(As noted above, the FCC in the Dunifer forfeiture proceeding held the microbroadcasting regulations did not violate the First Amendment.) See Bent Oak, 19 F. Supp.2d at 744-48 (applying doctrine of primary jurisdiction and dismissing case without prejudice because no administrative proceeding currently pending); United States v. Dunifer, 997 F. Supp. at 1238 (noting earlier stay of litigation under doctrine of primary jurisdiction in light of then-pending FCC forfeiture proceeding); cf. Rosenthal Co. v. Bagley, 581 F.2d 1258, 1260 (7th Cir. 1978) (holding exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine retains its validity even when the collateral judicial action challenges the constitutionality of the basic statute under which agency functions); see also Turro v. FCC, 859 F.2d 1498 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (court of appeals review of FCC order denying request for waiver of FCC rules); WAIT Radio v. FCC, 418 F.2d 1153 (same; remanding matter to FCC for statement of reasons for denial of waiver). We hold that the district court has exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate the in rem forfeiture action, including Fried's constitutional affirmative defenses.
"`[S]trict adherence to a general rule may be justified . . . even if it appears to result in some hardship in individual cases.'" BellSouth Corp. v. FCC, 162 F.3d 1215, 1225 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (quoting Turro v. FCC, 859 F.2d 1498, 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1988)). MGM also relies on Gulf Power Co. v. FERC, 983 F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1993), as support for its argument that the Register is imposing a harsh penalty.
'" [S]trict adherence to a general rule may be justified . . . even if it appears to result in some hardship in individual cases.'" BellSouth Corp. v. FCC, 162 F.3d 1215, 1225 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (quoting Turro v. FCC, 859 F.2d 1498, 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1988)). Universal also argues that the Register's decision to deny Universal a waiver is not supported by substantial evidence, and therefore violates the APA. "[A]n agency's refusal to grant a waiver will not be overturned unless the agency's reasons are `so insubstantial as to render that denial an abuse of discretion.'"
The `strict adherence to a general rule may be justified by the gain in certainty and administrative ease, even if it appears to result in some hardship in individual cases.'Id. at 1225 (quoting Turro v. FCC, 859 F.2d 1498, 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1988)). And, the requestor of a waiver "assumes a `heavy' burden because `an agency's refusal to grant a waiver will not be overturned unless the agency's reasons are so insubstantial as to render that denial an abuse of discretion.'"
These translator stations are licensed by the FCC as a means of improving radio reception in areas that might otherwise be under-served due to distance or terrain obstructions. See Turro v. F.C.C., 859 F.2d 1498, 1499 (D.C. Cir. 1988). On the same day, these individuals monitored the translator station from Toledo, but no noticeable interference from Radio Free Lenawee was detected on the translator station's input frequency of 97.7 MHZ or output frequency of 100.7 MHZ.
See also Writers Guild of America, West, Inc. v. American Broadcasting Co., Inc., 609 F.2d 355, 364 (9th Cir. 1979) (dismissing claim of futility because FCC's position in a proper future administrative proceeding could not be inferred from the FCC's position in an adversarial context). In response to Mr. Dunifer's claim that the FCC has never granted a waiver to a Class D broadcaster, the United States cites Turro v. FCC, 859 F.2d 1498, 1500 n. 1 (D.C. Cir. 1988), in which the court noted that the FCC had granted two such waivers. Finally, Mr. Dunifer makes an effort, in a footnote at the end of his supplemental brief, to overcome the consequences of his failure to apply for a license by stating that he is "in effect, challenging the statutes [ 47 U.S.C. § 301, prohibiting broadcasting without a license, and 47 U.S.C. § 401, authorizing the government to enjoin anyone who broadcasts without a license], as applied to him via the regulations."