Under Tennessee law, "where [a] statute creates a new right and prescribes the remedy for its enforcement, the remedy prescribed is exclusive." Turner v. Harris, 281 S.W.2d 661, 665 (Tenn. 1955) (quoting Sutherland on Statutory Construction, Vol. 3, ยง 5812). For example, a borrower's remedies for loan charges and interest rates that violated the Industrial Loan and Thrift Company Act of 1979, Tenn. Code Ann. ยงยง 45-5-101 et seq., were held to be limited to the remedies prescribed in the statute, because the law "created new rights and remedies for borrowers with respect to interest rates above ten percent annually," and those rights did not exist at common law.
"[I]t is not within the prerogative of the judiciary to provide additional remedies and safeguards." Turner v. Harris, 198 Tenn. 654, 663, 281 S.W.2d 661, 665. We believe that the Supreme Court of Tennessee would reach the same conclusion as did the chancery court of Hamilton County in the opinion attached as Appendix A, upon the authorities therein cited, including State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Hubbard, 272 Ala. 181, 129 So.2d 669; Fidelity Casualty Co. of N.Y. v. McConnaughby, 228 Md. 1, 179 A.2d 117; Virginia Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co. v. Saccio, 204 Va. 769, 133 S.E.2d 268. This opinion was not available to the district judge at the time he rendered his opinion in this case.
This is so because if a statute creates a new right and prescribes a remedy for its enforcement, then the prescribed remedy is exclusive. Turner v. Harris, 198 Tenn. 654, 664, 281 S.W.2d 661, 665 (1955); Nashville C.R.R. v. Sprayberry, 56 Tenn. 852, 854 (1874). However, where a common law right exists, and a statutory remedy is subsequently created, the statutory remedy is cumulative unless expressly stated otherwise.
England, 878 F. Supp. at 1064-65 (citing Hodges v. S.C. Toof & Co., 833 S.W.2d 896, 898-99 (Tenn. 1992)). Hodges, 833 S.W.2d at 899 (citing Turner v. Harris, 281 S.W.2d 661, 665 (Tenn. 1955)). Id. (citing Leach, 196 S.W. at 140).
To sustain this position, State Farm has cited a number of authorities. Blue Ridge Insurance Co. v. Haun, 197 Tenn. 527, 276 S.W.2d 711; Vanderbilt Law Review, Vol. 12, p. 1227; Turner v. Harris, 198 Tenn. 654, 281 S.W.2d 661; Barkley v. International Mut. Ins. Co., 227 S.C. 38, 86 S.E.2d 602; Va. Farm Bur. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Saccio, 204 Va. 769, 133 S.E.2d 268; Ky. Farm Bur. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Miles, Ky., 267 S.W.2d 928; Aetna Cas. Surety Co. v. Simpson, 228 Ark. 157, 306 S.W.2d 117; Stollery Bros., Inc. v. Inter-Ins. Exchange of Chicago Motor Club, 15 Ill. App.2d 179, 145 N.E.2d 768; McCarthy v. Insurance Co. of Texas, Tex. Civ.App., 271 S.W.2d 836; De Vigil v. General Accident Fire Life Assurance Co., D.C., 146 F. Supp. 729; M.F.A. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mullin, D.C., 156 F. Supp. 445; Hoosier Cas. Co. of Indianapolis, Ind. v. Fox, D.C., 102 F. Supp. 214; State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Cooper, 4 Cir., 233 F.2d 500; Farm Bureau Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. v. Hammer, 4 Cir., 177 F.2d 793. It is unnecessary to go into a discussion of the authorities submitted by State Farm for the reason that no precedents have been cited, nor can be found, holding that under a financial responsibility act an insurance com
Any right created by the TFRA is limited to the remedies provided by the Act. See Turner v. Harris, 198 Tenn. 654, 281 S.W.2d 661 (1955) (construing a predecessor statute). Ordinarily, an injured party in an automobile accident, who has not yet obtained a judgment, has a right to file with the Commissioner of Safety a claim against the owner or operator of a motor vehicle causing the accident.
"[I]f a statute creates a new right and prescribes a remedy for its enforcement, then the prescribed remedy is exclusive." Hodges, 833 S.W.2d at 899 (citing Turner v. Harris, 198 Tenn. 654, 664, 281 S.W.2d 661, 665 (1955)). However, where a common law right exists and a statutory remedy is subsequently created, the statutory remedy is cumulative "absent language showing that [it is] intended to be exclusive."
1992), in which we stated: [i]f a statute creates a new right and prescribes a remedy for its enforcement, then the prescribed remedy is exclusive. Turner v. Harris, 198 Tenn. 654, 664, 281 S.W.2d 661, 665 (1955); Nashville C.R.R. v. Sprayberry, 56 Tenn. 852, 854 (1874). However, where a common law right exists, and a statutory remedy is subsequently created, the statutory remedy is cumulative unless expressly stated otherwise . . . Further, the Legislature is presumed to know the state of the law on the subject under consideration at the time it enacts legislation.
"It is a general principle that when a right is given by statute, and a remedy provided in the same Act, the right can be pursued in no other mode." Flatley v. Memphis Charleston Railroad Company, 56 Tenn. 230 (1872); Turner v. Harris, 198 Tenn. 654, 281 S.W.2d 661 (1955). We conclude T.C.A. Sections 39-3003 et seq., provide an exclusive method to be followed by the district attorney general and the court when he elects to proceed to enforce the statute as in this case.
Finally, the court enjoined the transfer of the canal system until such time that the required alterations would be completed. By its terms and under the law, the injunction is binding upon successors in interest to the property in privity with the defendant, Lackaff v. Bogue, 158 Neb. 174, 62 N.W.2d 889, (1954); 43 C.J.S. Injunctions ยง 263d. Therefore, this portion of the court's order afforded no additional protection to the plaintiffs, and is contrary to the usual rule that the plaintiff must have some lien or interest in the property of the defendant before its transfer can be enjoined, Irwin v. Meese, 325 Mich. 349, 38 N.W.2d 869 (1949); Turner v. Harris, 198 Tenn. 654, 281 S.W.2d 661 (1955). The injunction against transfer was erroneous and is set aside.