Opinion
3:23-cv-00221-ART-CSD
12-12-2024
KERRY TURNER, Plaintiff, v. RENO POLICE DEPARTMENT, et al. Defendants.
LINDSAY L. LIDDELL DEPUTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANTS DETECTIVE WILLIAMS AND DETECTIVE HERNANDEZ
LINDSAY L. LIDDELL
DEPUTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANTS DETECTIVE WILLIAMS AND DETECTIVE HERNANDEZ
MOTION TO DISMISS
(ECF NO. 17)
Defendants, Detective Williams and Detective Hernandez (“Defendants”) by and through counsel, hereby move to dismiss Plaintiff Kerry Turner's Amended Complaint pursuant to FRCP 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and FRCP 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. This motion is based upon the following Memorandum of Points and Authorities, Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and collateral estoppel. // //
Memorandum of Points and Authorities
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Detective Williams and Detective Hernandez violated his Fourth Amendment rights during an August 3, 2022 search. (ECF No. 17 at 4). The search uncovered fentanyl, and Plaintiff was charged with trafficking a controlled substance. In state court, Plaintiff unsuccessfully challenged the same search on a motion to suppress. Plaintiff was later convicted of trafficking and unlawful firearm possession. The Nevada Court of Appeals recently upheld Plaintiffs conviction and the lower court's finding that the August 3, 2022 search was reasonable and therefore constitutional.
This case should be dismissed with prejudice. Plaintiffs Fourth Amendment claim here is a collateral attack on his conviction and therefore barred by Heck v. Humphrey. This Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs claims pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because Plaintiffs is seeking a de facto appeal of the state court orders regarding the August 3, 2022 search. Moreover, issue preclusion prevents relitigating the constitutionality of the August 3, 2022 search because the Nevada Courts already fully considered and rejected Plaintiffs claim.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a defendant to seek dismissal of a claim or action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) is appropriate if the complaint, considered in its entirety, fails to allege facts on its face that are sufficient to establish subject matter jurisdiction. In re Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) Antitrust Litig., 546 F.3d 981, 984-85 (9th Cir. 2008). On a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss, the Court may consider extrinsic evidence. White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 2000)(analyzing FRCP 12(b)(1)). Once a party presents a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the burden is on the other party to establish jurisdiction. See Ass'n of Am. Med. Coll, v. United States, 217 F.3d 770, 778-79 (9th Cir. 2000).
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure mandates that a court dismiss a cause of action that fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See North Star Int'l v. Ariz. Corp. Comm'n, 720 F.2d 578, 581 (9th Cir. 1983). When considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, dismissal is appropriate only when the complaint does not give the defendant fair notice of a legally cognizable claim and the grounds on which it rests. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). In considering whether the complaint is sufficient to state a claim, the Court will take all material allegations as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See NL Indus., Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1986). In order to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must allege “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.
“Generally, a district court may not consider any material beyond the pleadings in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion .... However, material which is properly submitted as part of the complaint may be considered on a motion to dismiss.” Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. RichardFeiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1555 n.19 (9th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted). A court may also consider “matters of which a court may take judicial notice” when ruling on a motion to dismiss. Tellabs, Inc. v. MakorIssues & Rts., Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007).
III. PLAINTIFF'S STATE COURT PROSECUTION
A. Judicial Notice is Appropriate.
A Court may take judicial notice of proceedings in other courts which “have a direct relation to matters at issue.” U.S. ex rel. Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Guzman v. County of Alameda, No. CIO-02250 MEJ., 2012 WL 155535, at *1, n.1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2012)(taking judicial notice of “21 documents consisting of transcripts, minute orders, detention reports, petitions, and orders” from a state court juvenile dependency proceeding).
Incorporation by reference is a judicially created doctrine that treats certain documents as though they are part of the complaint itself. Urban Outfitters, Inc. v. Dermody Operating Co., LLC, 572 F.Supp.3d 977, 992-93 (D. Nev. 2021) citing Khoja v. Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc., 899 F.3d 988, 1002 (9th Cir. 2018). A defendant may seek to incorporate a document into the complaint ‘if the plaintiff refers extensively to the document or the document forms the basis of the plaintiffs claim. Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).
In the present case, Plaintiffs Section 1983 Fourth Amendment claim is based on the same set of facts underlying the state court criminal prosecution. See (ECF No. 17 at pp. 2-4); Exs. 1-6. Plaintiff seeks damages arising out of a search of his person, which uncovered a large amount of fentanyl. Id. He was then charged and convicted of fentanyl possession. See id. In state court, Plaintiff filed a motion to suppress specifically arguing the underlying search was unconstitutional and unreasonable. Ex. 2. After reviewing briefing and holding an evidentiary hearing, the state court issued an order denying the motion to suppress and specifically finding that the search was constitutionally sound. Exs. 1-5. In this case, Plaintiff attempts to relitigate the same set of facts and issues litigated in state court. Accordingly, judicial notice of documents filed in related state court prosecution is appropriate.
B. Factual Background of the State Court Proceedings.
In the Second Judicial District Court for the State of Nevada (“Nevada Court”), Plaintiff was charged with (1) trafficking a controlled substance, between 100 to 400 grams of fentanyl, and (2) ownership or possession of a firearm by a prohibited person. See Ex. 6. The arrest was based on undercover officers involved in a controlled buy with Plaintiff, during which they searched his body and vehicle, uncovering pressed fentanyl and a firearm. Exs. 1, 2, 3, 5. After a jury found Plaintiff guilty on both counts, on September 5, 2023, the Nevada State Court issued a judgment of conviction and sentenced Plaintiff to state prison. Ex. 6.
During the pendency of the criminal case, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Suppress arguing that the underlying search was unconstitutional. Ex. 1. Specifically, Plaintiffs defense counsel argued that the “public strip search” was excessively intrusive and unreasonable. Id. at pp. 7-11. Plaintiff took the position, as he does in this case, that the Defendants' search violated his Fourth Amendment rights under the U.S. Constitution. Id. After full briefing, the Nevada Court held an evidentiary hearing, and then issued an order denying the motion to suppress. Ex. 5. The Nevada Court's findings include:
1. Law enforcement had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff.
2. Law enforcement knew Plaintiff had an active warrant for a drug related charge, and an informant told them Plaintiff sold them fentanyl and possessed a weapon.
3. Detective Williams arranged for a controlled buy of fentanyl, for which Plaintiff arrived at the designated time and location, with informant's positive identification of Plaintiff s vehicle and person.
4. “[T]he search of Mr. Turner was reasonable and justified based on both officer safety and as an incident search to arrest.”
5. At the time of arrest, law enforcement knew Plaintiffs criminal history, reputation to be “armed,” and reputation as a fentanyl dealer.
6. Plaintiff did not immediately exit his vehicle when commanded, and took two minutes to exit the vehicle.
7. When Plaintiff exited the vehicle, “his pants were worn so low that the waistband was around the top of his thighs and the top of his buttocks was visible above the waistband of his underwear.”
8. Detective had no choice by to “take additional time conducting the search of Mr. Turner's groin area to ensure officer safety and prevent destruction of a controlled substances.”
9. Based on Detective Hernandez's training and experience, he conducted a “blade” hand motion over Plaintiffs clothing which revealed a “compressed ball of narcotics in the front of [Plaintiffs] pants.”
10. No strip search was performed. Instead, “to retrieve the fentanyl Detective Hernandez reasonably pulled the fentanyl away from [Plaintiffs] body and attempted to manipulate it out of [Plaintiffs] underwear.”
11. During the search, Plaintiff was shielded by three to four officers, and “none of his private area was visible.”
12. “The search was only as long as extensive as necessary to retrieve the dangerous contraband and ensure the safety of [Plaintiff] and law enforcement.”
13. The August 3, 2022 search “was proper under the Terry framework and was proper as being incident to arrest. ”
Ex. 5 at pp. 10-12 (emph. added).
Following the conviction in the Nevada Court, Plaintiff appealed. See Ex. 7. However, on November 7, 2024, the Nevada Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction. Id. at p. 11. Plaintiff again argued on appeal that the August 3, 2022 search was unlawful and that the Nevada Court erred in denying the motion to suppress. Id. at p. 5. The Nevada Court of Appeals found that “Detective Hernandez's actions in retrieving the drugs from [Plaintiffs] underwear were reasonable and consistent with the purposes to be served from a search incident to arrest.” Id. at pp. 9-10. Moreover, the Court of Appeals found that the
Nevada Court's “findings as to the reasonableness of the search are not clearly erroneous.” Id. at p. 11. Based on the Nevada Court of Appeals' recent affirmance, Plaintiffs convictions for drug trafficking and unlawful possession of a firearm clearly remain valid. Id.', Ex. 6.
IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. Plaintiffs Claim is Heck-Barred.
Plaintiff attempts to state a Fourth Amendment Section 1983 claim based on a “strip” search during his arrest. (ECF No. 17 at pp. 2-4). Plaintiff was convicted of (1) trafficking a Schedule II controlled substance, more than 100 grams but less than 400 grams of fentanyl, and (2) ownership or possession of a firearm by a prohibited person. Ex. 6. The Nevada Court denied a motion to suppress, specifically finding that the search was constitutionally sound and therefore the fentanyl uncovered during that search would not be suppressed at trial. Ex. 5.
In Heck v. Humphrey, the U.S. Supreme Court clarified that there is no viable Section 1983 claim where “...a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence.” 512 U.S. 477, 486-7 (1994). “[I]f it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless plaintiff can demonstrate that his conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.” Id. at 487. “Heck, in other words, says that if a criminal conviction stands and is fundamentally inconsistent with the unlawful behavior for which section 1983 damages are sought, the 1983 action must be dismissed.” Smithart v. Towery, 79 F.3d 951, 952 (9th Cir. 1996).
A Section 1983 action is “not an alternative forum for challenging [a] conviction.” Lyall v. City of Los Angeles, 807 F.3d 1178, 1192 (9th Cir. 2015). When plaintiffs “challenge the search and seizure of the evidence upon which their criminal charges were based,” Heck bars the claim. Whitaker v. Garcetti, 486 F.3d 572, 584 (9th Cir. 2007)(overruled on other grounds). When a claim challenges the validity of an investigation and probable cause for a search, prevailing on that claim would necessarily imply the invalidity of the state court conviction. Szajerv. City of Los Angeles, 632 F.3d 607, 612 (9th Cir. 2011).
The Ninth Circuit recently upheld District of Nevada Judge Gordon's decision to dismiss a Fourth Amendment claim based on Heck v. Humphrey. Askew v. Cnty. of Clark, case no. 21-15310, 2022 WL 3585714, at *1 (9th Cir. Aug. 22, 2022). In that case, the Plaintiff pursued a Fourth Amendment claim based on the search of her home, search of her vehicle, and seizure of her dogs. Askew v. Clark Cnty., Nev., 519 F.Supp.3d 817, 821 (D. Nev. 2021), affd in part, vacated in part, remanded sub nom., Askew, case no. 21-15310. During the plaintiffs state court prosecution for animal cruelty, the plaintiff filed a motion to suppress, further demonstrating that the searches and seizures formed the basis of the criminal investigation and prosecution. See Askew, case no. 21-15310, 2022 WL 3585714, at *1. The district court dismissed the Fourth Amendment claim because “a finding that either search or any seizure was unlawful would necessarily imply the invalidity of [plaintiffs] convictions.” Askew v. Clark Cnty., Nev., 519 F.Supp.3d at 825.
Here, Plaintiffs Fourth Amendment claim is HccAbarred based on the valid conviction for drug trafficking and unlawful firearm possession. Ex. 6. In this case, Plaintiff claims the same August 3, 2022 search that uncovered the drugs was “unreasonable,” and unconstitutional. (ECF No. 17 at pp. 3-5). Plaintiffs criminal conviction is directly based on the search he is challenging in this case. Exs. 5-7. Like in Askew, Plaintiff filed an unsuccessful motion to suppress in the Nevada Court, further demonstrating that the search formed the basis for his conviction. Askew, case no. 21-15310, 2022 WL 3585714, at *1; Exs. 1-5. If Plaintiff prevailed on his Fourth Amendment claim here, it would necessarily imply the validity of his conviction in the Nevada Court. Szajer, 632 F.3d at 612. Therefore, so long as Plaintiffs criminal conviction is valid, he cannot collaterally attack the conviction through a Section 1983 Fourth Amendment claim.
Dismissal is appropriate because Plaintiffs Fourth Amendment claim is barred by Heck v. Humphrey. Plaintiffs convictions remain valid, and the instant case is an inappropriate attempt to attack the search underlying his conviction. Ex. 7. Further, as set forth below, dismissal with prejudice is appropriate based on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and based on collateral estoppel.
B. Plaintiff's Claim is Barred by the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine.
Plaintiffs Fourth Amendment claim is premised exclusively upon a direct attack of the Order Denying Motion to Suppress and the Judgment of Conviction issued in the Nevada Court, and the Order of Affirmance issued in the Nevada Court of Appeals. Ex. 5; Ex. 6; Ex. 7. This is impermissible under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and accordingly, dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is appropriate.
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine derives its name from two Supreme Court cases: Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Company, 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). “Under Rooker-Feldman, a federal district court is without subject matter jurisdiction to hear an appeal from the judgment of a state court.” Bianchi v. Rylaarsdam, 334 F.3d 895, 896 (9th Cir. 2003). The Ninth Circuit case law “makes clear that this doctrine applies even where the challenge to the state court decision involves federal constitutional issues,” including section 1983 claims. Napolitano, 252 F.3d at 1029 (citing Worldwide Church of God v. McNair, 805 F.2d 888, 891 (9th Cir. 1986)). The “doctrine applies to both final and interlocutory decisions from a state court.” Benavidez v. Cnty. of San Diego, 993 F.3d 1134, 1142-43 (9th Cir. 2021)(emphasis added)(citing Napolitano, 252 F.3d at 1030. The doctrine does not depend on the availability of a forum; instead, it exists to protect state courts from collateral attack by a federal judgment. Id.
“To determine whether the Rooker-Feldman bar is applicable, a district court first must determine whether the action contains a forbidden de facto appeal of a state court decision.” Bell v. City of Boise, 709 F.3d 890, 897 (9th Cir. 2013). “A de facto appeal exists when ‘a federal plaintiff asserts as a legal wrong an allegedly erroneous decision by a state court, and seeks relief from a state court judgment based on that decision.' ” Id. (quoting Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1164 (9th Cir. 2003)); see also Cooper v. Ramos, 704 F.3d 772, 777-78 (9th Cir. 2012) (“To determine whether an action functions as a de facto appeal, we ‘pay close attention to the relief sought by the federal-court plaintiff.'” (quoting Bianchi v. Rylaarsdam, 334 F.3d 895, 900 (9th Cir. 2003) (emphasis in original)).
The Rooker-Feldman “doctrine forbids a losing party in state court from filing suit in federal district court complaining of an injury caused by a state court judgment, and seeking federal court review and rejection of that judgment.” Bell v. City of Boise, 709 F.3d 890, 897 (9th Cir. 2013). A district court “...must decline jurisdiction whenever they are ‘in essence being called upon to review the state court decision.” Doe & Assocs. Law Offices v. Napolitano, 252 F.3d 1026, 1030 (9th Cir. 2001)(quoting Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482 n. 16). If the claim is a de facto appeal, a plaintiff “may not seek to litigate an issue that is ‘inextricably intertwined' with the state court judicial decision from which the forbidden appeal is brought.” Bell v. City of Boise, 709 F.3d at 897(quoting Noel, 341 F.3d at 1158).
In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff repeats arguments he made during his prosecution in the Nevada Court-i.e. that the search violated his Fourth Amendment rights. (ECF No. 17 pp. 2-4); see also Ex. 1; Ex. 3. The instant case is a de facto appeal of the Nevada Court's Order Denying Motion to Suppress, Judgment of Conviction, and the Nevada Court of Appeal's Order of Affirmance. See (ECF No. 17 pp. 2-4); Ex. 5; Ex. 6; Ex. 7. In the Nevada Court, Plaintiff unsuccessfully argued that the August 3, 2022 search violated the Fourth Amendment. Exs. 1-5. The Nevada Court's Order includes findings of fact regarding the details of the search. Ex. 5 at pp. 10-12. That Order then applied those facts to the Fourth Amendment legal framework, and found that the search was reasonable and justified. Id. at p. 11. Plaintiff was then convicted of trafficking the fentanyl that was uncovered during the search. Ex. 6. Plaintiff exercised his right to appeal to the appropriate forum, the Nevada Court of Appeals. See Ex. 7. The state appellate court affirmed the Nevada Court's finding that the August 3, 2022 search was constitutional. Id. at pp. 5-11.
To grant relief in this case, this Court would be required to reverse the Nevada Court and Nevada Court of Appeals' findings that the August 3, 2022 search was constitutionally sound. Even construing Plaintiffs Amended Complaint broadly, it presents an impermissible de facto appeal because a state court has already found the August 3, 2022 did not violate Plaintiffs Fourth Amendment rights. The state court orders specifically analyzed Detective Williams and Detective Eiernandez's involvement in that search. Ex. 6 at pp. 10-12; Ex. 7 at pp. 7-11. The only surviving claim in this case is a “Fourth Amendment unreasonable search claim against Williams and Hernandez.” (ECF No. 26 at p. 2) This is precisely the type of de facto appeal that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents.
This Court is prohibited from exercising jurisdiction over Plaintiffs de facto appeal of the Nevada Court proceedings. Mittal v. Cnty. of Clark, 716 Fed.Appx. 644 (9th Cir. 2018). Accordingly, this Court should dismiss the Amended Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to FRCP 12(b)(1).
C. Issue Preclusion Prevents Reconsidering the Nevada Court's Decisions.
“[O]nce a court has decided an issue of fact or law necessary to its judgment, that decision may preclude relitigation of the issue in a suit on a different cause of action involving a party to the first case.” Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94, 101 S.Ct. 411, 414 (1980) (citing Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153, 99 S.Ct. 970, 973 (1979)); see also Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27 (1982). This preclusion principle is rooted in concerns of judicial economy. By precluding parties from contesting matters that they have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate, issue preclusion acts to “relieve parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserve judicial resources, and, by preventing inconsistent decisions, encourage reliance on adjudication.” McCurry, 449 U.S. at 94, 101 S.Ct. at 414 (citing Montana, 440 U.S. at 153-54, 99 S.Ct. at 973-74); see also University of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 798, 106 S.Ct. 3220, 3225 (1986) (noting that preclusion principles “enforce repose”). Of course, “central to the fair administration of preclusion doctrine” is the notion that a party will be bound only if it had “an adequate opportunity or incentive to obtain a full and fair adjudication in the first proceeding.” Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 28 cmt. j. Only when a party has previously had such a full and fair opportunity to litigate that issue does the benefits of preclusion outweigh the countervailing due process concerns present whenever a party is estopped from raising a claim. See Blonder-Tongue Lab., Inc. v. University of III. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 328-30, 91 S.Ct. 1434, 1442M3 (1971).
Federal courts apply state law to determine the preclusive effect of state court judgments. See Hawkins v. Risley, 984 F.2d 321, 325 (9th Cir. 1993). Under Nevada law, issue preclusion requires a finding of the following four elements: “(1) the issue decided in the prior litigation must be identical to the issue presented in the current action; (2) the initial ruling must have been on the merits and have become final; ... (3) the party against whom the judgment is asserted must have been a party or in privity with a party to the prior litigation”; and (4) the issue was actually and necessarily litigated. Alcantara ex rel. Alcantara v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 130 Nev. Adv. Op. 28, 321 P.3d 912, 916 (2014); quoting Five Star Capital Corp. v. Ruby, 124 Nev. 1048, 1055, 194 P.3d 709, 713 (2008). “Issue preclusion cannot be avoided by attempting to raise a new legal argument or factual argument that involves the same ultimate issues previously decided in the prior case.” Alcantara ex rel. Alcantara v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 321 P.3d 912, 916-17.
Here, Plaintiff is precluded from relitigating the constitutionality of the August 3, 2022 search. Plaintiffs claim is identical in this case to that which was litigated in the Nevada Court-whether the search violated his Fourth Amendment Constitutional rights. Exs. 1-5; (ECF No. 26 at p. 2). The Nevada Court's Order was on the merits. Ex. 5.
Moreover, that Order is final based on the Nevada Court of Appeals' affirmation. Ex. 7. Plaintiff is the same party who argued the issue in state court, and actually and fully litigated the issue on a motion to suppress. Exs. 1-5. Therefore, Plaintiff must be collaterally estopped from relitigating the constitutionality of the August 3, 2022 search.
Plaintiffs Amended Complaint should be dismissed under FRCP 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The issue of whether Defendants' search of Plaintiff is constitutionally sound was already litigated and decided against Plaintiff in the Nevada Court. Ex. 5; Ex. 7. Dismissal with prejudice is therefore appropriate.
V. Conclusion
Defendants respectfully request that this Court dismiss the Amended Complaint in its entirety pursuant to FRCP 12(b)(1) and FRCP 12(b)(6). Plaintiff is /AcLbarred from collaterally attacking his conviction through the instant case. Moreover, dismissal with prejudice is appropriate because this case presents a de facto appeal barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and Plaintiff is collaterally estopped from relitigating the issue of whether the August 3, 2022 search violated his Fourth Amendment rights. Therefore, the Court should dismiss this case with prejudice.
EXHIBIT INDEX
EXHIBIT 1 CR22-3196A Motion to Suppress, 13 pages filed May 9, 2023
EXHIBIT 2 CR22-3196A Opposition To Motion 21 pages filed May 17, 2023
EXHIBIT 3 CR22-3196A Reply to Opposition to Suppress 6 pages filed May 23, 2023
EXHIBIT 4 CR22-3196A Minutes from June 5, 2023 hearing 3 pages filed June 9, 2023
EXHIBIT 5 CR22-3196A Order Denying Motion to Suppress 13 pages filed June 11, 2023
EXHIBIT 6 CR22-3196A Judgement of Conviction 2 pages filed September 5, 2023
EXHIBIT 7 87396-COA Order of Affirmance 12 pages filed November 7, 2024
EXHIBIT INDEX