In Kentucky the terms of a property settlement agreement that is embodied in a divorce decree are not subject to later modification by a Kentucky court if the agreement constitutes a property settlement agreement as such, that is, is meant as a final settlement of the property rights and claims of the parties. Richey v Richey, 389 S.W.2d 914 (Ky App, 1965), Turner v Ewald, 290 Ky. 833; 162 S.W.2d 181 (Ky App, 1942). Kentucky law does provide for certain exceptions to this general rule, however, none of these exceptions apply to the case at bar. This rule was changed by a 1972 Kentucky statute.

Annotation, 1947, 166 A.L.R. 675, 676. See statement of the rule in Minnesota, set forth in Douglas v. Willcuts, 1935, 296 U.S. 1, 6-8, 56 S.Ct. 59, 80 L.Ed. 3. The question, therefore, as it here arises, may be stated as whether the agreement as incorporated in and made a part of the judgment provides for alimony. If it settles only property rights its inclusion in the judgment does not confer jurisdiction to modify it. Ettlinger v. Ettlinger, 1935, 3 Cal.2d 172, 44 P.2d 540; Rich v. Rich, 1941, 44 Cal.App.2d 526, 112 P.2d 780; Turner v. Ewald, 1942, 290 Ky. 833, 162 S.W.2d 181; Watt v. Watt, 1942, 69 Ohio App. 322, 43 N.E.2d 633. "After a decree of divorce in any case granting alimony and providing for the care and custody of children, the case shall * * * be considered open for any future orders in those respects.

Under Kentucky law such a settlement, completely exonerating and relieving the husband, can be had. Of this there can be no 'mere inference' or 'vague conjecture- ', to use the language of Mr. Justice Douglas in Helvering v. Fitch, supra.         The case of Turner v. Ewald, 290 Ky. 833, 162 S.W.2d 181, 188, is a well-considered and ably reasoned opinion in which the whole court sat. It has not since been overruled or modified. The whole line of Kentucky cases was reviewed.

And under the Kentucky law such a settlement as was entered into between William B. Belknap and Helen Strong Belknap is a final settlement of the property rights between them and can not be modified, changed, or increased at a later time by the court. Turner v. Ewald, 290 Ky. 833, 162 S.W.2d 181; Hargis v. Hargis, 252 Ky. 198, 66 S.W.2d 59; Renick v. Renick, 247 Ky. 628, 57 S.W.2d 663; Keach v. Keach, 217 Ky. 723, 290 S.W. 708. The Supreme Court has ruled that under such conditions the rule established by Douglas v. Willcuts, supra, did not apply, and that the income paid from such a trust to the divorced wife was not chargeable for income tax purposes to the husband. Helvering v. Fuller, 310 U.S. 69, 60 S.Ct. 784, 84 L.Ed. 1082; Pearce v. Commissioner, 315 U.S. 543, 62 S.Ct. 754, 86 L.Ed. 1016.

In the case at bar it seems that the same reasoning compels the same conclusion because in this case not only has the wife by the agreement been cut off from support by her husband in case of her remarriage, but she is cut off from support in case of the remarriage of her husband and, in addition, is cut off from support in case the husband ceases to be an army officer. Other cases cited and relied upon by defendant are as follows: Bart v. Bart, 182 Md. 477, 35 A.2d 125; Heckman v. Heckman, D.C., 83 F. Supp. 687; Millheisler v. Millheisler, 43 Wn.2d 282, 261 P.2d 69; Turner v. Ewald, 290 Ky. 833, 162 S.W.2d 181; none of these cases convinces us that we should take any view of the situation before the court other than has been indicated above. This court is doing, as we think, what would be done in New York under their statute, supra.

s at periodical intervals. Robinson v. Robinson, 1889, 79 Cal. 511, 515, 21 P. 1095; Huellmantel v. Huellmantel, 1899, 124 Cal. 583, 57 P. 582; Honey v. Honey, 1923, 60 Cal.App. 759, 214 P. 250; Scheibe v. Scheibe, 1943, 57 Cal.App.2d 336, 134 P.2d 835; Enders v. Enders, 1922, 36 Idaho 481, 211 P. 549; Openshaw v. Openshaw, 1932, 80 Utah 9, 12 P.2d 364; Schuster v. Schuster, 1936, 88 Utah 257, 53 P.2d 428; Golden v. Golden, 1937, 41 N.M. 356, 68 P.2d 928; Evans v. Evans, 1933, 182 Wn. 297, 46 P.2d 730; Christenson v. Christenson, 1926, 141 Wn. 226, 251 P. 111; Wilhelm v. Wilhelm, 1928, 126 Or. 388, 270 P. 516; Fuller v. Fuller, 1944, Or., 151 P.2d 979; Drake v. Drake, 1911, 27 S.D. 329, 131 N.W. 294; Roubicek v. Roubicek, 1945, 246 Ala. 442, 21 So.2d 244; Smith v. Rogers, 215 Ala. 581, 112 So. 190; Plunkett v. Plunkett, 223 Ala. 400, 137 So. 24; Cecil v. Cecil, 200 Ky. 453, 255 S.W. 64; Lyon v. Lyon, 243 Ky. 236, 47 S.W.2d 1072; Skidmore v. Skidmore, 1935, 261 Ky. 327, 87 S.W.2d 631; Turner v. Ewald, 1943, 290 Ky. 833, 162 S.W.2d 181; Yung v. Yung, 1943, 294 Ky. 369, 171 S.W.2d 1017; Lydick v. Lydick, 1938, 147 Kan. 385, 76 P.2d 876; Stuckek v. Stuckek, 1928, 249 Ill. App. 598; McKey v. Willett, 248 Ill. App. 602; Kraft v. Kraft, 193 Iowa 602, 187 N.W. 449; Brown v. Brown, 222 Mass. 415, 111 N.E. 42; Baird v. Baird, 1942, 311 Mass. 329, 41 N.E.2d 5; White v. Shalit, 1938, 136 Me. 65, 1 A.2d 765; Bickle v. Bickle, 1936, 196 Minn. 392, 265 N.W. 276; Longbotham v. Longbotham, 119 Minn. 139, 137 N.W. 387; Tiffin v. Tiffin, 209 Mich. 232, 176 N.W. 435; Hagerty v. Hagerty, 1923, 222 Mich. 166, 192 N.W. 553; Lemp v. Lemp, 249 Mo. 295, 155 S.W. 1057, Ann. Cas. 1914D, 307; Miller v. Miller, 173 Miss. 44, 159 So. 112; Hopkins v. Hopkins, 174 Miss. 643, 165 So. 414; Baker v. Baker, 2 Ohio App. 321, 24 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 376; Howe v. Howe, 1918, 21 Ohio N.P.N.S., 324; Winslow v. Winslow, 133 Tenn. 663, 182 S.W. 241, Ann. Cas. 1917A, 245; Eaton v. Davis, 1941, 176 Va. 330, 10 S.E.2d 893; Tuning v. Tuning, 90 W. Va. 457, 111 S.E

CULLEN, Commissioner. This is an appeal by John Albert Scott from a circuit court order denying his motion, made in February 1973, for modification of a 1968 divorce judgment as to alimony (maintenance) payments required to be made by John to his divorced wife, Della. The ground on which the motion was denied was that since the provisions of the judgment as to alimony were derived from a property-settlement agreement, incorporated in the judgment, in which payment of the alimony was an integral part of a complete settlement of the parties' property rights, the court had no power to modify the judgment as to alimony, under such cases as Richey v. Richey, Ky., 389 S.W.2d 914, Turner v. Ewald, 290 Ky. 833, 162 S.W.2d 181, and Renick v. Renick, 247 Ky. 628, 57 S.W.2d 663. The appellant seeks to escape from the rule of the above-cited cases on the grounds that (1) the rule is inequitable and wrong and the cases should be overruled; (2) the rule should not apply here because the wife received substantially all of the property and therefore there was no consideration for the agreement as to alimony; and (3) the 1972 legislative changes in the divorce statutes in effect abolished the rule.

In this case a property settlement agreement in the true sense of the term was involved. In the case of Turner v. Ewald, et al., 290 Ky. 833, 162 S.W.2d 181, the parties entered into a property settlement agreement providing for periodic payment of alimony. The agreement contained this provision:

Before his marriage, appellee had accumulated the following property: about $1800, which he had saved from his pay while in the army; three cows, and a 1940 Pontiac automobile. His gross income was shown to be: a monthly allotment of $67.50 from the United States Government under the Farm Training Program, which was increased by $26.25 per month after marriage; about $80 every four weeks from the sale of milk, and a share in the proceeds of his father's farm, the amount of which was not definitely shown, except that appellee testified he received $500 for his share of the tobacco crop for the preceding year. In the case of Turner v. Ewald, 290 Ky. 833, 162 S.W.2d 181, 186, we approved the practice of lump sum alimony settlements, saying: "In this jurisdiction a lump-sum award in lieu of a periodical allowance is favored where the husband owns sufficient property to permit such a settlement of alimony claims fairly to both parties." In the case of Lewis v. Lewis, 204 Ky. 5, 263 S.W. 366, it was written: "We have never adopted a fixed rule for determining the amount of alimony or the percentage of her husband's estate to which a wife is entitled upon securing a divorce.

Generally, if the husband's estate is sufficient to permit it to be done, alimony should be allowed the wife in a lump sum instead of in monthly payments. Turner v. Ewald, 290 Ky. 833, 162 S.W.2d 181. In arriving at the amount of alimony, courts have no fixed rule but will take into consideration the age, health, social position, and earning capacity of both husband and wife, and further will consider the estate of the husband from which his income is derived, Sabel v. Sabel, 286 Ky. 575, 151 S.W.2d 56; and in at least two instances this Court has expressed the view that probable accretion of wealth from other sources may be considered. Muir v. Muir, 133 Ky. 125, 92 S.W. 314, 28 Ky. Law Rep. 1358, 4 L.R.A., N.S., 909; and Sheban v. Shehan, 152 Ky. 191, 153 S.W. 243. Appellant has an estate in his own right which he inherited from his maternal grandfather, supplemented by certain gifts from his mother in the total value of more than $450,000.