Opinion
Civil Action No: 04-349, Section: "R"(5).
January 18, 2005
ORDER AND REASONS
The defendant moves the Court for summary judgment. The plaintiff, who is pro se, has not responded to the motion. For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS the defendant's motion.
I. BACKGROUND
On February 9, 2004, Nathan Turner sued the United States Army for discrimination on the basis of race, disability, and for retaliation for engaging in protected Title VII activity. (R. Doc. 1, Ex. 1.) Turner is a welder with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in New Orleans, Louisiana. On October 29, 2001, the Army issued a vacancy announcement for the position of Realty Specialist, GS-1170. ( See Ex. A-2.) The duties of the position include participating in planning and mapping activities, and functioning as the coordinator for work pertaining to the acquisition of land for the Atchafalaya Basin project and other major direct federal and local cooperation projects. ( Id.) Applicants could qualify for the position through experience or education. To qualify through experience, an applicant has to have 52 weeks of specialized experience that would equip him with the particular knowledge, skills, and abilities to perform the duties of the position. ( Id.) To qualify through education, an applicant has to have one full year of graduate education or have completed a bachelor's degree that included superior academic achievement. ( See Ex. A-13, OCI Fact-Finding Conference at 47; see also Ex. A-10, United States Office of Personnel Management, Qualification Standards for General Schedule Positions at 162.)
Turner submitted a resumé for the Realty Specialist position. ( See Ex. A-4.) In January of 2002, the Army informed Turner that it had received his application, but that his name was not referred for consideration because his resumé did not reflect the required qualifications. (Ex. A-5.) Specifically, Turner did not qualify by experience he did not have a year of experience that would have equipped him with the specialized knowledge necessary to be a Realty Specialist. (Ex. A-13 at 48.) Likewise, Turner did not qualify by education because his highest academic credential was an associate's degree in welding technology. ( Id.)
On November 15, 2001, the Army issued a recruitment notice for the position of Maintenance Mechanic Supervisor. ( See Ex. A-6.) The Maintenance Mechanic Supervisor supervises personnel assigned to the Old River Control Structure and related flood control and drainage facilities, and plans and directs all work required in the operation and maintenance of assigned structures. ( Id.; Ex. A-7.) The Maintenance Mechanic Supervisor is also responsible for the on-site operational management of forests, fish, wildlife, and other natural or created resources so as to provide maximum benefits to the general public with minimum disturbance to the natural environmental features of the project. (Ex. A-7.) No specific length of training or experience is required for the position. (Ex. A-6.) The applicants should, however, have experience, education or training of sufficient scope and quality to perform the duties of the position. ( Id.)
Turner applied for the position of Maintenance Mechanic Supervisor. He submitted the same resumé for the Maintenance Mechanic Supervisor position as he did for the Realty Specialist position. (Ex. A-13 at 15.) In January of 2002, the Army informed Turner that it had received his application but that it would not forward his application for consideration because he did not have the required qualifications. (Ex. A-8.)
Turner alleges that the Army did not hire him for either position because of his race or his disability. Additionally, Turner alleges that the Army refused to hire him in retaliation for filing previous employment discrimination charges against it. Turner's complaint reflects that he has filed more than 20 equal employment opportunity charges against the Army. The Army now moves for summary judgement on Turner's claims.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Legal Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues as to any material facts, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56 (c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-323 (1986). A court must be satisfied that no reasonable trier of fact could find for the nonmoving party or, in other words, "that the evidence favoring the nonmoving party is insufficient to enable a reasonable jury to return a verdict in her favor." Lavespere v. Niagara Mach. Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 178 (5th Cir. 1990) ( citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986)). The moving party bears the burden of establishing that there are no genuine issues of material fact.
If the dispositive issue is one on which the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party may satisfy its burden by merely pointing out that the evidence in the record contains insufficient proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325; see also Lavespere, 910 F.2d at 178. The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party, who must, by submitting or referring to evidence, set out specific facts showing that a genuine issue exists. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. The nonmovant may not rest upon the pleadings, but must identify specific facts that establish a genuine issue exists for trial. See id. at 325; Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1996).
The Court may not grant summary judgment simply because the plaintiff has not opposed the motion. Hibernia Nat'l Bank v. Administracion Central Socieded Anonima, 776 F.2d 1277, 1279 (5th Cir. 1985). The Court may, however, "accept as undisputed the movant's version of the facts and grant a motion for summary judgment where the movant has made a prima facie showing of its entitlement to summary judgment." R.L. Carpenter, 764 F. Supp. at 429 (citing Eversley v. Mbank Dallas, 843 F.2d 172, 174 (5th Cir. 1988). A pro se litigant is "not, as the party with the burden of proof, excused from the requirement that she set forth specific facts supporting her claim." Bookman v. Shubzda, 945 F. Supp. 999, 1004 (N.D. Tex. 1996) (citing Jones v. Sheehan, Young, Culp, P.C., 82 F.3d 1334, 1338 (5th Cir. 1996).
B. Turner's Race Discrimination Claim
(1) Law
Title VII makes race discrimination in employment unlawful. The plaintiff in a Title VII action bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of race discrimination. McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). This means that the plaintiff must show that (1) he is a member of the protected class, (2) he was qualified for the position, (3) he was rejected for the position, and (4) that the employer continued to seek applicants with the plaintiff's qualifications. Id. See also Haynes v. Pennzoil Co., 207 F.3d 296, 300 (5th Cir. 2000). Once the plaintiff establishes the prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for not hiring him. McDonnel-Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. If the defendant satisfies its burden, the plaintiff must show that the defendant's reason is actually a pretext for discrimination. Haynes, 207 F.3d at 300.
(2) Analysis
The Court finds that Turner has failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. This is because Turner was not qualified for either position. Specifically, the Army considered only applicants who had either (1) 52 weeks of specialized experience, or (2) one full year of graduate education or a bachelor's degree that included superior academic achievement. Turner's experience did not qualify him for the position because he did not have a year of experience that would have provided him with the specialized knowledge necessary to be a Realty Specialist. (Ex. A-13 at 48.) Turner's education did not qualify him for the position because his highest academic credential is an associate's degree in welding technology. ( Id.)
Likewise, Turner was not qualified to be a Maintenance Mechanic Supervisor. The Army considered only applicants with experience, education or training of sufficient scope and quality to perform the duties of the position. ( See Ex. A-6.) The duties of the position include supervising personnel assigned to the Old River Control Structure and related flood control and drainage facilities, and planning and directing all work required in the operation and maintenance of assigned structures. ( Id.; Ex. A-7.) The duties also include on-site operational management of forests, fish, wildlife, and other natural or created resources so as to provide maximum benefits to the general public with minimum disturbance to the natural environmental features of the project. (Ex. A-7.) Turner did not have any experience that would have prepared him to perform the duties of a Maintenance Mechanic Supervisor. ( See Ex. A-4.) The Court notes that Turner served the Army as a maintenance mechanic for 17 years. ( Id.) His duties in that position, however, were substantially different from the Maintenance Mechanic Supervisor position for which he applied. Specifically, when Turner worked as a maintenance mechanic, he read blueprints and fabricated metal. (Ex. A-4; Ex. A-13 at 52.) He did not perform any of the duties required of the Maintenance Mechanic Supervisor. Ultimately, Turner has failed to show that he was qualified to be either a Maintenance Mechanic Supervisor or a Realty Specialist. Therefore, Turner's race discrimination claim fails.
C. Disability Discrimination
Turner also contends that the Army did not hire him for either position because he is disabled. Turner suffers from job-related stress. (Ex. A-13 at 23-24.) The Rehabilitation Act prohibits employment discrimination against qualified individuals with disabilities. 29 U.S.C. § 794. To qualify for relief under the Rehabilitation Act, the plaintiff must prove that (1) he is disabled, (2) he is otherwise qualified for the job, (3) he is employed by a federal employer, and (4) he suffered discrimination on the basis of his disability. Hileman v. Dallas, 115 F.3d 352, 353 (5th Cir. 1997). As with his race discrimination claim, Turner's disability discrimination claim fails because there is no evidence that he is "otherwise qualified" for either of the positions he sought. Additionally, there is no evidence that Turner is disabled. For the purposes of the Rehabilitation Act, a disability is a condition that substantially limits one or more major life activities. Id. Nothing before the Court indicates that Turner's job-related stress substantially limits any of his major life activities. Accordingly, Turner is not entitled to relief under the Rehabilitation Act.
D. Retaliation
Turner also alleges that the Army did not hire him for either position because he has filed more than 20 employment discrimination charges against it. Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an employee who has opposed an employment practice made unlawful by Title VII or has made a charge under Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). To recover on a Title VII retaliation claim, the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of retaliation. Specifically, the plaintiff must show that (1) he engaged in an activity protected by Title VII; (2) the employer took adverse employment action against him; and (3) a causal connection exists between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 705 (5th Cir. 1997). Once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate reason for the employment action. Shirley v. Chrysler First, Inc., 970 F.3d 39, 42 (5th Cir. 1992). If the defendant makes this showing, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to prove that the asserted reason is a pretext for retaliation. Id.
The Court finds that Turner has not established a prima facie case of retaliation. This is because there is no evidence before the Court that connects the Army's failure to hire Turner for the positions he sought and his previous employment discrimination charges. See Winchester v. Galveston Yacht Basin, 943 F.Supp. 776, 780 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (dismissing the plaintiff's retaliation claim because there was insufficient evidence to indicate a causal connection between her prior protected activity and the adverse employment action). Accordingly, Turner's retaliation claim fails.
III. CONCLUSION
For the forgoing reasons, the Court GRANTS the defendant's motion for summary judgment.