Twyford v. Stephens

5 Citing cases

  1. Cherry v. Chambers

    235 P.2d 674 (Okla. 1951)   Cited 3 times

    The record does not disclose that plaintiff failed to make good her tender, but if it did the motion by defendant came too late. In the case of Twyford v. Stephens, 183 Okla. 534, 83 P.2d 578, it was held that: "The failure of a former owner of land sold for taxes suing to quiet title as against one claiming title under the tax deed, to tender the taxes, interest, penalties and costs assessed against the land, as required by secs.

  2. Hammer v. Baldwin

    225 P.2d 801 (Okla. 1950)   Cited 4 times

    There was uncontradicted testimony that these instruments were left with the county clerk in his office after the certificate numbers on the original notice had been corrected. It appears that when the certificates and notice were produced at the trial they did not bear the filing mark or stamp of the clerk. It has often been held that delivery of an instrument at his office to an officer whose duty it is to receive it for filing is equivalent to filing, regardless of the failure of such officer to mark it as filed. Covington v. Fisher, 22 Okla. 207, 97 P. 615; Twyford v. Stephens, 183 Okla. 534, 83 P.2d 578. When the notice and tax certificate were deposited with the county clerk in his office, section 451 [ 68-451], Title 68, O.S. 1941, was fully complied with.

  3. Loy ex rel. Union Securities Co. v. Kessler

    39 N.W.2d 260 (N.D. 1949)   Cited 8 times

    In Brady v. McCrory, 108 Okla. 40, 233 P. 734, it is said, "A grantor not in possession, however, may prosecute an action for the benefit of his grantee, or the grantee may prosecute the action in the name of his grantor, or may associate himself with his grantor in the action." See also Smith v. Jos. W. Moon Buggy Co. 66 Okla. 333, 169 P. 875; Slyman v. Alexander, 126 Okla. 232, 259 P. 224; Cox v. Fowler, 141 Okla. 110, 283 P. 995; Twyford v. Stephens, 183 Okla. 534, 83 P.2d 578. This action was originally commenced in the name of Union Securities Company, a corporation plaintiff.

  4. Lawyer v. Crowe Coal Co.

    166 P.2d 1009 (Okla. 1946)   Cited 5 times
    In Lawyer v. Crowe Coal Co. et al., 196 Okla. 465, 166 P.2d 1009, it was held that the holder of a resale tax deed must commence an action for possession within two years from the date such deed is recorded, citing Lane v. Bass, 193 Okla. 682, 146 P.2d 563. Under the ruling in Owens v. Luckett, supra, plaintiff's second amended petition was subject to a demurrer, because it did not contain any allegation of fact which could have been relied upon to toll the statute of limitations.

    We have held that a party may waive the tax tender statute by going to trial without raising the question. Courtney v. Worley, 181 Okla. 399, 74 P.2d 370; Twyford v. Stephens, 183 Okla. 534, 83 P.2d 578. But, here, the plaintiff specifically raised' the question against Cole, and the record is silent as to whether it was urged as against Chancey. Under the circumstances, we think it cannot be said that the record shows that plaintiff waived the right to have the tax tender statute complied with.

  5. McGrath v. Eichoff

    100 P.2d 880 (Okla. 1940)   Cited 23 times
    In McGrath, the plaintiff, who was asking the court to set aside the tax deed, did not make his tender until after the court had announced its decision in his favor.

    of the plaintiff for the use and benefit of the defendants, the consideration paid for the McGrath tax resale deed, together with all taxes, penalties, and interest thereon that had been advanced by the defendants. The journal entry of judgment contains an order requiring the plaintiff to pay into court such expenditures of the defendants with interest thereon at the rate of 6 per cent. While we have held that "it is the duty of the trial court to require * * * the payment of the taxes, interest, penalties, costs, and expenses legally assessed against the land as a condition precedent to entering judgment in favor of the plaintiff" in an action to quiet title as against the tax deed holder (Meriwether v. Bowling, 184 Okla. 1, 84 P.2d 1), yet we have also held that the timely tender into court of such amounts is purely a personal benefit, as it affects the substantial rights of the holder of the tax deed and may be waived by him. See Courtney v. Worley, 181 Okla. 399, 74 P.2d 370, and Twyford v. Stephens, 183 Okla. 534, 83 P.2d 578. If it be assumed here as it was in the Courtney Case that the provisions of sections 12761 and 12763, O. S. 1931 (68 Okla. St. Ann. ยงยง 453, 455), relative to such tender are applicable, it is our opinion that, as the defendants in the present case failed to call the trial court's attention to the asserted requirement of tender and the plaintiff's failure to comply therewith until said court had orally announced its decision, they waived the necessity of an earlier tender by him. Under such circumstances, "the court has the authority" in entering its judgment "to require the landowner to reimburse the deed holder for taxes paid by him, with interest at the legal rate of 6 per cent. per annum." Courtney v. Worley, supra. Since this requirement was incorporated in the journal entry of judgment in the present case, we think that the court has sufficiently complied with its asserted duty in that respect, and so hold.