While the claims both arose out of the same contract, they arose out of separate transactions. We agree with the plaintiff that Turzynski v. Liebert (1976), 39 Ill. App.3d 87, 350 N.E.2d 76, is persuasive here. In that case the plaintiff entered into a contract with the defendant to purchase a medical practice.

The doctrine "extends not only to what actually was decided in the original action but also to matters which could have been decided in that suit." La Salle National Bank v. County Board of School Trustees, 61 Ill.2d 524, 529, 337 N.E.2d 19, 21-22 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 936, 48 L.Ed.2d 177, 96 S.Ct. 1668 (1976); see also City of Elmhurst v. Kegerreis, 392 Ill. 195, 203, 64 N.E.2d 450, 453 (1945); Zalduendo v. Zalduendo, 45 Ill. App.3d 849, 857, 360 N.E.2d 386, 392 (1st Dist. 1977); Pierog v. H.F. Karl Contractors, Inc., 39 Ill. App.3d 1057, 1060, 351 N.E.2d 249, 252 (1st Dist. 1976); Turzynski v. Liebert, 39 Ill. App.3d 87, 90, 350 N.E.2d 76, 79 (1st Dist. 1976). Plaintiff's first suit was to contest the validity of the will.

• 1 A suit is barred by res judicata if it is shown that there was a former adjudication which resulted in a final judgment, that the parties are the same, the subject matter is the same and the cause of action is the same in both suits. ( Smith v. Bishop (1962), 26 Ill.2d 434, 436, 187 N.E.2d 217, 219; American National Bank Trust Co. v. Zoning Board of Appeals (1973), 12 Ill. App.3d 794, 797, 299 N.E.2d 147, 149.) If those requirements are met and the judgment in the former suit was on the merits ( Turzynski v. Liebert (1976), 39 Ill. App.3d 87, 90, 350 N.E.2d 76, 79), the latter suit is barred by res judicata and should be dismissed. The bar of a general statute of limitations is a procedural issue.

On the other hand, where the plaintiff brings a suit against the defendant and claims that he is entitled to recover for a wrong committed by the defendant in a separate and distinct act or transaction from the wrong complained of in the first suit, the Illinois courts do not let the first suit operate as a bar to the second suit. In Turzynski v. Liebert, 39 Ill. App.3d 87, 350 N.E.2d 76 (1st Dist. 1976), the prior suit resulted when the defendant, who had sold the plaintiff his medical practice, announced his intentions to begin a new medical practice next door to plaintiff's. Plaintiff had brought suit seeking injunctive relief, claiming that defendant had breached his covenant not to compete.

Moreover, it has been held that where each suit rests upon different acts breaching different provisions of the same contract, the causes of action may be different. See Gittings v. Hilton (1979), 77 Ill. App.3d 911, 396 N.E.2d 843; Kahler v. Don E. Williams Co. (1978), 59 Ill. App.3d 716, 375 N.E.2d 1034; Turzynski v. Liebert (1976), 39 Ill. App.3d 87, 350 N.E.2d 76. • 13 This case concerns a different lease section, different facts, different evidence, and different types of relief. Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, the Jones case only precludes Benton from filing a similar challenge to defendants' pattern and practice of processing rent abatement claims during the relevant period.

Defendants contend that the same cause of action was involved in both cases in that they arose out of a single group of operative facts ( Baird Warner); namely, whether they breached the contract causing delay and thereby injuring Fuller. Fuller, on the other hand, correctly points out that more than one action may arise from contract ( Baird Warner; Turzynski v. Liebert (1976), 39 Ill. App.3d 87, 350 N.E.2d 76), and of course the issue in the present case is not whether, as in the Federal trial, the contract was breached in such a fashion that Fuller was injured but whether it was breached in such a way as to render Fuller liable to Reliable. We need not, however, decide if this distinction is sufficient to give rise to a separate cause of action.

• 3, 4 Collateral estoppel or estoppel by verdict, a branch of res judicata, prohibits relitigation of an issue essential to and actually decided in an earlier litigation by the same parties or their privies. ( City of Chicago v. Westphalen (1981), 93 Ill. App.3d 1110, 1119-20, 418 N.E.2d 63, 71; Turzynski v. Liebert (1976), 39 Ill. App.3d 87, 90, 350 N.E.2d 76, 79.) Under the modern view, identity of party for application of estoppel is satisfied so long as the party against whom its application is sought, Country Mutual in this case, is identical in both actions and had a full and fair opportunity to contest an issue which was necessarily determined in the prior proceeding.

The causes of action therefore lacked the requisite identity. See also Turzynski v. Liebert (1976), 39 Ill. App.3d 87, 90-91. Moreover, the doctrine of res judicata generally applies only to facts and conditions as they existed when the prior judgment was entered.

Even if the subsequent action involves a different cause of action, collateral estoppel will apply to prevent "a party from raising issues which were essential to the former litigation, and which were actually decided therein." ( Turzynski v. Liebert (1976), 39 Ill. App.3d 87, 90, 350 N.E.2d 76, 79.) Our supreme court in Illinois State Chamber of Commerce v. Pollution Control Board (1979), 78 Ill.2d 1, 398 N.E.2d 9 (quoting from Riley v. Unknown Owners (1975), 25 Ill. App.3d 895, 324 N.E.2d 78) stated:

• 1, 2 Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction operates as a bar to any subsequent litigation between the same parties or their privies on matters found to be part of the same cause of action before the same or a different tribunal. ( Turzynski v. Liebert (1976), 39 Ill. App.3d 87, 90, 350 N.E.2d 76.) The cause of action merges into the judgment and that judgment is conclusive as to all matters which were litigated, which properly should have been litigated or might have been litigated in the original action. ( City of Elmhurst v. Kegerreis (1945), 392 Ill. 195, 203, 64 N.E.2d 450; Prochotsky v. Union Central Life Insurance Co. (1971), 2 Ill. App.3d 354, 356, 276 N.E.2d 388.)