Opinion
Civil Action 3:20-cv-142
05-31-2022
ANTHONY S. TWITTY Plaintiff, v. MARGRETT BARNS, C.R.N.P., CASEY THORNLEY, C.R.N.P., DR. MUHAMMAD NAJI, TERRI SECHRENGOST, C.H.C.A., DIRECTOR, CEO or PRESIDENT of WELL PATH Defendants.
Gibson, District Judge.
ECF Nos. 79 & 87
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
LISA PUPO LENIHAN, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. RECOMMENDATION
It is respectfully recommended that the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant Healthcare Administrator Terri Sechrengost (ECF No. 79) be granted. It is further recommended that the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants Nurse Practitioner Margrett Barns, Director CEO or President of Well Path, Dr. Muhammad Naji, and Physician Assistant Casey Thornley (ECF No. 87) be granted. It is also recommended that the Court decline to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claims. Finally, it is recommended that judgment be entered in favor of all Defendants and that the Clerk mark the case closed.
II. REPORT
Plaintiff, Anthony S. Twitty (“Plaintiff” or “Twitty”), proceeding pro se, filed this civil rights action against the healthcare administrator and healthcare providers at the State Correctional Institution at Houtzdale (“SCI-Houtzdale”). Generally, he alleges that his medical treatment was denied/delayed to the extent that his medical condition worsened, and that his pleas to the healthcare administrator for assistance in gaining access to medical care were ignored, all in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Plaintiff also alleges a municipal liability claim against the Director, CEO or President of Well Path, and a state law claim for professional negligence.
A. FACTS
Plaintiff is currently in custody at SCI-Houtzdale. Concise Statement of Material Facts (“CSMF”) and Plaintiff's Responses thereto, ECF Nos. 81 & 100 ¶ 2. Defendant Terri Sechrengost (“Sechrengost”) is the Healthcare Administrator at SCI-Houtzdale. The parties agree that as the Healthcare Administrator, Sechrengost is responsible for the planning, organizing, directing and managing of healthcare services which includes the coordination of a professional medical staff in cooperation with the DOC-contracted medical vendor, compliance monitoring and supervision of contracted services. The work of the Healthcare Administrator is performed independently under the general direction of the Deputy Superintendent for Centralized Services. She is not involved with any inmate's course of medical care and treatment and does not supervise or direct any of the clinicians or nurses on staff. Her duties are purely administrative. The parties further agree that Sechrengost coordinated treatment for Plaintiff and continues to coordinate medical care for Plaintiff. ECF Nos. 81 & 100 ¶¶ 25-26.
The summary judgment record contains a detailed history of Plaintiff's medical care at SCI-Houtzdale and at outside medical facilities. On January 14, 2019, Plaintiff was seen by Defendant PA-C James on the PA Line. She examined Plaintiff for rectal bleeding, internal/external hemorrhoids, and hypertension. She entered a plan for him to take hemorrhoid suppositories twice per day for two weeks, resume taking his blood pressure medication to help control his blood pressure and ordered a CBC panel. She scheduled him for a visit on the PA Line in 10 days. ECF No. 88-3 at 91-93. On January 24, 2019, Plaintiff was seen by Defendant Nurse Practitioner Barnes for an assessment of rectal bleeding. Barnes noted that he was examined at his last visit and tests revealed that he had blood in his stool. She scheduled Plaintiff for the MD Line during the upcoming week for treatment. ECF No. 88-3 at 89-90.
The Medical Defendants' submissions refer to Defendant Thornley by her married name, James. The Court will refer to her as James in the body of this Report and Recommendation.
On January 30, 2019, Plaintiff was seen by Defendant Dr. Naji for his complaints of bloody diarrhea for the past three weeks. Dr. Naji also conducted a rectal exam. His assessment was colitis, prescribed medications, and instructed Plaintiff to return to the MD Line in two (2) weeks. ECF No. 88-3 at 87-88.
Two days later, on February 1, 2019, Plaintiff presented to the PA Line for complaints of abdominal and stool issues. PA James noted that Plaintiff had previously seen the doctor but had not yet received the medications ordered by Dr. Naji. She dispensed the prescribed medications to get Plaintiff's treatment started. ECF No. 88-3 at 85-86. Dr. Naji saw Plaintiff on February 13, 2019, for complaints of continued blood in his stool, reports that his medications were not helpful, but that his diarrhea improved. Dr. Naji examined Plaintiff for rectal bleeding and indicated a consult for a colonoscopy to further investigate. ECF No. 88-3 at 80-81. On February 15, 2019, Dr. Naji referred Plaintiff offsite to Blair Gastroenterology for a colonoscopy. Dr. Naji noted that a colonoscopy was needed because of Plaintiff's bloody diarrhea that began one month prior and was not responsive to medication. ECF No. 88-4 at 3435.
On March 11, 2019, Plaintiff was seen by Defendant Barnes in response to his request for an update on his colonoscopy. Barnes advised that his consult was ordered and approved, and they were awaiting an appointment. ECF No. 88-3 at 78-79. On April 5, 2019, Plaintiff was seen by Nurse Practitioner Lisa Peace for complaints regarding his bowels, fatigue, and being cold. Plaintiff complained that nothing was being done for him. Peace explained that medical personnel had done everything possible and were awaiting an opening for his colonoscopy. Peace explained to Plaintiff that it is normal to have to wait for an appointment, and that it could take 3 to 4 months from the time of approval. His current care plan was to continue with a CBC lab test. He was to return to care in one week for a follow-up on his labs and on an as needed basis. ECF No. 88-3 at 76-77.
On April 6, 2019, Nurse Peace entered orders related to Plaintiff's colonoscopy which was scheduled for April 12, 2009, and that nursing was to instruct Plaintiff not to take anything by mouth the day before. ECF No. 88-3 at 74-75. Defendant James saw Plaintiff on the PA Line on April 12, 2019, to inform him that his colonoscopy was cancelled due to security issues. She further advised that the procedure was being rescheduled but they did not have a date certain. James discussed his CBC lab results, informing Plaintiff that his levels were within normal limits, and that his blood counts remained stable despite his rectal bleeding. Plaintiff agreed to await the rescheduling of the colonoscopy with a return to medical on an as needed basis. ECF No. 88-3 at 72-73.
On April 16, 2019, Plaintiff was seen by Dr. Naji at the Hypertension and Cardiac Chronic Care Clinics. Per the assessment, Plaintiff's hypertension control was determined to be “fair.” Dr. Naji also noted that a diuretic was to be added and Plaintiff was scheduled for a CMP lab draw in six months. ECF No. 88-3 at 67-71.
On May 16, 2019, Plaintiff was seen by Nurse Barnes for complaints of rectal bleeding and his concerns regarding his colonoscopy. Barnes reported that they were waiting for a return call on scheduling. She then assessed Plaintiff for rectal bleeding. Per his care plan, Plaintiff was to have a CBC drawn on May 17 and would review his lab results with the PA during the upcoming week. ECF No. 88-3 at 65-66.
On May 27, 2019, Plaintiff submitted a Request to Staff Member form directed to Defendant Sechrengost complaining of his continuing symptoms. ECF No. 82-1 at 356. On May 29, 2019, Barnes advised Plaintiff that his colonoscopy had been rescheduled. She also reviewed his lab results with him. ECF No. 88-3 at 63-64. On May 28, 2019, Sechrengost responded to Plaintiff's Request to Staff Member indicating that a colonoscopy appointment was scheduled. ECF No. 82-1 at 356. On June 17, 2019, Plaintiff submitted another Request to Staff Member form to Sechrengost, again complaining of his symptoms and asserting that he was twice scheduled for his colonoscopy but both appointments were cancelled, he stated, for failure to prep him in time. She responded on June 19, 2019, indicating again that his colonoscopy was rescheduled and that if he was currently having medical problems, he should sign up for sick call to be evaluated by a medical provider. ECF No. 82-1 at 354-55.
On June 19, 2019, Plaintiff went to medical with complaints about not receiving his colonoscopy. Barnes informed him that the appointment had been moved. He reported that he had blood in his bowel every morning and he has had bowel movements ten times in the past 24 hours. Barnes informed Plaintiff that she would redraw his CBC and ordered the PA to review his chart on July 11 for final prep for his July 19 colonoscopy. Plaintiff was instructed to see the PA for a chart review and CBC. ECF No. 88-3 at 61-62. On June 25, 2019, Plaintiff's lab results were reviewed with PA James who indicated that his hemoglobin and hematocrit levels were slightly decreased and that they would do a repeat CBC in two weeks. ECF No. 88-3 at 59-60.
Nurse Peace reviewed Plaintiff's chart for colonoscopy prep on July 11, 2019. She noted his decreased hemoglobin and hematocrit levels but noted that they had increased from previous levels and were approaching normal. The plan was to proceed as scheduled. On July 18, 2019, Plaintiff was housed in preparation for his colonoscopy. On July 19, 2019, Plaintiff returned from the outside colonoscopy procedure without incident or complaint. ECF No. 88-3 at 55-58.
On July 20, 2019, Plaintiff presented to the PA Line to discuss a continuation of his current medication. On July 23, 2019, Plaintiff came to medical to inquire about his pathology results. He was advised that the results were still pending. By July 26, 2019, he discussed his results with Nurse Peace who noted that Plaintiff was diagnosed with ulcerative colitis. He was to be treated with Prednisone and educated about certain dietary changes.
On July 30, 2019, Plaintiff filed a grievance indicating that his condition worsened because of the delayed colonoscopy and that harmful and contraindicated medications were prescribed as a result of not having the procedure sooner. ECF No. 82-1 at 352-53. On August 16, 2019, in the Initial Review Response, the facility noted that an appointment was initially scheduled for the earliest opening, and that due to unforeseen circumstances, had to be rescheduled twice. The facility also indicated that after a review of his medication records, no contraindicated medications were prescribed. ECF No. 82-1 at 350. On appeal, Plaintiff states that his pleas for help were rejected. ECF No. 82-1 at 349. The Final Appeal Decision affirmed the below decisions by the facility. ECF No. 82-1 at 346-48.
On August 6, 2019, Dr. Naji scheduled Plaintiff to follow up regarding his ulcerative colitis on the MD Line in two weeks. ECF No. 88-3 at 44-45, 48-53. On August 9, 2019, Plaintiff was seen by PA Nagle on the PA Line. His assessment was uncontrolled hypertension. Nagle modified Plaintiff's blood pressure medications and instructed Plaintiff to present to the PA Line for a review of his blood pressure checks in three weeks. ECF No. 88-3 at 42-43. His blood pressure was assessed by medical, and medications were modified on August 12, 2019. ECF No. 88-3 at 39-41.
On August 20, 2019, Plaintiff was seen by Dr. Naji for his ulcerative colitis. The plan was to start Plaintiff on Asacol, an NSAID used to treat the condition. ECF No. 88-3 at 36-37. Nurse Barnes saw Plaintiff on September 9, 2019, because his colitis started bleeding after his Prednisone dosage was lowered. She increased the dosage and noted that he be seen on the PA Line in 20 days to determine the next treatment step. ECF No. 88-3 at 32-33. Plaintiff voiced concerns regarding his ulcerative colitis to PA Nagle on September 27, 2019, because his bleeding had increased despite the increase in his Prednisone dosage. Nagle increased his dosage with follow-up in one month. ECF No. 88-3 at 30-31.
Plaintiff continued to have problems with recurrent bleeding when tapering off Prednisone and alternate medications were prescribed. Plaintiff was seen in medical on the following dates related to these recurrences: October 25, 2019 (ECF No. 88-3 at 14-17); October 29, 2019 (ECF No. 88-3 at 12-13); November 19, 2019 (ECF No. 88-3 at 6-7); November 29, 2019 (ECF No. 88-3 at 4-5); December 5, 2019 (ECF No. 88-3 at 2-3); December 12, 2019 (ECF No. 88-2 at 145-46); December 28, 2019 (ECF No. 88-2 at 144); December 31, 2019 (ECF No. 88-2 at 142-43); January 15, 2020 (ECF No. 88-2 at 138-39); January 21, 2020 (ECF No. 88-2 at 136-37); and January 30, 2020 (ECF No. 88-2 at 132-33).
On February 6, 2020, PA James wrote up a consult request with Blair Gastroenterology. She indicated that Plaintiff had been recently diagnosed with ulcerative colitis on colonoscopy, and had failed symptomatic improvement with Prednisone, Asacol, and Sulfasalizine. The request was approved by Dr. Naji and the regional medical director. ECF No. 88-4 at 25-28.
Plaintiff was seen on March 12, 2020. It was recommended that he start on a probiotic and receive addition blood work. ECF No. 88-4 at 29-33. Thereafter, Plaintiff was seen in medical on March 23, 2020, by PA James and on April 1, 2020, by PA Della Torre. ECF No. 88-2 at 127-28, 124-26. On April 2, 2020, Plaintiff was seen by PA James, reporting that he was having more than 30 bowel movements per day accompanied by dark urine. PA James placed Plaintiff in the infirmary to be monitored. Nurses regularly rounded on him. ECF No. 88-2 at 122-23.
On April 3, 2020, Dr. Naji examined Plaintiff and after reviewing laboratory results on April 6, 2020, his assessment was anemia due to ulcerative colitis. Dr. Naji modified his medications and ordered an iron study. ECF No. 88-2 at 110-13. Dr. Naji followed up on April 10, 2020, and again on April 20, 2020, where lab results showed that Plaintiff was positive for H. Pylori, a stomach bacteria associated with stomach ailments and ulcers. Dr. Naji ordered H. Pylori treatment and a vitamin D supplement. ECF No. 88-2 at 105-06, 101-02.
Dr. Naji continued to follow up with Plaintiff on the following dates: April 28, 2020; May 7, 2020; May 27, 2020; June 17, 2020; July 22, 2020; August 10, 2020; September 3, 2020. ECF No. 88-2 at 97-98, 95-96, 93-94, 91-92, 89-90, 84-85, 82-83.
PA Della Torre saw Plaintiff on December 1, 2020; January 12, 2021; January 28, 2021; and February 5, 2021, for flares of his ulcerative colitis. ECF No. 88-2 at 66-67, 64-65, 61-63, 60.
On February 8, 2021, Plaintiff was seen by Dr. Naji who noted Plaintiff's complaint of recurrent rectal bleeding. ECF No. 88-2 at 51-59. Plaintiff's medications were modified, and Plaintiff was referred for a telemedicine appoint with Penn Highlands Gastroenterology. ECF No. 88-4 at 18-21. The consult was approved by the regional medical director. Plaintiff was seen on March 2, 2021, for ulcerative colitis. The plan was to have a repeat colonoscopy. ECF No. 88-4 at 22-24. On March 19, 2021, Dr. Naji referred Plaintiff for an offsite appointment for a colonoscopy.
On March 22, 2021, PA Della Torre ordered more lab tests and on April 14, 2021, she saw Plaintiff on sick call where he reported his symptoms were worse at night. A medication change was discussed and ordered. ECF No. 88-2 at 42-45.
On May 10, 2021, Dr. Naji entered orders for Plaintiff's upcoming colonoscopy and placed him in the infirmary for colonoscopy prep as of June 6, 2021. ECF No. 88-2 at 39-41. The colonoscopy had to be rescheduled, and on August 11, 2021, Dr. Naji entered new orders for an infirmary admission on August 31, 2021, with the colonoscopy to occur on September 1, 2021. ECF No. 88-2 at 34-36.
As of the filing of the parties' submissions, Plaintiff continues to receive care at SCI-Houtzdale.
B. LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate if, drawing all inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, the pleadings, documents, electronically stored information, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with any affidavits or declarations, show “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 (a) & (c). Summary judgment may be granted against a party who fails to adduce facts sufficient to establish the existence of any element essential to that party's case, and for which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The moving party bears the initial burden of identifying evidence which demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact; that is, the movant must show that the evidence of record is insufficient to carry the non-movant's burden of proof. Id. Once that burden has been met, the non-moving party must set forth “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial” or the factual record will be taken as presented by the moving party and judgment will be entered as a matter of law. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Corp. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)) (emphasis added by Matsushita Court). An issue is genuine only “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.” Anderson v. LibertyLobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). In Anderson, the United States Supreme Court noted the following:
[A]t the summary judgment stage the judge's function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial....
[T]here is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party. If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.Id. at 249-50 (internal citations omitted).
C. ANALYSIS
Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act provides as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or any other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ....42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim for relief under this provision, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the conduct in the complaint was committed by a person or entity acting under color of state law and that such conduct deprived the plaintiff of rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States. Piecknick v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 36 F.3d 1250, 1255-56 (3d Cir. 1994). Section 1983 does not create rights; it simply provides a remedy for violations of those rights created by the United States Constitution or federal law. Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1204 (3d Cir. 1996).
Prison officials are required under the Eighth Amendment to provide basic medical treatment to prisoners. Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). In order to establish a violation based on the Eighth Amendment, “evidence must show (i) a serious medical need, and (ii) acts or omissions by prison officials that indicate deliberate indifference to that need.” Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 235 (3d Cir. 2004); Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 582 (3d Cir. 2003). To satisfy the first prong, the plaintiff must demonstrate that his medical needs are serious. “Because society does not expect that prisoners will have unqualified access to health care, deliberate indifference to medical needs amounts to an Eighth Amendment violation only if those needs are ‘serious.'” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103-04). Serious medical needs include those that have been diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment or that are so obvious that a lay person would recognize the necessity for doctor's attention, and those conditions which, if untreated, would result in the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain or a lifelong handicap or permanent loss. See Atkinson v. Taylor, 316 F.3d 257, 272-73 (3d Cir. 2003); see also Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1006 (1988). The parties agree that Plaintiff's medical needs were at all relevant times sufficiently serious for Eighth Amendment purposes.
The second element requires an inmate to show that prison officials acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical need. The “deliberate indifference” standard is a stringent standard of fault requiring proof that a defendant disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his actions. Board of Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 410 (1997). The defendant must be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial harm exists, and he must also draw the inference. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). The test for whether a prison official was deliberately indifferent is whether that defendant “acted or failed to act despite his knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm.” Id. at 841. Only egregious acts or omissions can violate this standard. See White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 108-09 (3d Cir. 1990). Nevertheless, “prison officials who actually knew of a substantial risk to inmate health or safety may be found free from liability if they responded reasonably to the risk, even if harm ultimately was not averted.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844.
The Third Circuit has found deliberate indifference where a prison official: (1) “knows of a prisoner's need for medical treatment but intentionally refuses to provide it;” (2) “delays necessary medical treatment for non-medical reasons;” (3) “prevents a prisoner from receiving needed or recommended treatment”; or (4) “persists in a particular course of treatment in the face of reluctant pain and risk of permanent injury.” Rouse, 182 F.3d at 197 (internal citations and quotations omitted). The Third Circuit also has held that “[n]eedless suffering resulting from a denial of simple medical care, which does not serve any penological purpose,” violates the Eighth Amendment. Atkinson, 316 F.3d at 266; see also Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Inst. Inmates, 834 F.2d at 346; Durmer v. O'Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 67 (3d Cir. 1993).
The deliberate indifference standard, however, affords considerable deference to prison doctors in the diagnosis and treatment of medical problems. Inmates of Allegheny Cnty. Jail v. Pierce, 612 F.2d 754, 762 (3d Cir. 1979). Courts will not second-guess the propriety or adequacy of a particular course of treatment if it is a question of sound professional judgment. Id. Thus, “mere disagreements over medical judgment do not state Eighth Amendment claims.” White, 897 F.2d at 110 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Even if a doctor's judgment concerning the proper course of a prisoner's treatment ultimately is shown to be mistaken, the mistaken judgment would amount to medical malpractice rather than an Eighth Amendment violation. See White, 897 F.2d at 110; see also Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06. Accordingly, a “misdiagnosis or preference for a certain type of treatment will not alone rise to the level of deliberate indifference.” Christy v. Robinson, 216 F.Supp.2d 398, 413 (D.N.J. 2002) (citations omitted). Moreover, “no [Eighth Amendment] claim is stated when a doctor disagrees with the professional judgment of another doctor” because “[t]here may, for example, be several acceptable ways to treat an illness.” White, 897 F.2d at 110. Against this backdrop, the Court considers each claim of deliberate indifference in turn.
MEDICAL DEFENDANTS (ECF No. 87)
Eighth Amendment
Here, Plaintiff has failed to come forward with evidence to raise an issue of material fact as to whether the Medical Defendants were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff's medical needs. The record reflects, and the parties agree, that Plaintiff's medical needs were serious. He suffered with debilitating symptoms related to his ulcerative colitis and his subsequent H. Pylori infection.
The record does not reflect, however, that the Medical Defendants “largely ignored” his serious medical needs as argued by Plaintiff. Conversely, the record is replete with medical documentation demonstrating that the Medical Defendants were consistently attempting to treat Plaintiff's ulcerative colitis. And contrary to Plaintiff's arguments that his symptoms could have been controlled earlier if he was afforded diagnostic testing earlier, the record does not reflect that his colonoscopies were rescheduled to cause Plaintiff sustained suffering. Instead, the record reflects that the first rescheduling was due to security issues and the second was due to an oversight in prepping Plaintiff in time for the scheduled procedure. The Court will not second guess the security concerns of prison administrators, and the failure to timely prepare Plaintiff for the procedure is at most negligence and not deliberate indifference. Medical records reflect that when Plaintiff's medical procedures were rescheduled, consistent medical care was provided in an attempt to offer Plaintiff relief. As noted by the Medical Defendants, in approximately a two-year period, Plaintiff was seen and treated 75 times by the medical personnel at SCI-Houtzdale.
Plaintiff also suggests that the cause of all his medical problems pertaining to his bowels was the H. Pylori infection that was treated with antibiotics in April 2020. Plaintiff's colonoscopy confirmed, however, that he has ulcerative colitis, an incurable but manageable condition. Plaintiff cannot state an Eighth Amendment claim simply because he disagrees with the medical judgment of the Medical Defendants, even if it was incorrect. See White, 897 F.2d at 110.
Therefore, the Medical Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim should be granted.
Municipal Liability
Plaintiff also attempts to make out a claim for municipal liability against Defendant Director, CEO or President of Well Path suggesting that it had a custom or practice of denying healthcare to inmates. Because Plaintiff is unable to make out an underlying constitutional claim, his municipal liability claim must fail as a matter of law. See Brown v. Dep't of Health Emergency Med. Servs. Training Inst., 318 F.3d 473, 482 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 122 (1992) (emphasizing “the separate character of the inquiry into the question of municipal responsibility and the question whether a constitutional violation occurred.”)). Therefore, Plaintiff's municipal liability claim against Allegheny County should be dismissed with prejudice.
TERRI SECHRENGOST (ECF No. 79)
Sechrengost argues that she is entitled to summary judgment because the record is devoid of any evidence that she was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff's medical needs in that she neither denied him medical attention, nor did she ignore or fail to review his complaints about the medical staff.
Eighth Amendment
The parties agree that Sechrengost plays purely an administrative function at SCI-Houtzdale. She is neither a medical provider, nor is she in charge of the medical department. Record evidence reflects, and the parties agree, that when Plaintiff submitted his Request to Staff Member forms to Sechrengost, she was aware that Plaintiff was receiving consistent medical care. Moreover, Plaintiff's extensive medical records evidence that he was never denied medical care, even while waiting for his colonoscopy as Plaintiff alleges. He simply disagrees with the treatment he was provided, which will not support an Eighth Amendment claim.
Therefore, it is recommended that Sechrengost's Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim be granted.
SUPPLEMENTAL STATE LAW CLAIMS AS TO ALL DEFENDANTS
To the extent Plaintiff has raised any state law claims, it is recommended that the Court decline to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction if the Court decides to adopt the recommendation to grant Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Borough of West Mifflin v. Lancaster, 45 F.3d 780 (3d Cir. 1995) (“[W]here the claim over which the district court has original jurisdiction is dismissed before trial, the district court must decline to decide the pendent state claims unless considerations of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to the parties provide an affirmative justification for doing so.”).
III. CONCLUSION
It is respectfully recommended that the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant Healthcare Administrator Terri Sechrengost (ECF No. 79) be granted. It is further recommended that the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants Nurse Practitioner Margrett Barns, Director CEO or President of Well Path, Dr. Muhammad Naji, and Nurse Practitioner Casey Thornley (ECF No. 87) be granted. It is also recommended that the Court decline to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claims. Finally, it is recommended that judgment be entered in favor of all Defendants and that the Clerk mark the case closed.
In accordance with the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1)(B) and (C), and Rule 72.D.2 of the Local Rules of Court, the parties are allowed fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this Report and Recommendation to file objections. Any party opposing the objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of objections to respond thereto. Failure to file timely objections will constitute a waiver of any appellate rights.