Turney v. the State

7 Citing cases

  1. State v. Howington

    907 S.W.2d 403 (Tenn. 1995)   Cited 44 times   1 Legal Analyses
    In State v. Howington, 907 S.W.2d 403, 404-05 (Tenn. 1995), our supreme court considered whether the defendant could enforce an informal immunity agreement whereby, in exchange for his truthful testimony at his preliminary hearing, the State would recommend that he be bound to the grand jury on second degree murder instead of first degree murder, with which he had been charged.

    The initial burden is on the defendant to show the existence of an agreement by a preponderance of the evidence. Turney v. State [ 40 Tex.Crim. 561], 51 S.W. 243 (Tex.Crim. App. 1899). In this respect it differs from ordinary defenses where the defendant is only required to raise his defense by producing some evidence.

  2. Zani v. State

    657 S.W.2d 196 (Tex. App. 1983)   Cited 2 times

    Although it is not clear which of the three rounds was inflicted by appellant, the evidence was sufficient for the trial court to find that appellant directly caused the death of the deceased. Customarily, the existence and validity of an immunity agreement, being a question of law for the determination of the judge, is heard before the trial in chief, Camron v. State, 32 Tex.Cr. 180, 22 S.W. 682 (1893), and the burden is on the appellant to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, the existence of the alleged immunity contract. Turney v. State, 40 Tex.Cr. 561, 51 S.W. 243 (1899). However, the fact that the proof as to the cause of death was heard partially at the pretrial hearing and partially at the trial in chief was not error.

  3. Graham v. State

    994 S.W.2d 651 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999)   Cited 23 times
    Requiring only "the approval of the court"

    The authorities in this State hold that the agreement of the trial judge to such a proceeding is necessary. See Turney v. State, [ 40 Tex. Cr. 561,] 51 S.W. 243 [(1899)]; Hardin v. State, 12 Tex. App. [186], 189 [(1882)]; Cameron v. State [ sic], 32 Tex.Crim. 180, [22] S.W. [682 (1893)]; Bowden v. State, 1 Tex. App. [137,] 144 [(1876)].Accord, Wechsler v. State, 172 Tex. Cr. 559, 361 S.W.2d 379 (1962); Washburn v. State, 164 Tex. Cr. 448, 299 S.W.2d 706 (1956); Henderson v. State, 103 Tex. Cr. 502, 281 S.W. 557 (1926); Dollar v. State, 92 Tex. Cr. 254, 242 S.W. 733 (1922) (alternative ground); Messenger v. State, 81 Tex. Cr. 465, 198 S.W. 330 (1917); Ex parte Higgins, 71 Tex. Cr. 618, 160 S.W. 696 (1913); Reagan v.State, 49 Tex. Cr. 443, 93 S.W. 733 (1906); Cox v. State, 69 S.W. 145 (Tex.Cr.App. 1902); Ex parte Gibson, 42 Tex. Cr. 653, 62 S.W. 755 (1901); Vincent v. State, 55 S.W. 819, 820 (Tex.Cr.App. 1900); Ex parte Greenhaw, 41 Tex. Cr. 278, 53 S.W. 1024 (1899); Tullis v. State, 41 Tex. Cr. 87, 52 S.W. 83 (1899).

  4. Zani v. State

    701 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985)   Cited 20 times
    In Zani, the Court announced the level of proof required for enforcing an immunity agreement and upon whom the burden of meeting that level of proof must be placed.

    The initial burden is on the defendant to show the existence of an agreement by a preponderance of the evidence. Turney v. State, 40 Tex.Crim. R., 51 S.W. 243 (Tex.Cr.App. 1999). In this respect it differs from ordinary defenses where the defendant is only required to raise his defense by producing some evidence.

  5. Hammers v. State

    550 S.W.2d 432 (Ark. 1977)   Cited 26 times
    In Hammers, upon which Appellant relies, there was no dispute by the prosecutor that an agreement of immunity had existed at one time.

    There does not seem to be any doubt about her being ready, willing and able, but not called upon, to testify. The burden of proving the agreement and appellant's compliance with it rested upon her. Turney v. State, 40 Tex.Crim. 561, 51 S.W. 243 (1899); State v. Mob 69 N.C. 529 (1873). See also, People v. Johnson, 255 Ill. App.? 288 (1929).

  6. Carlisle v. State

    138 Tex. Crim. 530 (Tex. Crim. App. 1940)   Cited 4 times
    Holding that when district attorney promises use immunity to an accused in exchange for his testimony against a co-defendant, such an agreement is enforceable without regard to the general rule that no immunity may be extended without the approval of the court; when the prosecution makes a promise of immunity, it is obliged to respect the agreement

    The authorities in this State hold that the agreement of the trial judge to such a proceeding is necessary. See Turney v. State, 51 S.W. 243; Hardin v. State, 12 Tex. Cr. App., 189; Cameron v. State, 32 Tex. Crim. 180, 25 S.W. 288; Bowden v. State, 1 Tex. Cr. App. 144. However, in some instances the statutes give immunity when one defendant testifies against a co-defendant, without any agreement to that effect by the officers in authority.

  7. Gibson v. State

    769 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. App. 1989)   Cited 3 times

    The initial burden is on the defendant to show the existence of an agreement by a preponderance of the evidence. Turney v. State, 40 Tex.Crim. 561, 51 S.W. 243 (Tex.Cr.App. 1899). In this respect it differs from ordinary defenses where the defendant is only required to raise his defense by producing some evidence.