1. "Code Ann. § 27-2713 (Ga. L. 1956, pp. 27, 32; 1960, p. 857; 1966, p. 440) establishes the procedure in cases of this nature. The cases applying this statute are uniform in holding that the quantum of evidence sufficient to justify revocation of probation is less than that necessary to sustain a conviction in the first instance. Harrington v. State, 97 Ga. App. 315, 319 ( 103 S.E.2d 126). Only slight evidence is required to authorize revocation ( Sellers v. State, 107 Ga. App. 516, 518 ( 130 S.E.2d 790)), and where there is even slight evidence of misconduct, the appellate court will not interfere with revocation unless there has been manifest abuse of discretion. Rowland v. State, 124 Ga. App. 494 (3) ( 184 S.E.2d 494); Turner v. State, 119 Ga. App. 117 ( 166 S.E.2d 582)." Boston v. State, 128 Ga. App. 576 ( 197 S.E.2d 504). The evidence in this case is sufficient to show that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking the appellants' probation.

The existing standard of proof in Georgia probation revocation proceedings is governed by the so-called "slight evidence" rule. Under this rule, "[o]nly slight evidence is required to authorize revocation, Sellers v. State, 107 Ga. App. 516, 518 ( 130 S.E.2d 790), and where there is even slight evidence of misconduct, the appellate court will not interfere with revocation unless there has been manifest abuse of discretion. Rowland v. State, 124 Ga. App. 494(3) ( 184 S.E.2d 494); Turner v. State, 119 Ga. App. 117 ( 166 S.E.2d 582)." Boston v. State, 128 Ga. App. 576 ( 197 S.E.2d 504) (1973).

1. On a probation revocation hearing, slight evidence will be sufficient to support a judgment revoking the probationary feature of the sentence. Turner v. State, 119 Ga. App. 117 ( 166 S.E.2d 582) (1969). 2.

1. The trial judge is the sole trier of fact at a revocation of probation hearing. See Turner v. State, 119 Ga. App. 117 ( 166 S.E.2d 582) (1969). He found that the defendant had made the sale to the agent, and we find no abuse of discretion.

Code Ann. § 26-801 (b) (3) (Ga. L. 1968, pp. 1249, 1271). "The cases [dealing with revocation of probation] are uniform in holding that the quantum of evidence sufficient to justify revocation of probation is less than that necessary to sustain a conviction in the first instance. Harrington v. State, 97 Ga. App. 315, 319 ( 103 S.E.2d 126). Only slight evidence is required to authorize revocation, Sellers v. State, 107 Ga. App. 516, 518 ( 130 S.E.2d 790), and where there is even slight evidence of misconduct, the appellate court will not interfere with revocation unless there has been manifest abuse of discretion. Rowland v. State, 124 Ga. App. 494 (3) ( 184 S.E.2d 494); Turner v. State, 119 Ga. App. 117 ( 166 S.E.2d 582)." Boston v. State, 128 Ga. App. 576 ( 197 S.E.2d 504) (1973); see Johnson v. State, 142 Ga. App. 124 (1977).

Dickerson v. State, 136 Ga. App. 885 ( 222 S.E.2d 649); Amiss v. State, 135 Ga. App. 784, supra; Manley v. State, 133 Ga. App. 436 ( 211 S.E.2d 391); Sellers v. State, 107 Ga. App. 516 ( 130 S.E.2d 790). As the trior of facts the trial court has a very wide discretion in determining the sufficiency of evidence to authorize revocation. Raines v. State, 130 Ga. App. 1 ( 202 S.E.2d 253); Cooper v. State, 118 Ga. App. 57 ( 162 S.E.2d 753). This court will not interfere in the trial court's decision unless there has been a manifest abuse of that discretion. Raines v. State, 130 Ga. App. 1, supra; Boston v. State, 128 Ga. App. 576 ( 197 S.E.2d 504); Turner v. State, 119 Ga. App. 117 ( 166 S.E.2d 582); Sellers v. State, 107 Ga. App. 516, supra. In this case the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the evidence was sufficient to authorize revocation of probation.

The judge is the trior of the facts, and unless there is manifest abuse of his discretion, this court will not interfere with a revocation of a probated sentence. Raines v. State, 130 Ga. App. 1, 2, supra; Turner v. State, 119 Ga. App. 117 ( 166 S.E.2d 582); Rowland v. State, 124 Ga. App. 494 (3), supra. Consequently, since we do not have the transcript of evidence before us, and a review of the evidence would be necessary to determine whether or not the order was otherwise void or invalid, we cannot reverse it.

more trouble means trouble similar to that in which he had been involved previously, of which he may be presumed to be aware ( Daniel v. Whitlock, 222 Ga. 192, 195 (2) ( 149 S.E.2d 79)) — to the generalized and impracticable injunction of that trouble with wives that is accepted by some as the common lot of married mankind. It is unnecessary to decide the validity of this condition, however, in view of our holding in Division 3 hereinafter. 3. "[T]he quantum of evidence sufficient to justify revocation of probation is less than that necessary to sustain a conviction in the first instance. Harrington v. State, 97 Ga. App. 315, 319 ( 103 S.E.2d 126). Only slight evidence is required to authorize revocation, Sellers v. State, 107 Ga. App. 516, 518 ( 130 S.E.2d 790), and where there is even slight evidence of misconduct, the appellate court will not interfere with revocation unless there has been manifest abuse of discretion. Rowland v. State, 124 Ga. App. 494 (3) ( 184 S.E.2d 494); Turner v. State, 119 Ga. App. 117 ( 166 S.E.2d 582)." Boston v. State, 128 Ga. App. 576 ( 197 S.E.2d 504). The trial judge was not required to accept as true the probationer's testimony denying some or all of the testimony as to his alleged misconduct.

Code Ann. § 27-2713 (Ga. L. 1956, pp. 27, 32; 1960, p. 857; 1966, p. 440) establishes the procedure in cases of this nature. The cases applying this statute are uniform in holding that the quantum of evidence sufficient to justify revocation of probation is less than that necessary to sustain a conviction in the first instance. Harrington v. State, 97 Ga. App. 315, 319 ( 103 S.E.2d 126). Only slight evidence is required to authorize revocation, Sellers v. State, 107 Ga. App. 516, 518 ( 130 S.E.2d 790), and where there is even slight evidence of misconduct, the appellate court will not interfere with revocation unless there has been manifest abuse of discretion. Rowland v. State, 124 Ga. App. 494 (3) ( 184 S.E.2d 494); Turner v. State, 119 Ga. App. 117 ( 166 S.E.2d 582). In this case, the evidence, while conflicting, is sufficient to show that the defendant violated at least one of the conditions of his probation.

It is well settled that where a person is placed under a probation sentence, probation cannot be revoked without notice to the probationer and an opportunity to be heard on the question as to whether he violated its terms. Lester v. Foster, 207 Ga. 596 ( 63 S.E.2d 402). Of course, the hearing required need not meet the requisites of a jury trial; the proceedings may be informal or summary. Johnson v. State, 214 Ga. 818, 819 ( 108 S.E.2d 313); Dutton v. Willis, 223 Ga. 209, 211 ( 154 S.E.2d 221). On the hearing to determine whether the probation should be revoked, the judge is the sole trior of fact ( Faulkner v. State, 101 Ga. App. 889 ( 115 S.E.2d 393)), and where there is even slight evidence this court will not interfere with the revocation unless there has been an abuse of discretion. Turner v. State, 119 Ga. App. 117 ( 166 S.E.2d 582). It is axiomatic that notice and a hearing constitute the fundamental requirements of due process and a failure to observe such prerequisites will not be countenanced. Nevertheless, here there was a clear showing that the defendant had violated the terms of his parole and no objection was made by either the defendant or his counsel as to the trial judge's conducting an investigation into this matter.