Opinion
2:21-cv-03078-TMC-MGB
12-02-2021
Reginald Antonio Twitty, Petitioner, v. Captain, Anderson City Jail, [1] Respondent.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MARY GORDON BAKER, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
Reginald Antonio Twitty (“Petitioner”), a federal pretrial detainee proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), the assigned United States Magistrate Judge has reviewed the petition and submits this Report and Recommendation to the United States District Judge. For the reasons discussed below, the undersigned recommends that the petition be summarily dismissed without prejudice and without requiring Respondent to file an answer.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner is currently detained at the Anderson City Jail pursuant to certain criminal charges pending before the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina. (See United States v. Twitty et al, Case No. 6:19-cv-00898-TMC-1.) In filing this petition for habeas relief, Petitioner challenges the constitutionality of his underlying arrest and subsequent detention, claiming that his arrest was based on an “improperly executed warrant” and illegal electronic surveillance in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. (See Dkt. No. 1 at 5-7.) Petitioner seeks immediate release from his allegedly “unlawful pretrial detention.” (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 7.)
A federal court may take judicial notice of the contents of its own records, as well as those records of other courts. See Aloe Creme Labs., Inc. v. Francine Co., 425 F.2d 1295, 1296 (5th Cir. 1970); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989).
After filing his initial petition (Dkt. No. 1), Petitioner submitted a two-page handwritten “motion” asking that the Court serve his petition on Respondent and, once again, order his immediate release from custody (See Dkt. No. 8 at 1-2). The basis for Petitioner's motion is essentially the same as his initial petition, but for the additional argument that “[h]abeas corpus is [Petitioner's] only lawful way to seek relief from a complete deprivation of all [his] civil rights ” (Id. at 2.) Because Petitioner's motion is largely duplicative of the initial petition, the undersigned's recommendations herein apply to both filings.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under the established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of Petitioner's pro se petition pursuant to the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts; the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996; and in light of the following precedents: Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25 (1992); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); Nasim v. Warden, Md. House of Corr., 64 F.3d 951 (4th Cir. 1995); Todd v. Baskerville, 712 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1983); and Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147 (4th Cir. 1978).
See Rule 1(b), Rules Governing § 2254 Cases (allowing district courts to apply any or all of these rules to § 2241 petitions).
The narrow question before the Court is whether it “plainly appears” that Petitioner is not entitled to any relief. Rule 4, Rules Governing § 2254 Cases. If so, his petition must be dismissed; if not, the Respondent must file an answer. Id. Because Petitioner is a pro se litigant, his petition is accorded liberal construction. See, e.g., Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Gordon, 574 F.2d at 1151. Even under this less stringent standard, however, the Court cannot ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep t of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 390-91 (4th Cir. 1990). Such is the case here.
DISCUSSION
“It is well settled that in the absence of exceptional circumstances in criminal cases the regular judicial procedure should be followed and habeas corpus should not be granted in advance of trial.” Jones v. Perkins, 245 U.S. 390, 391-92 (1918). Rather, federal district courts “should withhold relief in [a] collateral habeas corpus action where an adequate remedy available in the criminal proceeding has not been exhausted.” Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 6 (1951); see also Timms v. Johns, 627 F.3d 525, 531 (4th Cir. 2010) (noting that “courts require exhaustion of alternative remedies before a prisoner can seek federal habeas relief”). Applying this principle, federal district courts routinely dismiss as premature habeas petitions that are filed during the defendant's criminal trial and raise claims that should be addressed as part of the criminal proceedings. See, e.g., In re Williams, 306 Fed.Appx. 818, 819 (4th Cir. 2009); Habersham v. U.S. Marshal Task Force, No. 1:19-cv-1981-BHH-SVH, 2019 WL 4575392, at *2 (D.S.C. Aug. 13, 2019), adopted, 2019 WL 4573420 (D.S.C. Sept. 20, 2019); Richard v. Cannon, No. 0:11-cv-1192-JFA-PJG, 2011 WL 8201965, at *2 (D.S.C. July 1, 2011), adopted, 2011 WL 8201835 (D.S.C. Oct. 5, 2011), aff'd, 463 Fed.Appx. 234 (4th Cir. 2012).
Here, a review of Petitioner's criminal docket confirms that he has not yet been tried or convicted of the criminal offenses underlying this action. (See United States v. Twitty et al, Case No. 6:19-cv-00898-TMC-1.) Moreover, the Court is currently considering similar claims in Petitioner's criminal proceeding regarding the legality of the Government's electronic surveillance and has yet to rule on the merits of Petitioner's arguments. (See Case No. 898, Dkt. Nos. 275, 278, and 279, seeking to suppress certain evidence procured by allegedly unlawful electronic surveillance.) Accordingly, Petitioner's habeas action is premature, and his claims should be presented through counseled motions in his pending criminal proceeding. See Habersham, 2019 WL 4575392, at *2 (dismissing § 2241 habeas action as premature where the district court was considering petitioner's claims regarding the constitutionality of certain warrants as part of the ongoing criminal proceeding); see also Meyers v. Mukasey, No. 3:08-cv-00581, 2009 WL 210715, at *1 (E.D. Va. Jan. 28, 2009) (“[W]here habeas claims raised by a pretrial detainee would be dispositive of the pending federal criminal charges, principles of federal court efficiency require that the petitioner exhaust those claims by presenting them at trial and then on direct appeal.”).
CONCLUSION
Based on the above, the undersigned finds that Petitioner cannot cure the deficiencies in his petition by amendment. The undersigned therefore RECOMMENDS that the Court DISMISS the petition without prejudice and without requiring Respondent to file an answer. Likewise, the undersigned further RECOMMENDS that the Court DENY Petitioner's motion (Dkt. No. 8) seeking immediate release from custody.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
The parties' attention is directed to the Important Notice on the next page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).