Opinion
Civil Action 3:20-142
06-14-2021
ANTHONY S. TWITTY Plaintiff, v. MARGRETT BARNS, CASEY THORNLEY, DR. MUHAMMAD NAJI, TERRI SECHRENGOST, and DIRECTOR, CEO OR PRESIDENT OF WELL PATH, Defendants.
Gibson, District Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
ECF Nos. 31 & 35
LISA PUPO LENIHAN, United States Magistrate Judge
I. RECOMMENDATION
It is respectfully recommended that the Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 31) filed by Defendant Director, CEO, or President of Well Path be granted without prejudice to Plaintiff filing an amended complaint by the deadline set by the District Judge. It is also recommended that the Moton to Dismiss (ECF No. 35) filed by Defendant CHCA Terri Sechrengost be denied.
II. REPORT
A. Relevant Factual Averments
Plaintiff, Anthony S. Twitty, (“Plaintiff” or “Twitty”) filed this civil rights action against several medical providers pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of his Eighth Amendment protections against deliberate indifference to serious medical needs while incarcerated at SCI Houtzdale. Complaint, ECF No. 9.
In addition to the various medical provider Defendants, Plaintiff also names the moving Defendants here, Director, CEO or President of Well Path (“Well Path”), which provides the medical staff to SCI Houtzdale, and Defendant Terri Sechrengost (“Sechrengost”), who at all relevant times was the Corrections Health Care Administrator at SCI Houtzdale.
As to moving Defendant Well Path, Plaintiff alleges only that it is the provider for the medical department and staff at SCI Houtzdale and supervises the operation of medical employees. Complaint, ECF No. 9 ¶ 5. No. other averments are alleged as to the Director, CEO or President of Wellpath.
As to moving Defendant Sechrengost, Plaintiff alleges that she ignored his DC-135A requests for medical care when he informed her that he was being denied medical care including prescribed medical treatment by outside specialists and that his symptoms were worsening. ECF No. 9 at ¶ 5 & at 14.
B. Legal Standards
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit summarized the standard to be applied in deciding motions to dismiss filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6):
Under the “notice pleading” standard embodied in Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a plaintiff must come forward with “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” As explicated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), a claimant must state a “plausible” claim for relief, and “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the pleaded factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Although “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, ” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007), a plaintiff “need only put forth allegations that raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary element.” Fowler, 578 F.3d at 213 (quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Covington v. Int'l Ass'n of Approved Basketball Officials, 710 F.3d 114, 117-18 (3d Cir. 2013).Thompson v. Real Estate Mortg. Network, 748 F.3d 142, 147 (3d Cir. 2014).
In addition to the complaint, courts may consider matters of public record and other matters of which a court may take judicial notice, court orders, and exhibits attached to the complaint when adjudicating a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1384 n.2 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing 5A Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d, § 1357; Chester County Intermediate Unit v. Pennsylvania Blue Shield, 896 F.2d 808, 812 (3d Cir. 1990)). A court may also consider indisputably authentic documents. Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 223 (3d Cir. 2004); Pension Ben. Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993); Golden v. Cook, 293 F.Supp.2d 546, 551 (W.D. Pa. 2003) (“[C]ourts are permitted to consider matters of which they may take judicial notice, including records and reports of administrative bodies, and publicly available records and transcripts from judicial proceedings ‘in related or underlying cases which have a direct relation to the matters at issue.'”) (citations omitted).
Importantly, when considering pro se pleadings, a court must employ less stringent standards than when judging the work product of an attorney. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). When presented with a pro se complaint, the court should construe the complaint liberally and draw fair inferences from what is not alleged as well as from what is alleged. Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 369 (3d Cir. 2003). In a § 1983 action, the court must “apply the applicable law, irrespective of whether the pro se litigant has mentioned it by name.” Higgins v. Beyer, 293 F.3d 683, 688 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Holley v. Dep't of Veteran Affairs, 165 F.3d 244, 247-48 (3d Cir. 1999)). See also Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1996) (“Since this is a § 1983 action, the [pro se] plaintiffs are entitled to relief if their complaint sufficiently alleges deprivation of any right secured by the Constitution.”). Notwithstanding this liberality, pro se litigants are not relieved of their obligation to allege sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal claim. See, e.g., Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 378 (5th Cir. 2002); Riddle v. Mondragon, 83 F.3d 1197, 1202 (10th Cir. 1996).
C. Analysis
Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act provides as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or any other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim for relief under this provision, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the conduct in the complaint was committed by a person or entity acting under color of state law and that such conduct deprived the plaintiff of rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States. Piecknick v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 36 F.3d 1250, 1255-56 (3d Cir. 1994). Section 1983 does not create rights; it simply provides a remedy for violations of those rights created by the United States Constitution or federal law. Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1204 (3d Cir. 1996).
1. Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 31) filed by Defendant Director, CEO, or President of Well Path
In support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Defendant argues that Plaintiff fails to allege the personal involvement of Defendant Well Path, and that liability pursuant to § 1983 may not be premised upon respondeat superior liability.
In response, Plaintiff argues that Well Path had a custom or practice of failing to supervise its employees whom Plaintiff names here as the medical provider Defendants. Specifically, Plaintiff sets forth the following:
The defendant, Director etc. of Wellpath is the provider for the medical department, and staff here at SCI-Houtzdale. They provide those medical personal [sic] who work in the prison medical depa[r]tment. They supervise the operation of their medical employees, along with its by laws [sic], rules, requirements, and cod[e] of ethics. The defendants['] actions, or lack thereof in providing adequate medical care for the plaintiff is unacceptable for any medical provider. The evidence will show under the supervision and direction of the defendants named in the complaint you begin to see a pattern, first, is where the defendants C.R.N.P. Barns, C.R.N.P. Thornley continued to downplay plaintiff[‘s] symptoms; Second is where Dr. Naji proscribed [sic] contraindicated medication without any diagnosis; Third was mutable postponements of crucial diagnostic testing; and fourth, refusal to administer treatment outlined by the specialist on my case.
Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 49 at 4. In his Complaint, Plaintiff also includes factual averments that suggest a custom or practice of SCI Houtzdale medical relating to its poor medical treatment of inmates in general:
On July 19, 2019 I was sent to Blair Gastroenterology. I was transported by C/O (1), Rooney and C/O (2), Shrock. Upon awakening from my procedure C/O (1), Rooney said to me that the doctor was upset while administering my Colonoscopy, and said “I would have had a far better prognosis if I would have been scheduled sooner for the procedure.[”] C/O (1), Rooney continued to state how upset the doctor was, that Houtzdale medical continued to treat there [sic] inmates this way “and that it was pure negligence on their part.[”]Complaint, ECF No. 9 at 9 (emphasis added).
In Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), the United States Supreme Court held that municipalities and other local governmental units are persons subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In so ruling, however, the Court declared that municipal liability may not be premised on the mere fact that the governmental unit employed the offending official, that is, through application of the doctrine of respondeat superior. Instead, the Court concluded that a governmental unit may be liable under § 1983 only when its policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. The official policy requirement distinguishes acts of the municipality from acts of employees of the municipality, thereby limiting liability to action for which the municipality is actually responsible. Id.
In finding municipal liability pursuant to § 1983, the plaintiff must identify the policy, custom or practice of the municipal defendant that results in the constitutional violation. Id. at 690-91. A municipal policy is made when a decision-maker issues an official proclamation or decision. Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481 (1986), quoted in, Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1480 (3d Cir. 1990). A custom or practice, however, may consist of a course of conduct so permanent and widespread that it has the force of law. Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1480. To establish municipal liability based upon a custom or practice, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the decision-maker had notice that a constitutional violation could occur, and that the decision-maker acted with deliberate indifference to this risk. Berg v. County of Allegheny, 219 F.3d 261, 276 (3d Cir. 2000). Finally, Plaintiff must show a causal connection between the custom or policy and the violation of the constitutional right. Bielevicz v. Dubinon, 915 F.2d 845, 850-51 (3d Cir. 1990). That is, a plaintiff must demonstrate an affirmative link or plausible nexus between the custom or practice and the alleged constitutional deprivation. Bielevicz, 915 F.2d at 850-51.
The Court recognizes that the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that, in civil rights cases, a court must give a plaintiff the opportunity to amend a deficient complaint-regardless of whether the plaintiff requests to do so-when dismissing a case for failure to state a claim, unless doing so would be inequitable or futile. See Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 251 (3d Cir. 2007). Based upon the facts included in Plaintiff's responsive brief (ECF No. 49), and in light of this Court's obligation to liberally construe Plaintiff's Complaint, the Court should permit Plaintiff leave to amend to include a Monell claim against the corporate Defendant Well Path. Therefore, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss will be granted without prejudice to Plaintiff filing an amended complaint in the time ordered by the District Judge, should the District Judge adopt this Report and Recommendation.
Plaintiff does not indicate whether he is suing the Director, CEO or President of Well Path in his/her personal or official capacity. When a plaintiff fails to plead capacity specifically, the court must examine the nature of the plaintiff's claims, the relief sought, and the course of the proceedings to determine whether a state official is being sued in a personal (i.e., individual), versus official, capacity. Keys v. Carroll, Civ. A. No. 3:10-CV-1570, 2011 WL 1152135, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 28, 2011) (citing Biggs v. Meadows, 66 F.3d 56, 60-61 (4th Cir. 1995)). When the Court does so here, it concludes that Plaintiff's claims are brought against Well Path in its official capacity because of Plaintiff's suggestion of a custom or practice of the medical department in delivering poor healthcare to the inmates at SCI Houtzdale, and because of his attempt to name the appropriate officer of the entity, i.e., “Director, CEO or President.”
2. Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 35) filed by Defendant Terri Sechrengost
In support of her Motion to Dismiss, Defendant Terri Sechrengost argues that Plaintiff fails to state a claim for relief because she was a non-medical prison administrator and Plaintiff had access to the medical staff at SCI Houtzdale. Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 36 at 3. Plaintiff responds that he repeatedly sought out the assistance of CHCA Sechrengost when he was unable to get relief, including their “flat out refusal of medical treatment, ” for his serious medical needs from the medical Defendants. Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 49 at 6.
Defendant Sechrengost correctly sets out the law regarding the liability of non-medical prison administrators:
As our precedent makes clear, “a non-medical prison official” cannot “be charge[d] with the Eighth Amendment scienter requirement of deliberate indifference” when the “prisoner is under the care of medical experts” and the official does not have “a reason to believe (or actual knowledge) that prison doctors or their assistants are mistreating (or not treating) a prisoner.” Spruill v. Gillis], 372 F.3d [218] at 236 [(3d Cir. 2004)]; see also [Durmer v. O'Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 69 (3d Cir. 1993)] (holding that non-physicians cannot “be considered deliberately indifferent simply because they failed to respond directly to the medical complaints of a prisoner who was already being treated by the prison doctor”).Pearson v. Prison Health Serv., 850 F.3d 526, 543 (3d Cir. 2017).
Here, Plaintiff alleges that he submitted a DC-135A Inmate Request to Staff to Defendant Sechrengost on two occasions informing her that he was being denied access to medical treatment and testing that was ordered by outside gastrointestinal specialists. He also indicated that his sick call request was being ignored. ECF No. 9 at 14. He stated that his symptoms were worsening to the point where he believed they were life threatening. He further informed her that he had not yet been rescheduled for his colonoscopy and that until he has that procedure, he was told he could not be given any other medical treatment. ECF No. 49-1. He explained that he was scheduled to go out for a colonoscopy, but the procedure was cancelled because he was not prepped in time, and after being rescheduled two months later, the procedure was cancelled again for the same reason. ECF No. 42-9. He further alerted her to the fact that his symptoms were progressively getting worse and that he was being refused any treatment until the outcome of the colonoscopy. Id. Therefore, pursuant to Pearson, 850 F.3d at 543, Plaintiff has stated a plausible claim for relief pursuant to the Eighth Amendment for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs against CHCA Sechrengost because she had reason to believe that medical personnel were not providing medical care to Plaintiff. It is recommended that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss be denied.
III. CONCLUSION
It is respectfully recommended that the Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 31) filed by Defendant Director, CEO, or President of Well Path be granted without prejudice to Plaintiff filing an amended complaint by the deadline set by the District Judge. It is also recommended that the Moton to Dismiss (ECF No. 35) filed by Defendant CHCA Terri Sechrengost be denied.
In accordance with the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1)(B) and (C), and Rule 72.D.2 of the Local Rules of Court, the parties are allowed fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this Report and Recommendation to file objections. Any party opposing the objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of objections to respond thereto. Failure to file timely objections will constitute a waiver of any appellate rights. May 25, 2021