Opinion
Civil Action No. 99-0696-RV-L.
October 31, 2000.
JUDGMENT
Pursuant to Rule 58 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, FINAL JUDGMENT is entered in favor of defendant DaimlerChrysler Corporation and against plaintiff Debra Turner. In accordance with the court's October 31, 2000 order granting DaimlerChrysler's motion for summary judgment, Turner shall recover NOTHING from DaimlerChrysler. Each party shall bear its own costs.
ORDER
Plaintiff Debra Turner brings this action against defendant DaimlerChrysler Corporation pursuant to the Alabama Extended Manufacturer's Liability Doctrine (AEMLD). Turner also asserts state law claims for negligence, breach of implied warranty, negligent product design, negligent construction and assembly, and negligent failure to warn. The court denied defendant DaimlerChrysler's motion for summary judgment in its order of July 26, 2000. Upon reconsideration, that order is VACATED. After carefully reviewing the law and considering the submissions of the parties, the court concludes that the motion is due to be and is hereby GRANTED.
The court held a pre-trial conference on October 3, 2000 during which the court notified the parties that it intended to grant summary judgment for the defendant.
I. BACKGROUND
On May 10, 1995, Turner purchased a new 1995 Jeep Cherokee from Don Dawson Jeep-Eagle, Inc., in Pensacola, Florida. The Cherokee was covered by a new vehicle limited warranty, which was in force for three years or 36,000 miles, whichever came first. The warranty covered the driver's supplemental restraint system components and limited any implied warranties to the three-year/36,000 mile coverage period.On July 12, 1998, Turner was struck head-on by another vehicle while she was driving her Cherokee on County Road 23 in Conecuh County, Alabama. The airbag in Turner's vehicle allegedly failed to deploy. As a result, Turner claims, she suffered serious injuries to her face, shoulders, chest and knees.
On June 24, 1999, Turner filed a complaint in state court against Don Dawson and General Motors Acceptance Corporation (GMAC). The complaint alleged that Don Dawson and GMAC were liable as the seller and manufacturer, respectively, of Turner's Cherokee. On July 28, 1999, Don Dawson removed the case to federal court. Don Dawson also filed a motion to compel arbitration and, shortly thereafter, GMAC filed a motion to dismiss. The court granted both motions and allowed Turner to amend her complaint to add DaimlerChrysler as a defendant.
The court has since granted Turner's motion to dismiss Don Dawson from this case (Doc. 56).
Since that time, Turner has not submitted any expert disclosures or reports as required by Rule 26(a)(2)(B) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. She also failed to identify any expert witnesses by the April 3, 2000 discovery deadline set forth in the court's Rule 16(b) Scheduling Order (Doc. 22 ¶ 6). Two months later, Turner filed a motion to extend that deadline, which was denied because Turner had not provided good cause for the untimely amendment.
II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In reviewing a summary judgment motion, the court must view the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Alexander v. Fulton County, 207 F.3d 1303, 1335 (11th Cir. 2000).
The party seeking summary judgment has the initial burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Once the moving party meets that burden, the non-moving party must set forth specific facts which demonstrate that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585-86, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1355, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). A genuine issue of material fact exists for trial if a reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of the non-moving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).
To avoid an adverse ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [its] pleading." Fed R. Civ. P. 56(e). Nor may the non-moving party defeat summary judgment by providing a mere "scintilla" of evidence. See Burger King Corp. v. Weaver, 169 F.3d 1310, 1321 (11th Cir. 1999). Instead, there must be a genuine factual conflict in the evidence to support jury question. See Continental Cas. Co. v. Wendt, 205 F.3d 1258, 1261 (11th Cir. 2000).
III. DISCUSSION
In this products liability action, Turner contends that the driver-side airbag restraint system in her 1995 Jeep Cherokee was defective within the meaning of the AEMLD. She also seeks recovery from DaimlerChrysler on the theories of negligence, wantonness, and breach of an implied warranty. Those theories have all been incorporated by the AEMLD. See Brock v. Baxter Healtheare Corp., 96 F. Supp.2d 1352 (S.D. Ala. 2000).See also Veal v. Teleflex, Inc., 586 So.2d 188, 191 (Ala. 1991); Shell v. Union Oil Co., 489 So.2d 569, 571 (Ala. 1986). The court will thus consider those claims "as part and parcel of [Turner's] AEMLD claim."McPhail v. Mitsubishi Motor Mfg. of Am., Inc., 80 F. Supp.2d 1309. 1314 (S.D. Ala. 1997);
To establish liability under the AEMLD, a plaintiff must prove:
He suffered injury or damages to himself or his property by one who sells a product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the plaintiff as the ultimate user or consumer, if (a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and (b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it was sold.Casrell v. Altec Industries, Inc., 335 So.2d 128, 132-33 (Ala. 1976). The Alabama Supreme Court has recognized that "the failure of a product does not presuppose the existence of a defect." Townsend v. General Motors Corp., 642 So.2d 411, 415 (Ala. 1994). This is particularly true where, as here, the product and its purported defect is of a "complex and technical nature." Brooks v. Colonial Chevrolet-Buick, 579 So.2d 1328, 1333 (Ala. 1991). In such situations, the plaintiff must affirmatively establish the defective condition of the product by means of expert testimony. See Id. at 1332-33. Turner, however, has not offered any evidence — let alone expert testimony — to show that her Cherokee's driverside airbag restraint system was defective. Simply establishing that the airbag did not deploy and that she was injured is not enough; Turner must affirmatively show that the airbag system was defective and that this defect proximately caused her injuries. See Townsend, 642 So.2d at 415 (Ala. 1994).
For its part, DaimlerChrysler has offered affidavit evidence demonstrating:
(1) that there were no defects in the Cherokee's driver-side airbag restraint system;
(2) that the airbag system did not proximately cause any of Turner's injuries; and
(3) that the airbag system performed as expected and designed in Turner's crash. Because Turner has not offered any evidence to the contrary, she cannot meet her burden of showing through expert testimony that the airbag system was defective. DaimlerChrysler is therefore entitled to summary judgment.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court concludes (1) that Turner's negligence, wantonness and breach of warranty claims have been subsumed by her AEMLD claim, and (2) that Turner has not set forth aprima facie case under the ALEMILD because she has not offered any evidence or expert testimony that a defect existed in her 1995 Jeep Cherokee's driver-side airbag restraint system. Accordingly, the court GRANTS DaimlerChrysler's motion for summary judgment.
Technically, Turner's complaint does not state a claim for wantonness, but Count Two (a negligence claim) contains a demand for punitive damages.