Opinion
Civil Action No. 99-3975.
August 9, 2004
MEMORANDUM
I. Background and Procedural History
On February 20, 1981, a state court jury found petitioner guilty of the first degree murder of Nelson Wright and possession of an instrument of crime. He was subsequently sentenced to life imprisonment for murder and to a consecutive sentence of 2½ to 5 years on the weapons offense. Petitioner appealed alleging trial court error regarding the admission of evidence and raised claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. His conviction and sentence were affirmed by Pennsylvania's Superior Court on May 20, 1983. Pennsylvania's Supreme Court denied petitioner's request forallocatur on September 21, 1983. Petitioner is currently serving out his sentence at SCI-Mahanoy, Frackville, Pennsylvania.
On December 19, 1983, petitioner filed a pro se petition in the Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia County, for post conviction relief pursuant to Pennsylvania's Post Conviction Hearing Act ("PCHA"), 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 9541, et seq. Petitioner's application for collateral relief alleged claims of ineffective assistance of counsel against both his trial and appellate counsel. During the pendency of his PCHA filing, petitioner filed a writ of habeas with this court requesting immediate relief on the basis of inordinate and unjustifiable state court delay. This court denied petitioner's motion on February 3, 1987, for his failure to exhaust his state court remedies. Thereafter, the Court of Common Pleas denied petitioner's PCHA application on April 29, 1988. The Superior court affirmed the lower state court's decision on February 22, 1989. A petitioner for allocatur was denied by the Supreme Court on November 29, 1989.
On August 12, 1990, petitioner filed a second pro se petition pursuant to the Post-Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA"), again raising claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. This petition was dismissed on October 22, 1990. Petitioner appealed the PCRA court's decision, which the Superior Court affirmed on June 17, 1992. The Supreme Court denied allocatur on December 21, 1992.
Thereafter, petitioner for a third time filed an application challenging his conviction. In that instance he requested relief by filing a Writ of Habeas Corpus with the Court of Common Pleas, on December 7, 1994. His petition claimed that the procedure under the Post-Conviction Relief Act violated his due process rights by failing to afford him an opportunity to fully develop the record to challenge his counsel's effectiveness. This application was denied on April 28, 1995. Petitioner appealed. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania dismissed petitioner's appeal on July 23, 1996. Allocator was denied on April 8, 1997.
On September 16, 1997, a fourth petition for post conviction relief, pursuant to the PCRA was filed by petitioner. That petition was denied on September 16, 1997 for being filed beyond the statutory deadline for asserting PCRA claims and because it reiterated previously litigated issues. On December 3, 1998, Pennsylvania's Superior Court affirmed the PCRA court's decision in that petitioner's application was time barred and failed to demonstrate eligibility for any statutory exception that would excuse an untimely filing. The Supreme Court denied allocatur on July 9, 1999.
On August 6, 1999, petitioner filed a second federal habeas corpus petition with this court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, alleging ineffective assistance of trial and post-trial counsel in his state court proceedings. This court issued a certification that petitioner's application was a second or successive 28 U.S.C. 2254 application. Petitioner's application was forwarded to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit for consideration. On October 28, 1999, the Third Circuit directed the clerk of the court to transfer petitioner's file to the district court for treatment as a first time application for habeas corpus relief, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner's file was transferred to this court on October 29, 1999. This court referred the matter to Magistrate Judge Carol Wells for a Report and Recommendation.
On May 30, 2000, Judge Wells issued a Report and Recommendation, recommending that petitioner's application be denied without an evidentiary hearing and that no probable cause existed for the issuance of a certificate of appealability. This court adopted Judge Wells' report on July 25, 2000; however, it did grant petitioner a certificate of appealability. A notice of appeal was filed on August 8, 2000. On August 16, 2002, the third circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. On July 29, 2003, the third circuit denied petitioner's writ of error coram nobis.
Now pending before this court, is petitioner's Motion for Relief from Judgment or Order pursuant to Rules 60(b)(1) and (3) of the Fed.R.Civ.P. For the reasons that follow, petitioner's motion is denied. II. Discussion
Petitioner argues that he should be granted relief under Rule 60(b) because the district court denied him due process under the law by disregarding his claims of actual innocence and his claims that false evidence was introduced at trial. He argues that the instant petition is not an attempt to challenge his conviction or to circumvent any procedure but, rather is filed to challenge the integrity of the federal habeas proceedings. This court does not address the merits of petitioner's claims as his motion is untimely. Petitioner's motion for relief was filed more than 3 years after this court entered judgment against him. Accordingly, this court lacks jurisdiction to entertain his current claims.
Rule 60(b) provides six grounds upon which relief from a final judgment may be sought. Petitioner's motion is premised upon allegations that the district court committed a mistake or, in the alternative, fraud. The Rule reads as follows:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or a party's legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b). The Rule incorporates time limitation requiring motions for relief of judgment to "be made with a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) not more than one year after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken." Id.; see also, Hancock Industries v. Schaeffer, 811 F.2d 225, 239 (3rd Cir. 1987) (explaining that the one year time limits of Rule 60(b) are clear and that remand from the court will not extend or alter the fact that the time limit had run in appellant's case for moving for relief from judgment). Here, petitioner filed his motion for relief from judgment on December 11, 2003, nearly 3 years after this court denied his petition on July 25, 2000. Therefore, petitioner's motion is time-barred pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1) or Rule 60(b)(3). Moreover, "Rule 60(b) is available only in cases evidencing extraordinary circumstances." Stradley v. Cortez, 518 F.2d 488, 493 (3d Cir. 1975), citing Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193, (1950). Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that there has been any mistake or fraud by the court or by any party to this action, which would justify relief from the judgment entered against him. And he has not presented any exceptional circumstances showing that relief from operation of the judgment is warranted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(1), (3), and (6).
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies petitioner's Motion for Relief From Judgment or Order pursuant to Rule 60(b) as untimely. Accordingly, the court's July 25, 2000 Order shall not be vacated. An appropriate Order follows.
ORDER
AND NOW, this ____ day of August, 2004, upon consideration of petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration pursuant to Rules 60(b)(1) and (3) of the Fed.R.Civ.P., it is hereby ORDERED as follows:
1. Petitioner's Motion for Relief from Judgment is DENIED.
2. All pending Motions are DENIED AS MOOT.