It is next contended that the court erred in sustaining the objections of the plaintiffs to certain questions propounded by the defendants, seeking to establish fraud and collusion between the plaintiffs and Perry B. Lincoln; but since the record does not show what the evidence would have been if it had been admitted, we cannot say that this was error. Under the decisions of this court, when a party complains of the rejection of evidence, it is necessary for him to show in the record the substance of what the evidence would have been, in order that this court may determine whether material errors were committed. Hutchings v. Cobble, 30 Okla. 158, 120 P. 1013; Steward v. Commonwealth National Bank, 29 Okla. 754, 119 P. 216; Turner et al. v. Moore, 34 Okla. 1. 127 P. 487; Lamont G. O. Co. v. Doop Frater, 39 Okla. 427, 135 P. 392; Evans v. Smith, 50 Okla. 285, 150 P. 1096; Ardizonne v. Archer, 71 Oklahoma, 177 P. 554. The next contention is that the plaintiffs failed to prove the value of the automobile, and there was no evidence from which the jury could fix such value.

"In order that this court may consider assignments of error relating to the exclusion of evidence, there must be a showing in the record as to what the excluded evidence would have been before the court can say that there was reversible, error in the ruling." Turner v. Moore, 34 Okla. 1, 127 P. 487; Farmers' Product Supply Co. v. Bond, 61 Okla. 244, 161 P. 181. Defendants also introduced a witness, Jack Peters, the former husband of plaintiff, who joined with her in the execution of the deeds in question, and inquired whether he had acted as her agent in collecting from Ford a portion of the consideration thereof.

Not knowing, therefore, what the testimony would have been, if received, we are unable to say whether or not it would have been admissible, or whether there was error in its rejection. Offutt v. Wagoner, 30 Okla. 458, 120 P. 1018; Muskogee Elec. Trac. Co. v. Staggs, 34 Okla. 161, 125 P. 481; Turner v. Moore, 34 Okla. 1. 127 P. 487. The tenth specification of error, argued by plaintiff in error, deals with alleged errors in the admission and exclusion of evidence.

"It is well established in this jurisdiction that when a party complains of the rejection of evidence, it is necessary for him to show in the record the substance of what the evidence would have been, in order that the court may determine whether material error had been committed." In support thereof the following cases were cited: Hutchings v. Cobble, 30 Okla. 158, 120 P. 1013; Steward v. Commonwealth Nat. Bk., 29 Okla. 754, 119 P. 216; Turner v. Moore, 34 Okla. 1, 127 P. 487; Evans v. Smith, 50 Okla. 285, 150 P. 1096; Ardizonne v. Archer, 71 Okla. 289, 177 P. 554; Gross v. Lincoln, 81 Okla. 87, 196 P. 960. Paragraph 2 of the syllabus there is:

Ardizonne v. Archer, 71 Oklahoma, 177 P. 554. See Creek Coal Mining Co. v. Paprotta, 73 Oklahoma, 175 P. 235; Turner v. Moore, 34 Okla. 1, 127 P. 487; Nat. Drill Mfg. Co. v. Davis, 29 Okla. 625, 120 P. 976; Offutt v. Wagoner, 30 Okla. 458, 120 P. 1018; Muskogee Electric Co. v. Staggs, 34 Okla. 161, 125 P. 481; Lamont Gas Oil Co. v. Doop Frater, 39 Okla. 427, 135 P. 392; Evans v. Smith, 50 Okla. 285, 150 P. 1096; Gault v. Thurmond, 39 Okla. 673, 136 P. 742. The evidence in this case fails to disclose anything regarding the property rights, the value thereof, or what the former decree includes.

It is well established in this jurisdiction that when a party complains of the rejection of evidence, it is necessary for him to show in the record the substance of what the evidence would have been, in order that the court may determine whether material error has been committed. Hutchings v. Cobble, 30 Okla. 581, 120 P. 1013; Steward v. Commonwealth National Bank, 29 Okla. 754, 119 P. 216; Turner et al. v. Moore, 34 Okla. 1, 127 P. 487; Evans v. Smith, 50 Okla. 285, 150 P. 1096; Ardizonne v. Archer, 71 Oklahoma, 177 P. 554; Gross v. Lincoln, 81 Okla. 87, 196 P. 960. No complaint is made of the action of the court in striking from the record the telegram of April 6, 1917, and in view of the evidence of the witness no valid complaint could be made.

The court below sustained the objection to the question, and there is no showing made in the record of what the witness would testify to, and this court is unable to say whether he would have answered the question in the affirmative or in the negative, and therefore the question is not properly before us for review. Jones v. Citizens' State Bank, 39 Okla. 393, 135 P. 373; Turner v. Moore, 34 Okla. 1, 127 P. 487: Nat. Drill Mfg. Co. v. Davis, 29 Okla. 625, 120 P. 976; Offut v. Wagoner, 30 Okla. 458, 120 P. 1018; Muskogee Elec. Tract. Co. v. Staggs, 34 Okla. 161, 125 P. 481; Lamont Gas Oil Co. v. Doop Prater, 39 Okla. 427, 135 P. 392; Evans v. Smith, 50 Okla. 285, 150 P. 1096; Gault v. Thurmond, 39 Okla. 673, 136 P. 742. 4.

This seems to be all of the testimony which was offered tending to support the issue of mistake. It does not appear that the trial court committed prejudicial error in the rulings complained of thereon. Under the decisions of this court, where a party complains of the rejection of evidence, it is necessary for him to show in the record the substance of what the evidence would have been in order that this court may determine whether material error was committed. Turner et al. v. Moore, 34 Okla. 1, 127 P. 487. The refusal of the court to permit a witness to answer a competent question is not reversible error if subsequently the witness has been permitted to answer the same, or substantially the same question. Stewart v. Commonwealth Nat. Bank, 29 Okla. 754, 119 P. 216.

It has been held by this court that before it will consider assignments of error relating to the exclusion of evidence, there must be such showing in the record as to what the excluded evidence would have been that the court can say that there was reversible error in the ruling. See Gault v. Thurmond, 39 Okla. 673, 136 P. 742; Turner et al. v. Moore, 34 Okla. 1, 127 P. 487, and cases cited. Although this rule might not be so strictly enforced with relation to questions upon cross-examination if it could be seen from the question itself that competent and admissible evidence might have been elicited thereby, yet a cause will not be reversed for the rejection of questions upon cross-examination, unless it can be determined, either from the form of the questions itself or from an offer of proof, that competent and admissible evidence might thereby have been excluded.

This being true, we cannot say that this was error. Turner et al. v. Moore, 34 Okla. 1, 127 P. 487; McCants v. Thompson, 27 Okla. 706, 115 P. 600. In the case of Teague v. Adams, 52 Okla. 107, 152 P. 826, it was held not error for the defendant in his answer to make a tender of the amount which he admitted owing to plaintiff, and also to tender said amount into court at the time of the trial.