Opinion
No. CV 04 0004407 S
January 2, 2008
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS PETITION
The petitioner, Derrick Twum, has brought this amended habeas corpus petition alleging that his incarceration is illegal because he has not received the correct amount of presentence confinement credit. Petitioner alleges that his confinement is illegal because his right to due process was violated, in contravention of the constitutional protections under the fifth and fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution and Article I, Sections Eight and Nine of the Connecticut Constitution. Presently, the petitioner is in the custody of the Commissioner of Correction in the State of Connecticut. Respondent's return denies petitioner's material allegations and that he is entitled to habeas corpus relief. Petitioner filed a reply that denies respondent's material allegations raised in the return.
The matter came before the court for a trial on the merits on September 12, 2007. Petitioner and Department of Correction (department) Record Specialist II Michelle Deveau testified as witnesses at the habeas proceeding. Additional documentary evidence included several transcripts, a mittimus and department records. Based on the court's review of the testimony and evidence, judgment enters denying the habeas corpus petition.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Petitioner shot and killed Peter Jergens on July 10, 1993. Petitioner, who is a citizen of the United Kingdom, thereafter left the United States and returned to his native country. A murder warrant was issued and petitioner was arrested by Scotland Yard on August 28, 1994. Petitioner was confined in the United Kingdom until he was extradited to Connecticut on March 30, 1995. Petitioner entered the custody of the department on March 31, 1995 and was held in presentence confinement until he was sentenced.
On April 11, 1995, petitioner was arraigned in Judicial District of Stamford, docket number CR95-018885, on one count of murder, and to which he subsequently entered a plea of not guilty on May 15, 1995. Thereafter, on July 10, 1995, petitioner was charged in a substitute information with one count of manslaughter, in violation of General Statutes § 53a-55(a)(3), to which he entered a plea of guilty. On September 13, 1995, petitioner was sentenced to a term of twenty years to serve for the manslaughter conviction, with the state entering a nolle prosequi on all other charges.
The department has credited petitioner with 166 days of presentence confinement credit (jail credit), reflecting the time period of March 31, 1995 through September 13, 1995, as well as 55 days of jail credit good time. Petitioner has also been credited with one day of jail credit in accordance with Public Act 01-78. The department has not credited petitioner for the time he was held in the United Kingdom prior to his extradition to Connecticut and entering the department's custody.
The offense date is July 10, 1993, making petitioner eligible to earn presentence and regular good time credits. See § 18-100d and Velez v. Commissioner of Correction, 250 Conn. 536, 738 A.2d 604 (1999).
Public Act 01-78 added subsection (2) to General Statutes § 18-98d(a) to allow for credit while held at a police station or courthouse lockup.
Additional facts will be discussed as necessary.
DISCUSSION
Petitioner is seeking credit for time he was held by another sovereign until he was extradited to the State of Connecticut. The Connecticut Supreme Court has addressed similar claims in a series of cases: Stuart v. Commissioner of Correction, 266 Conn. 596, 834 A.2d 52 (2003) (no equal protection violation when petitioner not credited with time while contesting extradition from Pennsylvania to Connecticut); Hammond v. Commissioner of Correction, 259 Conn. 855, 792 A.2d 774 (2002) (no equal protection or due process violations when petitioner not credited with time while contesting extradition from Massachusetts to Connecticut); Johnson v. Manson, 196 Conn. 309, 493 A.2d 846 (1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1063, 106 S.Ct. 813, 88 L.Ed.2d 787 (1986) (no equal protection or due process violations when petitioner not credited with time while contesting extradition from Florida to Connecticut); Taylor v. Robinson, 196 Conn. 572, 494 A.2d 1195 (1985), appeal dismissed, 475 U.S. 1002, 106 S.Ct. 1172, 89 L.Ed.2d 291 (1986) (relying on Johnson v. Manson, no statutory right to be credited with time while contesting extradition from New York to Connecticut). It is patently evident that this state's highest court has repeatedly and consistently rebuffed claims seeking credit for time held in other jurisdictions prior to extradition to Connecticut.
The only aspect of the instant matter that deviates somewhat from the foregoing series of cases is that petitioner here was held in another country instead of another state. In Hammond, the Supreme Court held, after reviewing Johnson and Taylor in great detail, " . . . that § 18-98d, by its terms, is inapplicable to persons confined in another state while contesting extradition . . ." Stuart v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 266 Conn. 601. Petitioner has presented nothing to this court to support the contention that § 18-98d applies to him but not to the petitioners in Stuart, Hammond, Johnson and Taylor.
The Stuart court noted that " . . . an extraditee, in contrast to a person who is confined in this state, has voluntarily chosen to leave the state. Indeed, we do not doubt that, in the great majority of such cases, the extraditee will have fled the state for the purpose of avoiding apprehension by authorities. In any event, an extraditee's confinement in another state results solely from the extraditee's own decision to leave the state. Consequently, any delay associated with the extradition process stems from the extraditee's decision to leave the state after having engaged in the criminal conduct that prompted the extradition request. Thus, the petitioner faced extradition only because he chose to travel to Pennsylvania sometime after he had committed the assault that led to his conviction in this state.
"Moreover, an extraditee has complete control over how much time he or she will spend confined in an out-of-state facility. In other words, although a person arrested in another state for a crime committed in this state has a right to challenge this state's efforts to extradite him, that person also has a corresponding right to waive an extradition hearing and to be returned immediately to this state . . . Thus, although an extraditee cannot control the length of time that a contested extradition proceeding will take, the extraditee may elect to avoid such a proceeding altogether." Stuart v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 266 Conn. 603-04.
" . . . [T]his state has no jurisdiction over a person arrested in another state on a fugitive warrant for crimes committed in this state. Consequently, this state cannot commence formal judicial proceedings against that person unless and until he is extradited to this state. By contrast, a person confined in this state pending disposition of a criminal case is subject to this state's legal process and, therefore, to any and all proceedings related to the charges that have been filed against him." Stuart v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 266 Conn. 604-05.
An out-of-country facility also is, by definition, an out-of-state facility. Under the applicable statute, § 18-98d(a)(1), an inmate held in a jurisdiction anywhere outside this state is not being " . . . confined to a community correctional center or a correctional institution . . ." Stuart v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 266 Conn. 601. See also Hammond v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 259 Conn. 871-72 (in 1980 the General Assembly enacted § 18-98d and did not include any language that suggested § 18-98d was to be applied to a person confined outside Connecticut who was contesting extradition to this state). Lastly, the Supreme Court in Hammond also emphasized that "[i]t is unlikely . . . that the legislature intended to make such credit [i.e., jail credit] available to a person who, like the petitioner, is incarcerated in another state and over whom the commissioner has no control." Hammond v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 259 Conn. 873.
General Statutes § 1-1(w) contains the following definition: "`Correctional institution,' `state prison,' `community correctional center' or `jail' means a correctional facility administered by the Commissioner of Correction." See also Hammond v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 259 Conn. 872.
Based on the foregoing, the petitioner has failed to proffer any evidence or argument that removes his matter from the auspices of the foregoing well-established case law that clearly demonstrates he is not entitled to the jail credit he seeks. The writ of habeas corpus is, therefore, denied. Petitioner's counsel shall prepare and file the judgment file within thirty days.