Opinion
A20-0989
04-13-2021
Jonathan Nicholas Turner, petitioner, Appellant, v. State of Minnesota, Respondent.
ORDER OPINION
Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-10-3364 Considered and decided by Frisch, Presiding Judge; Reilly, Judge; and Florey, Judge.
BASED ON THE FILE, RECORD, AND PROCEEDINGS, AND BECAUSE:
1. In 2010, the state charged appellant Jonathan Nicholas Turner with two counts of first-degree murder. A jury found appellant guilty of both charges and the district court sentenced appellant to life in prison, plus five years.
2. Appellant filed a direct appeal to the Minnesota Supreme Court challenging his conviction, then moved to stay his appeal to pursue postconviction relief. The supreme court granted his motion.
3. Since that time, appellant has filed four petitions for postconviction relief.
4. He filed his first postconviction petition in 2011. In that petition, appellant claimed that he was denied effective assistance of counsel, a witness provided false testimony, and the district court erred in partially closing the courtroom. The postconviction court denied appellant's petition. Appellant appealed this decision to the supreme court. But before the supreme court issued its decision, he again moved to stay and remand his appeal for postconviction proceedings; the supreme court granted his motion.
5. In 2013, in a negotiated plea, appellant pleaded guilty to second-degree murder in exchange for the vacation of his first-degree murder charges and the dismissal of his pending appeal. The district court vacated appellant's first-degree murder convictions and accepted his guilty plea.
6. In 2015, appellant filed his second petition for postconviction relief claiming that he was denied effective assistance of counsel, his guilty plea to second-degree murder was invalid, his sentence was illegal, and he found newly discovered evidence. The postconviction court denied appellant's petition. We affirmed in Turner v. State, No. A15-1822, 2016 WL 3659267 (Minn. App. July 11, 2016), review denied (Minn. Sept. 28, 2016). The supreme court denied appellant's petition for review.
7. In 2016, appellant filed his third petition for postconviction relief, again seeking to withdraw his guilty plea and to present newly discovered evidence. The postconviction court denied the petition, finding that his claims were time-barred under the postconviction statute and the proffered evidence did not satisfy the statute's requirements for newly discovered evidence.
8. In 2019, appellant filed his fourth petition for postconviction relief seeking to withdraw his guilty plea and to present "newly discovered evidence." He also claimed that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and the state committed prosecutorial misconduct.
9. Appellant asserts newly discovered evidence in the form of affidavits and a letter from three "witnesses" proves appellant did not murder the victim. He also contends newly discovered evidence in the form of an affidavit from his attorney proves that appellant received ineffective assistance of counsel.
10. In May 2020, the postconviction court denied appellant's petition for postconviction relief without an evidentiary hearing. It determined that his claims could not survive the procedural restrictions and time-bars imposed by the postconviction statute.
11. Appellant now argues that the postconviction court abused its discretion by failing to find that (1) an exception to the time-bar under Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 1 (2018), applied to his newly discovered evidence and prosecutorial misconduct claims, and (2) an exception to the procedural bar under State v. Knaffla, 243 N.W.2d 737 (Minn. 1976) applied to his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim.
12. "We review the denial of postconviction relief for abuse of discretion." Reed v. State, 793 N.W.2d 725, 729 (Minn. 2010). A postconviction court abuses its discretion when it makes clearly erroneous factual findings, bases its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, or exercises its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner. Pearson v. State, 891 N.W.2d 590, 596 (Minn. 2017).
13. Under Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(a)(1)-(2) (2018), a postconviction petition is time-barred if it was not filed within two years of the later of "(1) the entry of judgment of conviction or sentence if no direct appeal is filed; or (2) an appellate court's disposition of petitioner's direct appeal." But a postconviction court may consider an untimely petition if it presents newly discovered evidence or if the postconviction court finds that doing so would be in the interests of justice. Id., subd. 4(b)(2), (5) (2018). The newly discovered evidence must, on its face, prove the petitioner's innocence by a clear and convincing standard. Id., subd. 4(b)(2); Scherf v. State, 788 N.W.2d 504, 508 (Minn. 2010).
14. Under the rule established by Knaffla, a postconviction court is procedurally barred from considering claims that were raised, or could have been raised, in a previous postconviction appeal. 243 N.W.2d at 741; see also Townsend v. State, 723 N.W.2d 14, 18 (Minn. 2016) (stating a postconviction court will not consider claims raised or those that were known and could have been raised in an earlier postconviction petition). A postconviction court, however, may considered Knaffla-barred claims when the interests of justice so require. Hooper v. State, 838 N.W.2d 775, 787 (Minn. 2013).
15. The postconviction court found that neither exception under Minn. Stat. § 590.01 of newly discovered evidence nor interests of justice applied to appellant's claims of newly discovered evidence and prosecutorial misconduct. We agree. Taken at face value, none of appellant's alleged newly discovered evidence establishes his innocence by a clear and convincing standard. Fifteen years after the murder, appellant's prison acquaintances signed affidavits and a letter claiming that someone other than appellant murdered the victim. But at his guilty-plea hearing, appellant admitted, under oath, that he committed second-degree murder. And the affidavit of appellant's attorney stating that in 2013 he did not look for additional witnesses or evidence does not establish appellant's innocence. We note that this was 10 years after the murder and the year of appellant's guilty plea. Similarly, nothing in the record suggests that the interests of justice require that the postconviction court consider appellant's claim of prosecutorial misconduct. Appellant knew about this alleged misconduct at the time of his first postconviction petition. Thus, we conclude that the postconviction court did not abuse its discretion by failing to consider appellant's newly-discovered-evidence and prosecutorial-misconduct claims under Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(b)(2), or Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(b)(5).
The following excerpt is from appellant's guilty plea.
Q: [Appellant], to the charge of murder in the second degree, intentional murder, that occurred on or about July 29, 2003, in the community of Minneapolis in the County of Hennepin, how do you plead?
Appellant: Guilty.
. . .
Q: Did you shoot the gun at [the victim]?
Appellant: Yes.
Q: Did you intentionally pull the trigger and shoot the gun?
Appellant: Yeah.
. . .
Q: Did you intend to shoot [the victim]?
Appellant: Yes.
Q: Did you intend to kill him?
Appellant: Yes.
16. We also agree with the postconviction court's determination that the interests-of-justice exception to the Knaffla procedural bar does not apply to appellant's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. Appellant raised an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim in his first, second, and current petition for postconviction relief We assessed the merits of appellant's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim in his first postconviction appeal and concluded that appellant was not denied effective assistance of counsel. Turner, 2016 WL 3659267, at *4. Nothing in the record suggests that fairness demands that the postconviction court consider appellant's current ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. We determine that the postconviction court did not abuse its discretion when it found that the interests-of-justice exception to the Knaffla procedural bar did not apply to appellant's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. The district court's order is affirmed.
2. Pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c), this order opinion is nonprecedential, except as law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.
Dated: April 13, 2021
BY THE COURT
/s/_________
Judge Denise D. Reilly