Turoff v. Stefanac

16 Citing cases

  1. Davis v. Iofredo

    127 Ohio App. 3d 367 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998)   Cited 2 times

    Furthermore, this court has held that when a case is being heard on a motion for a temporary restraining order, a trial court may not consolidate that motion with a trial on the merits and enter judgment without clear and unambiguous notice of its intent to do so. Turoff v. Stefanac (1984), 16 Ohio App.3d 227, 229, 16 OBR 243, 245, 475 N.E.2d 189, 191. In Turoff the court stated that where both parties are present at the hearing for a temporary restraining order, rather than it being an ex parte proceeding, the trial court may treat the motion as one for a preliminary injunction.

  2. Hardrives Paving Construction v. Mecca

    No. 98-T-0192 (Ohio Ct. App. Sep. 30, 1999)

    Civ.R. 65(B)(2) requires that a court order the consolidation of a hearing on the application for a preliminary injunction with a trial on the merits, thus providing the parties with notice that the case is, in fact, being heard on the merits. Turoff v. Stefanac (1984), 16 Ohio App.3d 227, 228. Yet, while Ohio Courts agree that a plaintiff is generally entitled to a full trial on the merits, it is clear that a court may dismiss a complaint where it finds that a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and that plaintiff cannot state such a claim.

  3. Union Township v. Union Twn. Local 3412

    No. CA99-08-082 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 14, 2000)   Cited 4 times

    Before the trial court may order such consolidation or resolve the case on its merits, the trial court must give notice to the parties of its intent to consolidate the matters. Turoff v. Stefanac (1984), 16 Ohio App.3d 227, 228-229. We first note that the record does not contain any indication that either party or the trial court sought to consolidate the hearing on the motion for a preliminary injunction with a hearing on the merits of the Township's claim.

  4. City of Bexley v. Duckworth

    No. 99AP-414 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 7, 2000)   Cited 8 times
    Reversing consolidation without notice of preliminary proceedings with decision on the merits where defendants argued they "were unprepared to cross-examine one of plaintiff's witnesses" and "would have presented other direct evidence and conducted more extensive cross-examination had they been aware that the case was being tried on the merits"

    Further, "Civ.R. 65(B)(2) * * * require[s] that a court order the consolidation of a hearing on the application for a preliminary injunction with a trial on the merits, thus providing the parties with notice that the case is, in fact, being heard on the merits." Turoff v. Stefanac (1984), 16 Ohio App.3d 227, 228. Defendants contend that they were prejudiced by the manner in which the trial court consolidated the preliminary injunction hearing with a trial on the merits.

  5. Lend-A-Paw Feline S. v. Lend-A-Paw Foun.

    Court of Appeals No. L-01-1052, Trial Court No. CI-0199904343 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 9, 2001)   Cited 3 times

    Thus, the general rule is that a court must " order the consolidation of a hearing on the application for a preliminary injunction with a trial on the merits, thus providing the parties with notice that the case is, in fact, being heard on the merits." Turoff v. Stefanac (1984), 16 Ohio App.3d 227, 228. See, also, City of Bexley v. Duckworth, supra.

  6. Medcorp v. York Township

    Court of Appeals No. F-02-019, Trial Court No. 02-CV-000092 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 30, 2002)

    Civ.R. 65(B)(2) provides that either before or after the commencement of the hearing on the motion for a preliminary injunction, the trial court may order that the trial of the action on the merits be advanced and consolidated with the hearing. While a trial court is required to notify the parties of its intent to consolidate the matters, Turoff v. Stefanac (1984), 16 Ohio App.3d 227, 228-229, a court's failure to so inform the parties is not reversible error where neither party objects to the consolidation and the parties were fully prepared to proceed on the merits. Strah v. Lake Cty. Humane Soc. (1993), 90 Ohio App.3d 822, 835.

  7. Ohio Service Grp. v. Integrated Open

    2006 Ohio 6738 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006)

    However, "it is generally improper to dispose of a case on the merits following a hearing for a preliminary injunction without consolidating that hearing with a trial on the merits or otherwise giving notice to counsel that the merits would be considered." Seasonings Etcetera, Inc. v. Nay (Feb. 23, 1993), Franklin App. No. 92AP1056, citing George P. Ballas Buick-GMC, Inc. v. Taylor Buick, Inc. (1982), 5 Ohio App.3d 71; Turoff v. Stefanac (1984), 16 Ohio App.3d 227. "Before consolidation, the parties should normally receive clear and unambiguous notice of the court's intent to consolidate the trial and the hearing either before the hearing commences or at a time which will still afford the parties a full opportunity to present their respective cases." Bd. of Edn. Ironton City Schools v. Ohio Dept. of Edn. (June 29, 1993), Lawrence App. No. CA92-39, citing Univ. of Texas v. Camenisch (1981), 45 U.S. 390, 395, 101 S.Ct. 1830; Warren Plaza v. Giant Eagle, Inc. (June 15, 1990), Trumbull App. No. 88-T-4122, jurisdictional motion allowed, 55 Ohio St.3d 705, appeal dismissed (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 497.

  8. Sunshine Diversified Investments v. Chuck

    2009 Ohio 4226 (Ohio Ct. App. 2009)

    {¶ 22} "`[I]t is generally improper to dispose of a case on the merits following a hearing for a preliminary injunction without consolidating that hearing with a trial on the merits or otherwise giving notice to counsel that the merits would be considered.' Seasonings Etcetera, Inc. v. Nay (Feb. 23, 1993), Franklin App. No. 92AP-1056, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 1182, citing George P. Ballas Buick-GMC, Inc. v. Taylor Buick, Inc. (1982), 5 Ohio App.3d 71, 5 Ohio B. 182, 449 N.E.2d 503; Turoff v. Stefanac (1984), 16 Ohio App.3d 227, 16 Ohio B. 243, 475 N.E.2d 189. `Before consolidation, the parties should normally receive clear and unambiguous notice of the court's intent to consolidate the trial and the hearing either before the hearing commences or at a time which will still afford the parties a full opportunity to present their respective cases.' Bd. of Edn. Ironton City Schools v. Ohio Dept. of Edn. (Jun. 29, 1993), Lawrence App. No. CA92-39, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 3476, citing Univ. of Texas v. Camenisch (1981), 451 U.S. 390, 395, 101 S.Ct. 1830, 68 L.Ed.2d 175; Warren Plaza v. Giant Eagle, Inc. (June 15, 1990), Trumbull App. No. 88-T-4122, 1990 Ohio App. LEXIS 2381, jurisdictional motion allowed, 55 Ohio St.3d 705, 562 N.E.2d 898, appeal dismissed (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 497, 589 N.E.2d 23.

  9. Mingo Junction Safety Forces Assoc. v. Chappano

    2011 Ohio 3401 (Ohio Ct. App. 2011)

    The trial court handled the TRO and preliminary injunction request together, which is proper where, as here, both parties had notice of, were present at, and participated in the hearing. See Turoff v. Stefanec (1984), 16 Ohio App.3d 227, 228, 475 N.E.2d 189. The trial court then granted the TRO/preliminary injunction and instructed the parties to brief the issue of whether a permanent mandatory injunction should issue, which both sides then did.

  10. Vill. of Ottawa Hills v. Boice

    2014 Ohio 1992 (Ohio Ct. App. 2014)

    This subdivision (B)(2) shall be so construed and applied as to save to the parties any rights they may have to trial by jury. {¶ 13} As this court recognized in Lend-A-Paw Feline Shelter, Inc. v. Lend-A-Paw Found. of Greater Toledo, Inc., 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-01-1052, 2001 WL 1388029 (Nov. 9, 2001), citing Turoff v. Stefanac, 16 Ohio App.3d 227, 228, 475 N.E.2d 189 (1984), "the general rule is that a court must 'order the consolidation of a hearing on the application for a preliminary injunction with a trial on the merits, thus providing the parties with notice that the case is, in fact, being heard on the merits.'" That notice provides the parties a "'full opportunity to present their respective cases.'"