Opinion
E068439
09-08-2017
T.W., Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY, Respondent; SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Real Party in Interest.
Nicole Williams, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Petitioner. No appearance for Respondent. Jean-Rene Basle, County Counsel, and Michael A. Markel, Deputy County Counsel, for Real Party in Interest.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super.Ct.No. J260034) OPINION ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS; petition for extraordinary writ. Christopher B. Marshall, Judge. Petition denied. Nicole Williams, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Petitioner. No appearance for Respondent. Jean-Rene Basle, County Counsel, and Michael A. Markel, Deputy County Counsel, for Real Party in Interest.
I
INTRODUCTION
After petitioner T.W. (Mother) received over 24 months of reunification services as to her two-year-old son A.J., the juvenile court terminated Mother's reunification services and set a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing. Mother petitions for extraordinary relief pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.452. Mother contends the juvenile court erred in determining there was a substantial risk of detriment to the child if returned to Mother's custody. She also argues the San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS) failed to provide her with reasonable reunification services and that services should have been extended. We find no error, and deny the petition.
All future statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise stated.
The child's father is not a party to this appeal.
II
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Mother is legally blind and suffers from asthma and anxiety. She has a history with CFS, which resulted in the removal and subsequent termination of services for three of her other children, W.S., M.S. and D.S. In March 2005, CFS opened a voluntary family maintenance case as to W.S. due to substantiated allegations of general neglect and physical abuse. In July 2005, W.S. was removed from Mother's care due to general neglect and physical abuse. In September 2005, the juvenile court found true allegations of medical and general neglect against Mother. After Mother participated in reunification services, the court returned W.S. to Mother in September 2006 with family maintenance services. Shortly thereafter, in December 2006, CFS again removed W.S. and sibling M.S. from Mother's care based on allegations of general neglect. In February 2007, the court terminated Mother's services as to W.S. and denied Mother services with respect to M.S. W.S. and M.S. remained in the dependency system until July 2010 when the court granted legal guardianship over them.
In January 2013, CFS removed another child, D.S., from Mother due to allegations of severe neglect, general neglect, and caretaker absence/incapacity. In March 2013, the court found true the allegations of severe and general neglect against Mother and provided Mother with reunification services, including a parenting program, substance abuse counseling, drug testing, and a 12-Step program. In July 2014, the court terminated Mother's reunification services.
Less than five months later in November 2014, A.J. came to the attention of CFS due to allegations of general neglect. At the time of the referral, Mother was receiving In Home Supportive Services (IHSS). Following A.J.'s birth in September 2014, Mother requested additional IHSS hours because she needed help caring for A.J. In response to the referral, a social worker went to Mother's home and observed Mother to be capable of caring for A.J. The social worker also spoke to the IHSS provider, who reported no issues or concerns regarding Mother's ability to care for A.J.
When the social worker made an unannounced visit to Mother's home on March 4, 2015, the home was found to be neat and clean, and Mother appeared knowledgeable of A.J.'s needs and medical appointments. A.J. was born prematurely and spent 20 days in a hospital due to feeding problems. Another home visit occurred on March 19, 2015, and the home was clean and A.J. appeared healthy and well cared for. During the visit, the social worker requested that Mother submit to a drug test but she failed to do so because she claimed she was not on the list of patients to be tested at the clinic when she arrived.
When the social worker attempted another home visit on March 26, 2015, a neighbor informed the social worker that Mother was not at home and that the neighbor had heard Mother yelling at A.J. to " 'shut the f_ _ _ up!' " while he was crying. The neighbor also reported that she had seen Mother sitting on the porch and mocking A.J. while he was in the house crying. The social worker returned to Mother's home on March 26, 2015, and requested that Mother submit to a drug test. Mother did so and the test results were negative. During this visit, Mother provided the social worker with several certificates documenting her completion of various services including a substance abuse program in June 2014, a series of life skill classes, and a parenting class.
Later, the social worker reviewed Mother's child welfare history and learned that Mother had a history of substance abuse involving alcohol and methamphetamine. Mother's substance abuse problem began when she was in junior high school and continued until November 2013. Because of substance abuse and child welfare history, Mother was offered services under a voluntary family maintenance program on March 30, 2015. Those services included random drug testing and a continuation of her Alcoholics Anonymous/Narcotics Anonymous (AA/NA) weekly meetings. The social worker requested Mother to drug test on April 17, 2015. The test was positive for amphetamines.
On April 23, 2015, CFS detained A.J., and on April 27, 2015, CFS filed a petition pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (b) (failure to protect), (g) (no provision for support), and (j) (abuse of sibling). The juvenile court detained A.J. the following day, and ordered Mother to drug test. Mother tested positive for methamphetamine.
Based on Mother's substance abuse and child welfare history, CFS recommended no reunification services for Mother. CFS was concerned that Mother had not benefitted from prior services and that Mother did not understand she cannot use drugs while caring for her child.
The matter was set contested and discussed in mediation. Mother agreed to submit on the allegations as amended but continued to object to the recommendation to deny her services. CFS later changed its recommendation and was willing to provide Mother with reunification services.
The jurisdictional/dispositional hearing was held on June 17, 2015. Mother waived her constitutional rights, and the juvenile court found the allegations in the amended petition true. The child was declared a dependent of the court and Mother was provided with reunification services. Mother's reunification plan required Mother to attend and complete a parenting program, an outpatient substance abuse program, a 12-Step program, undergo random drug testing, and individual counseling.
By the time of the six-month review hearing, Mother had made substantial progress in her reunification plan. She had completed 12 random drug tests that were all negative. She had received certificates for life skills, parenting education/child abuse, five months of outpatient substance abuse treatment, self-care, and anger management. In addition, she was participating in NA/AA meetings. However, the social worker did not recommend return of A.J. to Mother. The social worker explained, "Even though parents are making good progress, the parents need to demonstrate a consistent ability to adequately parent their child over a period of time."
On December 17, 2015, the court set the matter for trial because Mother sought to have A.J. transitioned back to her care.
The contested six-month review hearing was held on January 14, 2016. Following argument, the juvenile court continued Mother's services and provided Mother with a minimum of two visits a week for two hours. The court authorized the social worker to liberalize the duration and frequency of the visits, including allowing unsupervised visits for Mother. The court also ordered that Mother's visits be held at the visitation center and include an interactive component that would allow a parenting coach to give Mother advice on how to interact and care for A.J.
By the time of the 12-month review hearing, Mother had completed her reunification plan and continued to test clean for drugs. Nevertheless, the social worker was not recommending A.J.'s return to her care because Mother had not adequately demonstrated an ability to care for the child long term. The social worker noted Mother became easily frustrated and had required assistance with caring for A.J.'s basic needs. For example, many times during visits, Mother had required assistance with things such as how to sanitize A.J.'s pacifier, what to do when A.J. had soiled his clothes through his diaper, and guidance with consoling A.J. when he was separated from the caregiver at the beginning of the visits. During one visit, A.J. would not eat all the food Mother had brought. Mother had to be taught that it was okay if A.J. did not finish everything and that A.J. did not need to be forced to eat everything on the plate. The social worker opined that although Mother did "a very good job being prepared for visits by bringing snacks and her own diaper bag, or by having her home ready and prepared and by playing with [A.J.] during visits," "it appears that it may be difficult for [Mother] to care for [A.J.] on her own over an extended period of time." The social worker wanted Mother to see a mental health professional to assess her ability to care for A.J. on her own and to assess for any developmental delays.
The 12-month review hearing was held on June 3, 2016. At that time, CFS recommended continuing services and unsupervised visits for Mother. Minor's counsel, however, objected to unsupervised visits. The court ordered unsupervised visits for Mother two times per week for two hours to take place at the CFS office. The court also authorized the social worker to change the location of the visits as appropriate and ordered Mother to undergo a psychological evaluation.
By the October 24, 2016 18-month review hearing, CFS recommended terminating services and setting a section 366.26 hearing. The social worker indicated that the court had not ordered Mother to participate in services during the last reporting period other than to randomly drug test and undergo a psychological evaluation. The social worker also noted that the case plan outlined how Mother could show her ability to meet the needs of A.J. and required Mother to participate in A.J.'s appointments, assist with scheduling and demonstrate that she understood A.J.'s developmental, medical, and health needs. The social worker pointed out that Mother showed many strengths and positive actions during the last reporting period. Mother was testing clean and her psychological evaluation indicated that she did not have a developmental delay. In addition, Mother attended many of A.J.'s medical appointments and provided the health care professionals with valuable history about A.J. and Mother's family. Mother also demonstrated an understanding of A.J.'s needs such as special shoes because he was falling down while trying to walk and the need for follow-up appointments due to A.J. not meeting his developmental milestones. The hearing was continued to November 23, 2016.
Despite Mother's progress, the social worker continued to be concerned with her ability to meet A.J.'s special needs long term without additional CFS support. The social worker indicated that A.J.'s needs "have included receiving a cognitive evaluation, vision evaluation, [h]earing evaluation, dental screenings, IRC services, craniofacial evaluation and genetic evaluation because [A.J. was] not meeting many developmental milestones for his age." The social worker explained that A.J. "continues to receive services through Desert Mountain Children's Center, including occupational therapy and play therapy." Additionally, A.J. "has been diagnosed with developmental delays, including a speech delay." A.J. also continued to bump into things when he walked and had upcoming appointments with neurology. Medical staff reported that A.J.'s muscle tone was weak, partly resulting in him falling. A.J. was required to undergo continued examinations and assessments due to his developmental delays. A.J.'s special needs required that he be seen at Loma Linda University Hospital, as the health clinics in the High Desert (where Mother resided) did not have the resources to provide the services and specialists A.J. needed. Mother relied on CFS for bus passes for visits and gas cards for medical appointments. The social worker believed that even local medical appointments would be difficult for Mother to attend without assistance. In addition, Mother relied on A.J.'s caregiver to schedule A.J.'s medical appointments and maintain a calendar for her as to when and where the appointments were to take place. Although Mother was aware of some of A.J.'s needs, Mother appeared to be more passive and observant, as opposed to actively engaged in A.J.'s appointments and needs.
Furthermore, CFS was concerned with Mother's child welfare history. Despite receiving voluntary family maintenance services, family maintenance services and family reunification services, Mother failed to reunify with three children. In each case, Mother made good progress and demonstrated personal growth, only to fail when not being directly supervised and assisted by CFS. Meanwhile, A.J. recognized his caregivers as parental figures and was very bonded and attached to his caregivers, who sought to adopt him. During visits, the caregiver had to stay in the room with Mother for approximately the first 15 to 30 minutes to help with the transition. Mother had been seen attempting to soothe A.J., who cried and threw tantrums during visits.
The 18-month review hearing was held on November 23, 2016. After hearing testimony from Mother and argument from counsel, the juvenile court found it was in A.J.'s best interest to continue the section 18-month review hearing for three months. The court ordered unsupervised visits to Mother, twice a week for two hours, in a public setting. The court also authorized unsupervised visits at Mother's home by packet once the social worker assessed Mother's home and the people living there completed background checks. The court noted, "And so we will see how things are progressing. This is a child with very, very specific and significant special needs."
Mother resided with her boyfriend. The criminal background check on Mother's boyfriend revealed several Live Scan hits for robbery, possession of controlled substances, and being under the influence. The most recent Live Scan hit, for being under the influence, was from July 26, 2014, which was during the time that he claimed to have been clean for three years following a 30-year substance abuse history. CFS continued to have concerns about Mother's ability to care for A.J. on her own and to provide transportation to A.J.'s medical appointments. The caregiver's daughter had to transport Mother to one medical appointment. CFS also observed that Mother had a difficult time with A.J. and Mother had to ask the caregiver's daughter to take him. Additionally, there was an allegation of abuse against Mother, as A.J. had some bruising following a visit. That allegation, however, was later deemed unfounded.
In an addendum report, the social worker recommended that services be terminated and a section 366.26 hearing be set. The social worker conducted a home assessment of Mother's home on February 7, 2017, and spoke to Mother's boyfriend who initially denied being Mother's fiancé but later admitted he was engaged to Mother. Mother's fiancé did not have a relationship with A.J. and knew very little concerning his needs except that he " 'can't stand right or something.' " Despite having very little knowledge of A.J.'s needs, the fiancé reported that he was committed to assisting Mother in caring for A.J. by helping her get A.J. to his appointments and doing " 'fatherly stuff' " with A.J. if he was returned to Mother. However, the fiancé had yet to assist Mother with transportation. On the other hand, Mother did have a good understanding of A.J.'s needs including his need for occupational therapy and the fact that he was under the care of a neurologist. Mother was also aware that A.J. had a speech delay but believed he was receiving services through the Inland Regional Center (IRC) at the caregiver's home. However, the IRC services were pending. Mother was further aware that A.J. was attending group classes at Desert Mountain to strengthen his social skills. She knew A.J. required leg braces because of his inability to walk due to his feet and lack of muscle strength between his feet and legs. In addition, as requested, Mother made A.J.'s appointments and kept track of the appointments with a calendar, a list, and in her head. Nonetheless, she did not demonstrate any initiative in arranging appointments unless prompted to do so and she still relied on the caregiver and the caregiver's family to transport A.J. to his appointments, including those in Loma Linda. Mother also had limited interaction with medical personnel during A.J.'s appointments and required encouragement from the caregiver to communicate more with the medical personnel. Similarly, Mother needed encouragement to interact with A.J. during therapy appointments at Desert Mountain and sometimes appeared not to know what to do in certain situations. For example, the social worker received multiple accounts that Mother did not know what to do and had problems following instructions when A.J. had tantrums, which included kicking or hitting Mother.
The social worker concluded that Mother could only meet A.J.'s needs when being supervised by CFS and when receiving assistance from the caregiver and the caregiver's family. Mother had not demonstrated an ability to care for A.J. on her own and Mother did not have a support system that would allow her to care for A.J. in the absence of CFS oversight and the ongoing efforts of the caregiver and the caregiver's family. Mother's fiancé and her in-home care provider were Mother's only support system. Mother's fiancé had very limited knowledge of A.J.'s needs and had failed to assist Mother with transportation. Mother's in-home care provider not only had her own child removed from her care in the past but one of Mother's children as well. Additionally, Mother's child welfare history showed that Mother had completed service plans in the past and had children returned to her care, only to be unable to maintain their safety and well-being.
The continued 18-month review hearing was held six months later on May 31, 2017. At that hearing, no further witnesses were called and the parties proceeded by way of argument. Mother's counsel argued that Mother's support system was adequate and that Mother was scheduling A.J.'s appointments and was attending those appointments. Mother's counsel also asserted that Mother had made great strides and there was no reason to believe Mother would not continue to meet A.J.'s needs in the absence of CFS oversight and the assistance of the caregiver and the caregiver's family.
Minor's counsel argued that "the real issue" here is whether or not Mother is able to care for A.J. on a full-time basis without assistance from CFS or anyone else and that the record shows Mother is not able to care for A.J. on her own. Minor's counsel further noted that two letters attached to the social worker's report indicate Mother appeared to become frustrated with the child and that she was extremely impatient at the doctors' visits. Minor's counsel further pointed out: "There was some indication that she may have been verbally aggressive with the child during that time frame, and those are small portions of time where she is required to care for the child. And even in that small amount of time, she becomes frustrated with him. [¶] The mother, at this point in time, has had over two years of services with regard to this particular child. That's not to include all of the services that she had received prior to this child being removed. [¶] And even at this point in time, 24-plus months into it, she does not have housing that's adequate for the child. While the physical layout of the home may be appropriate, and all the dangerous chemicals may be stored away, there is the fact that the boyfriend, who resides in the home, has a criminal history with violent felony convictions, as well as substance abuse convictions as recent as 2014. So it's not an appropriate home for the child to be placed in."
Following arguments, the juvenile court noted that it did have an opportunity to talk to all counsel about the case and that the case was not a "simple one." The court stated: "The Court does understand and appreciate that [Mother] has made efforts to finish and complete her services and do what's asked, and that is an achievement that no one should take anything from the mother for having done. [¶] The issue, however, is demonstrating substantial progress, demonstrating this ability to be independently able to care for [A.J.] [¶] And that, from notes at visits, from what is noted in terms of how Mother interacts with [A.J.], and how and what she does during medical appointments, and how she participates with medical appointments, is something that the Court believes still at this point would constitute a substantial risk of detriment to [A.J.'s] safety and protection if [A.J.] were to be returned to the mother on this day. [¶] The Court is in agreement with the recommendation, but not taking away from the fact that the mother has made progress." The court thereafter terminated Mother's reunification services, ordered unsupervised visits twice a week for four hours at a neutral site, and set a section 366.26 hearing.
III
DISCUSSION
A. Detriment
Mother contends insufficient evidence supports the juvenile court's determination there was a substantial risk of detriment to A.J. if returned to Mother's custody. We disagree.
"Until reunification services are terminated, there is a statutory presumption that a dependent child will be returned to parental custody. [Citation.] As relevant here, section 366.22, subdivision (a) requires the juvenile court at the 18-month review hearing to return the child to the custody of the parent unless it determines, by a preponderance of the evidence, that return of the child would create a substantial risk of detriment to the child's physical or emotional well-being." (In re Yvonne W. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1394, 1400.) "We review the evidence most favorably to the prevailing party and indulge in all legitimate and reasonable inferences to uphold the court's ruling. [Citation.] ' "Substantial evidence" is evidence of ponderable legal significance, evidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid value. [Citation.]' [Citation.]" (Tracy J. v. Superior Court (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1415, 1424 (Tracy J.).) " ' "Where, as here, a discretionary power is inherently or by express statute vested in the trial judge, his or her exercise of that wide discretion must not be disturbed on appeal except on a showing that the court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice. [Citations.]" [Citations.]' [Citations.] In the presence of substantial evidence, appellate justices are without the power to reweigh conflicting evidence and alter a dependency court determination. [Citations.]" (Constance K. v. Superior Court (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 689, 705, italics omitted (Constance K.).)
Mother states it is undisputed that she completed her case plan. Mother's compliance with her reunification service plan is commendable, but not dispositive. (Constance K., supra, 61 Cal.App.4th at p. 704 ["Compliance with the reunification plan is certainly a pertinent consideration at the section 366.22 hearing; however, it is not the sole concern before the dependency court judge"].) Although a parent's compliance with his or her case plan must be considered by the juvenile court, it is only one factor in determining whether returning the child presents a risk of detriment. (In re Joseph B. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 890, 899.) In deciding whether there is a risk of detriment, the court considers other factors, including, but not limited to, "whether changing custody will be detrimental because severing a positive loving relationship with the foster family will cause serious, long-term emotional harm [citations]; properly supported psychological evaluations which indicate return to a parent would be detrimental to a minor [citations]; whether the natural parent maintains relationships with persons whose presence will be detrimental to the ward [citation]; instability in terms of management of a home [citation]; difficulties a minor has in dealing with others such as stepparents [citations]; limited awareness by a parent of the emotional and physical needs of a child [citation]; failure of a minor to have lived with the natural parent for long periods of time [citation]; and the manner in which the parent has conducted himself or herself in relation to a minor in the past. [Citations.]" (Constance K., at pp. 704-705.)
In Blanca P. v. Superior Court (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1738 (Blanca P.), the court recognized the easy cases in deciding whether it would be detrimental to return a child are "ones where there is a clear failure by the parent to comply with material aspects of the service plan. In Angela S. v. Superior Court (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 758, 763-764 . . . , for example, a mother continued to test positive for illegal drug use, continued to move from place to place, failed to 'regularly' attend therapy, and failed to complete her parenting class. This was obviously enough to support a finding of detriment. [¶] The harder cases are, like the one before us, where the parent has complied with the service plan, but for some reason has not convinced a psychologist or social worker that it would be safe to return the child to the parent. The problem is not, as it were, quantitative (that is, showing up for counseling or therapy or parenting classes, or what have you) but qualitative (that is, whether the counseling, therapy or parenting classes are doing any good). These are sensitive cases, fraught with emotional overtones, because they invariably deal with an evaluation of the personality, character and attitudes of the parent." (Blanca P., at p. 1748, fn. & italics omitted.)
While we agree this is one of the more difficult cases, it is not comparable to Blanca P., where the absence of any substantial evidence to support a detriment finding was clear. And in view of our standard of review (In re Brian M. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1398, 1401 [substantial evidence]), and Mother's appellate burden (In re L.Y.L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 947 [parent has burden on appeal to show there is no substantial evidence to support the finding or order]), we cannot disturb the juvenile court's finding. The issue in this case was not whether Mother had completed her case plan, but whether she could provide a safe and protective home for A.J. and whether she could care for and meet A.J.'s needs on a full-time basis, in the long term, absent CFS's assistance. The record, as set out in detail above, indicates Mother was unable to meet A.J.'s special needs without the assistance of CFS or A.J.'s caregivers. Mother required assistance with A.J.'s medical needs. She also was unable to transport A.J. to his medical appointments without assistance. In addition, Mother did not know how to handle A.J. during his tantrums, which included kicking and hitting Mother and lasted for 15 minutes or more. Furthermore, Mother's support system, which consisted of her fiancé and in-care home provider, was questionable. Mother's fiancé, who resided with Mother, had a 30-year substance abuse history and an extensive criminal history. Moreover, Mother's fiancé had never met A.J. and knew very little about A.J.'s various developmental delays and medical needs. Mother's in-home care provider not only had her own child removed in the past by CFS but Mother also had one of her own children removed from her as well. Meanwhile, A.J. had been placed with his caregivers for two years, recognized them as parental figures, and had become very bonded to them. This, however, was not surprising since they had been transporting A.J. to all his appointments and working with his special needs following his appointments on a day-to-day basis. With his special needs, A.J. required a great deal of attention and patience. However, the social worker received several reports of Mother growing impatient and frustrated with A.J. during his occupational therapy and doctor appointments. The juvenile court could reasonably find returning A.J. to Mother's custody posed a risk of detriment.
Mother relies significantly on David B. v. Superior Court (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 768 (David B.), and compares her situation to the father's circumstances in that case. Mother's comparison is inapt. In David B., the father was a nonoffending parent who sought to reunify with his two-year-old daughter after the mother's drug use and mental health issues brought the child into the dependency system. (Id. at pp. 774-775.) At the 18-month review hearing, the social worker recommended that the case be set for a hearing under section 366.26, focusing on "minor quibbles" concerning the father's parenting ability and illiteracy, and concerns that the minor had not fully bonded with him during 18 months of steady visitation. (Id. at p. 773.) The juvenile court did not return the child to the father because the court was concerned that the father was planning to continue to live with his sister and brother-in-law, who had unresolved drug, alcohol, and domestic violence problems. The agency, however, never indicated to the father that his housing was an issue. The father had overnight visits with the child at the home, and he did everything the social worker asked of him to prepare that home for his child. (Id. at p. 787.) Although the juvenile court voiced other concerns, none of them had anything to do with the substance abuse problems of the father, who had been sober for 20 months when the child welfare agency contacted him about the dependency case. (Id. at pp. 775, 787.) The Court of Appeal granted the father's petition, finding the brother-in-law's potential danger to the child did not necessarily demonstrate the child could not reside in the same home with the father. (Id. at pp. 773-774.) The Court of Appeal concluded there was no support in the record for the finding the father lacked basic parenting abilities in any sense that would indicate danger to the child, and stated the juvenile court should have considered less drastic alternatives. (Ibid.)
Whatever concerns the social worker might have had about the father in David B., the evidence in that case did not establish any shortcomings that made it dangerous to return the child to his care. Here, by contrast, Mother's fiancé was an obstacle to Mother gaining custody of A.J., as the fiancé lived with Mother and had an extensive criminal and substance abuse history. In addition, the record indicates Mother was unable to meet A.J.'s developmental and medical needs on a long-term basis without the assistance of CFS or A.J.'s caregivers, thereby placing A.J. at risk if he were returned to Mother's care. It would be unrealistic to expect CFS to monitor Mother around the clock and there were no less drastic alternatives for the juvenile court to consider. This is more than a "minor quibble" about Mother's parenting skills. Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's ruling that returning A.J. to Mother would be detrimental.
B. Reasonable Services
Mother also argues CFS failed to provide reasonable services to her. Specifically, she asserts CFS should have provided her with liberalized and unsupervised visits to allow her to show she could independently care for A.J. She further argues CFS failed to take into account her physical disability when implementing her case plan and should have contacted her prior IHSS provider to supplement CFS services and eventually be the sole source of services as when the case first began. Because visitation and services were unreasonable, Mother asserts, the juvenile court should have continued the case to transition A.J. back to Mother through the provision of family maintenance services or, in the alternative, the court should have exercised its discretion to continue the case pursuant to section 352 for additional reunification services since services overall were not reasonable.
Initially, we find Mother forfeited her challenge to the adequacy of the visitation orders and services. At the six-month, 12-month, and 18-month review hearings, the juvenile court found CFS had provided reasonable reunification services to Mother. Mother does not claim, and nothing in the record indicates, that she objected to the court's findings at those hearings. Instead, Mother waited over 24 months before complaining about the reasonableness of her visitations and services. By failing to object to the adequacy of reunification services and the visitation orders in the juvenile court, Mother has forfeited her right to assert error in this court. (See Los Angeles County Dept. of Children etc. Services v. Superior Court (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 1088, 1093 [a parent may not "wait silently by until the final reunification review hearing to seek an extended reunification period based on a perceived inadequacy in the reunification services occurring long before that hearing"]; In re Kevin S. (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 882, 885; In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293 [forfeiture rule applies in dependency cases]; In re Lorenzo C. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1338-1339 [same].)
Even if we were to reach the merits, we reject Mother's claims that she was provided with inadequate visitation and unreasonable reunification services. We review the juvenile court's order finding that reasonable services were offered under the substantial evidence standard. (See In re Shelley J. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 322, 329, superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in In re Christopher C. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 73, 82; In re J.E. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 557, 566.) While we recognize that in many cases more services might have been provided and the services that were provided may have been imperfect, the standard is whether the services provided were reasonable under the circumstances. (In re J.E. at p. 566; see In re Jasmon O. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 398, 425 ["[t]he services offered were reasonable under the circumstances"].)
Mother asserts that visitation was unreasonable because it should have progressed to unsupervised visits at Mother's home with overnight and weekend visits. However, the barrier to Mother's unsupervised visitation was due to the fact Mother's fiancé resided in Mother's home and had a lengthy criminal and substance abuse history, and the presence of Mother's in-home care person. At the November 23, 2016 hearing, the court authorized CFS to provide unsupervised visitation at Mother's home following an assessment of Mother's home and by approval packet. The court explained, "And the Court will have unsupervised [visits] at [Mother's] home by approval packet because there's people at home that are going to need to be scanned and looked into." Minor's counsel added that "if there's going to be any consideration of liberalizing the visits to the mother's home that any adults that are going to have significant contact with the child be interviewed and Live-Scanned." The court responded, "The Court agrees. And that's ordinarily what the social worker would do in terms of accomplishing whether it's safe to have the child visit at home."
At the continued hearing held on January 17, 2017, the court and the parties addressed the issue again. The court authorized visits in Mother's home by approval packet and then raised the question, "[w]hat was [the] issue." Minor's counsel responded, "I can't recall specifically, your Honor, but I don't remember if there was another adult living in Mother's home. Obviously that adult would need to be cleared and approved." Mother's trial counsel added: "It was Mom's boyfriend. He's in her support system. And it's my understanding that they have been attempting to get in contact with the social worker since the last hearing to have that approved, but it's unresolved at the moment." CFS's counsel then advised the court and the parties that the social worker was currently in the office and that Mother should contact her right then.
When the parties returned to court on February 27, 2017, the issue remained unresolved. The court indicated: "We had a brief discussion, all counsel and the Court, just before we called the matter. And my understanding is that with delays on both sides from the CFS to the boyfriend, that everybody now has been Live-Scanned; is that correct?" CFS's counsel responded that was correct and that he believed that the boyfriend was Live Scanned in the previous week. Mother's counsel agreed but then stated that the boyfriend's appointment for the actual Live Scan was for the next day, February 28.
Thereafter, the social worker submitted an informational report to the court on April 4, 2017, indicating that the fiancé did Live Scan and he had several hits for robbery, possession of controlled substances, and being under the influence. The social worker noted that the fiancé's last hit was on July 26, 2014, for being under the influence, which coincided with the fiancé's claim that he had been clean for three years. The social worker further reported that the fiancé had a 30-year history of substance abuse but no child welfare history. The social worker also noted that the second person of Mother's support system, her in-home care services provider, had her own child removed by CFS as well as one of Mother's children. Based on the background checks, unsupervised visits in Mother's home, including overnights and weekends, never occurred because the social worker believed these individuals posed a risk to A.J.
No other evidence was presented concerning unsupervised overnight and weekend visits to the juvenile court. Accordingly, the only evidence the court received regarding Mother's home and her support system was that Mother's home was inappropriate for placement, let alone unsupervised visits, including overnight and weekends. Based on the social worker's reports, the juvenile court could reasonably conclude unsupervised overnight and weekend visits in Mother's home were inappropriate. Substantial evidence supports the court's determination not to implement unsupervised visits at Mother's home.
Mother relies on Tracy J., supra, 202 Cal.App.4th 1415 to support her position. In Tracy J., the child was removed from the care of his parents, who were developmentally disabled. The juvenile court ordered reunification services, including independent living skills training and weekly supervised visitation of three to four hours. (Id. at pp. 1420-1421.) During visits with the child, the parents were "protective and alert," they put his needs above their own, they provided for the child's safety, and they responded appropriately when the child fell and bumped his head. (Id. at p. 1422.) However, the department was concerned about the parents' ability to assess and treat the child's asthma. (Id. at p. 1421.) At the 18-month review hearing, the juvenile court terminated reunification services, finding that returning the child to the parents would be detrimental to the child and that reasonable services had been provided. (Id. at pp. 1420-1422.) The Court of Appeal reversed, finding that reasonable services had not been provided. In particular, the visitation should have been advanced, since there was no evidence showing that the parents' behavior had or would jeopardize the child's safety. (Id. at p. 1427.) They had parented the child "fairly independently" and had shown an ability to pick up skills if given proper training. (Ibid.)
This case is distinguishable from Tracy J. Mother's visitation was never limited in the instant case due to her disability of being legally blind. Rather, Mother never progressed to unsupervised overnight and weekend visits at her home because of her fiancé living in her home and the presence of her in-home care provider. These two individuals posed a safety risk to A.J., a child with very specific and special needs. There is no evidence to suggest CFS or the juvenile court presumed harm to A.J. because Mother was disabled or that CFS limited Mother's visitation due to her disability. Under the circumstances of this particular case, substantial evidence supports a finding that the court-ordered visitation was reasonable.
Mother also argues that the court should have exercised its discretion under section 352 and continued the hearing in order to provide Mother with additional services as her initial services were unreasonable. Based on the psychological assessment performed by Dr. Brodie, Mother asserts that the social worker should have provided her with referrals for vocational training and individual counseling to address self-esteem and confidence issues, and the social worker should have contacted IHSS to arrange in-home care services for Mother and A.J. for when A.J. was returned to Mother's care. The social worker attached the September 21, 2016 psychological evaluation to the 366.22 hearing report dated October 24, 2016. Dr. Brodie concluded in the evaluation report that Mother did not have any developmental delays or cognitive disabilities. Instead, Mother suffered from low self-esteem and a lack of confidence, and was extremely passive. As a result, Dr. Brodie recommended a vocational rehabilitation program, which could promote her self-esteem and confidence. Dr. Brodie further recommended individual counseling to address Mother's low self-esteem and lack of confidence, as well as an assessment regarding the degree of in-home assistance that Mother would need in order to care for her son given her visual impairment.
On October 24, 2016, Mother requested the trial be set contested and the court set a trial date of November 23, 2016. Mother testified at the hearing held on November 23, and then the court continued the matter for 90 days to see how Mother did with increased unsupervised visits. The court ordered unsupervised visits in a public setting, twice a week for two hours. The court also authorized unsupervised visits at Mother's home if the people residing with Mother underwent a background check and the social worker assessed the home as appropriate for A.J. Mother did not request to engage in further services or claim she required vocational training as suggested by Dr. Brodie. The parties' focus was on how unsupervised visits would progress. The court and the parties agreed the case was moving towards family maintenance and A.J.'s return to Mother.
The record shows that neither the court nor the parties were requiring or requesting Mother to begin vocational training or individual counseling and that Mother's low self-esteem or lack of confidence was not a concern for the parties. CFS removed A.J. due to Mother's substance abuse as well as Mother's child welfare history. Accordingly, Mother received and completed services connected to her substance abuse issue, including outpatient substance abuse treatment, random drug testing, individual counseling, and a 12-Step program. In addition, by the time of the six-month review hearing, Mother had completed a life skills and self-care program. Further, at the November 23, 2016 hearing, Mother testified that she was still receiving in-home services and that her in-home services provider remained a part of her support system. The primary reason A.J. could not be returned to Mother's care after receiving over 24 months of services was not because of inadequate services or a lack thereof, but because the court could never implement unsupervised visits at Mother's home due to the presence of Mother's fiancé and in-home care support person. Moreover, Mother became frustrated and impatient with A.J. at appointments and Mother had to rely on CFS and the caregiver and the caregiver's family for transportation. Contrary to Mother's claim, services provided to Mother were reasonable. Mother received over 24 months of services and never complained the services provided were unreasonable or inadequate.
Mother further asserts that the juvenile court should have exercised its discretion and continued her services beyond the 18-month review pursuant to section 352. We review decisions to extend reunification periods under a deferential abuse of discretion standard. (Andrea L. v. Superior Court (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 1377, 1388 (Andrea L.).) Although Courts of Appeal have held that the Legislature did not intend strict enforcement of the 18-month limit on family reunification services to override all other concerns (Renee J. v. Superior Court (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1450, 1465 (Renee J.), cases in which the reunification period has been extended beyond 18 months generally involve "extraordinary circumstances" in which a parent has been prevented or precluded from participating in services. (Denny H. v. Superior Court (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1501, 1510; Andrea L., at p. 1388; see, e.g., In re Elizabeth R. (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1774, 1777, 1787 [accommodating the special needs of a mentally ill parent who was hospitalized during most of the 18-month reunification period]; In re Dino E. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1768, 1778 [no reunification plan ever developed for parent].) Thus, the juvenile court's discretion to continue reunification services past the 18-month review date is limited.
Assuming the circumstances of this case warranted a continuance of the 18-month hearing under the factors discussed in Renee J., supra, 96 Cal.App.4th 1450, the record shows that Mother received the continuance she now claims is due. The 18-month review hearing was originally scheduled for November 23, 2016. On that date, following Mother's testimony, the court continued the 18-month review hearing for three months. However, the hearing was held six months later on May 31, 2017. Despite limitations imposed on the length of time a child can remain in temporary placement, the 18-month hearing was held over 24 months after A.J. was removed from parental custody. (See §§ 366.21, subd. (g)(1); 366.22, subd. (a).) Thus, Mother was afforded additional reunification services past the 18-month review date and had further opportunity to remedy problems that may have presented a substantial risk of detriment to A.J., or any other concerns. Section 366.22, subdivision (b), provides that 24 months is the greatest amount of time permitted for reunification to continue. Moreover, there was no dispute Mother received and completed reunification services, and the juvenile court made findings that those services were reasonable. Under these circumstances, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in not continuing Mother's services.
In exercising its discretion to extend services past the 18-month review date, the juvenile court should consider whether the parent was offered or provided reasonable reunification services, the likelihood of success of further reunification services, whether the child's need for a prompt resolution outweighs any benefit from extending the reunification period, and any other relevant factors the parties may bring to the court's attention. (Renee J., supra, 96 Cal.App.4th at p. 1466.) --------
IV
DISPOSITION
The petition is denied.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
CODRINGTON
J. We concur: MILLER
Acting P.J. FIELDS
J.