of Saida II, 696 S.W.2d at 67-68.

Therefore, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is inapplicable, and Manchester was not required to pursue its administrative remedies as a prerequisite to the assertion of its common-law claims. Foree, 431 S.W.2d at 316; Gregg, 162 Tex. at 33, 344 S.W.2d at 415; Texas Catastrophe Ins. Ass'n v. Miller, 625 S.W.2d 343, 347 (Tex.App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, writ dism'd w.o.j.). Texas Marine and Lyondell also argue that a court decree granting injunctive relief to Manchester would, in effect, nullify and set aside the statutory permits issued by the TACB.

Accordingly, Leisure was required to follow the "mandatory and exclusive" procedures of the APA to obtain judicial review of the Board's order. Saida, supra; Mingus v. Wadley, 115 Tex. 551, 285 S.W. 1084 (1926); Merida v. Texas Municipal Retirement System, 597 S.W.2d 55 (Tex.Civ.App. 1980, no writ); see also: Rowden v. Texas Catastrophe Ins. Ass'n, 677 S.W.2d 83 (Tex.App. 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Texas Catastrophe Property Ins. v. Miller, 625 S.W.2d 343 (Tex.Civ.App. 1981, writ dism'd w.o.j.) [deceptive trade practice claims were asserted in Rowden and Miller ]. Finally, Leisure complains that the Board did not notify counsel of its rendition of the order so that he could timely file a motion for rehearing.