Opinion
Steven Deon Turner, Petitioner, Pro se, Lancaster, CA.
For Sandra Alfaro, Respondent: Jonathan Matthew Krauss, LEAD ATTORNEY, Jason C Tran, CAAG - Office of the Attorney General, California Department of Justice, Los Angeles, CA.
OPINION
ORDER DISMISSING HABEAS PETITION WITHOUT PREJUDICE AND ADMINISTRATIVELY CLOSING CASE
MARGARET M. MORROW, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
BACKGROUND
On January 27, 2015, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody (Pet. at 1), apparently challenging his 2014 convictions for shooting at an occupied vehicle, possession of a firearm by a felon, and possession of ammunition by a felon (see Lodged Doc. 1 at 1).
Because the Petition is not sequentially numbered, the Court has used the pagination provided by the Court's official Case Management/Electronic Court Filing system.
On February 4, 2015, the Magistrate Judge ordered Petitioner to show cause why his Petition should not be dismissed without prejudice under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 45-46, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971), and its progeny given that his state convictions are not yet final (see Pet. at 4; Lodged Doc. 3). On February 26, 2015, Petitioner filed his response. On March 19, 2015, Respondent filed a reply after the Magistrate Judge directed her to do so.
DISCUSSION
As a general proposition, a federal court will not intervene in a pending state criminal proceeding absent extraordinary circumstances involving great and immediate danger of irreparable harm. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 45-46; see also Fort Belknap Indian Cmty. v. Mazurek, 43 F.3d 428, 431 (9th Cir. 1994) (abstention appropriate if ongoing state judicial proceedings implicate important state interests and offer adequate opportunity to litigate federal constitutional issues). " [O]nly in the most unusual circumstances is a defendant entitled to have federal interposition by way of injunction or habeas corpus until after the jury comes in, judgment has been appealed from and the case concluded in the state courts." Drury v. Cox, 457 F.2d 764, 764-65 (9th Cir. 1972) (per curiam); see also Sherwood v. Tomkins, 716 F.2d 632, 634 (9th Cir. 1983) (when " appeal of a state criminal conviction is pending, a would-be habeas corpus petitioner must await the outcome of his appeal before his state remedies are exhausted, even where the issue to be challenged in the writ of habeas corpus has been finally settled in the state courts").
Younger abstention is appropriate if three criteria are met: (1) the state proceedings are ongoing; (2) the proceedings implicate important state interests; and (3) the state proceedings provide an adequate opportunity to litigate the plaintiff's federal constitutional claims. See Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432, 102 S.Ct. 2515, 73 L.Ed.2d 116 (1982). The Ninth Circuit has articulated a fourth criterion: that the federal action would " enjoin" the state proceeding " or have the practical effect of doing so." Potrero Hills Landfill, Inc. v. Cnty. of Solano, 657 F.3d 876, 882 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court has noted that " where vital state interests are involved, a federal court should abstain unless state law clearly bars the interposition of the constitutional claims." Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 432 (internal quotation marks omitted). " The pertinent inquiry is whether the state proceedings afford an adequate opportunity to raise the constitutional claims." Id. (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted).
A federal court may properly intervene when a petitioner makes a " showing of bad faith, harassment, or some other extraordinary circumstance that would make abstention inappropriate." Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 435; see Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 85, 91 S.Ct. 674, 27 L.Ed.2d 701 (1971) (" Only in cases of proven harassment or prosecutions undertaken by state officials in bad faith without hope of obtaining a valid conviction and perhaps in other extraordinary circumstances where irreparable injury can be shown is federal injunctive relief against pending state prosecutions appropriate."). Though the list of possible extraordinary circumstances justifying intervention has not been fully articulated, see Baffert v. Cal. Horse Racing Bd., 332 F.3d 613, 621 (9th Cir. 2003), the circumstances must create a " pressing need for immediate federal equitable relief, not merely in the sense of presenting a highly unusual factual situation, " Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 125, 95 S.Ct. 1524, 44 L.Ed.2d 15 (1975).
Here, all criteria for abstention are satisfied. Petitioner's appeal of his convictions remains pending (see Lodged Doc. 3), and criminal proceedings necessarily implicate important state interests, see Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-45. In his response to the OSC, Petitioner asserts that his Petition does not challenge his convictions but rather " the Second Appellate Court['s] erroneous [d]enial of [his] [w]rit of manda[amus], due to [the] unconstitutional mail process at Los Angeles County Jail, which [he] had no ability to correct." (OSC Resp. at 1; see also Lodged Docs. 5 & 6 (state court of appeal denying habeas petitions).) He claims that even though he explained to the state appellate court that its order asking for a response from him was delivered to him late because of the jail's mail policy and that he therefore could not timely respond to it, the court nonetheless denied the writ. (OSC Resp. at 3-5.) But this Court may not intervene before Petitioner's state convictions are final simply because the state appellate court has already rejected his claims. See Sherwood, 716 F.2d at 634. Moreover, as the Magistrate Judge observed in her OSC, the proper mechanism to contest the conditions of his incarceration including the LA County Jail's mail policy is a civil-rights action, not a habeas petition. See Badea v. Cox, 931 F.2d 573, 574 (9th Cir. 1991).
Although the Court has authority to construe a habeas petition as a civil-rights action, see Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249, 251, 92 S.Ct. 407, 30 L.Ed.2d 418 (1971) (per curiam), superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized in Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 84, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006), it would not be appropriate to do so here because Petitioner's trust statement was not signed or certified (see Pet. at 14); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2) (requiring certified copy of trust account statement for civil action brought in forma pauperis). Moreover, Petitioner has already filed a civil-rights action raising substantially similar claims. See Turner v. Flannigan, No. 15-cv-0614-MMM (JPR) (C.D. Cal. filed Jan. 12, 2015). It remains pending.
Petitioner has not explained why he is in need of immediate equitable relief or what extraordinary circumstance warrants the Court's intervention. (See generally OSC Resp. at 1-7.) Nothing about Petitioner's underlying claim that his trial judge should have recused himself under California Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6 (id. at 1-2) makes apparent why any error cannot be corrected on appeal. In any event, his claim appears to be based only on state statutory law and thus is not even cognizable on federal habeas review. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68, 112 S.Ct. 475, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991) (holding that federal habeas relief will not lie to correct errors in state court's interpretation or application of state law).
In an effort to show that extraordinary circumstances exist, Petitioner contends that the officer who oversees legal mail delivered his mail two days late " with malice [sic] intent to hinder petitioner in his appeal." (OSC Resp. at 3.) He alleges that the jail is " d[e]liberately ind[i]fferent to the time sensitive deadlines." (Id. at 4 (internal quotation marks omitted).) The bad-faith and harassment exceptions to Younger abstention are narrow. See Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 611-12, 95 S.Ct. 1200, 43 L.Ed.2d 482 (1975). They require more than mere conclusory allegations. Canatella v. California, 404 F.3d 1106, 1112 (9th Cir. 2005). But that is all Petitioner has provided. Petitioner argues that the delayed mail violates his constitutional right of access to the courts. (OSC Resp. at 3.) But Petitioner has timely appealed his state convictions, and that appeal remains pending. (See Pet. at 4; Lodged Doc. 3.) In fact, Petitioner's repeated filings in state court and his instant Petition demonstrate that he has not been deprived of access to the courts. See Conway v. Oliver, 429 F.2d 1307, 1308 (9th Cir. 1970) (per curiam) (finding that prisoner prosecuting § 1983 action was not deprived of access to courts based on his numerous court filings). In any event, any such claim is better made in a § 1983 lawsuit.
Indeed, to support his claim, Petitioner cites numerous cases brought under § 1983. (See OSC Resp. at 3-4); Trujillo v. Williams, 465 F.3d 1210, 1214-15, 1226 (10th Cir. 2006) (§ 1983 suit by inmate for delayed delivery of legal materials and lack of access to out-of-state legal materials); Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 579-80, 118 S.Ct. 1584, 140 L.Ed.2d 759 (1998) (§ 1983 suit by inmate for jail's alleged diversion of legal materials); Brewer v. Wilkinson, 3 F.3d 816, 817-18 (5th Cir. 1993) (§ 1983 suit by inmates against jail's mail staff for opening and inspecting legal mail outside their presence); Ching v. Lewis, 895 F.2d 608, 609 (9th Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (§ 1983 suit by inmate for, among other things, access to prison law library and courts).
Finally, Petitioner argues that the appellate court acted in bad faith by denying his motion for reconsideration. (OSC Resp. at 4-6.) Petitioner appears to accuse the appellate court of defrauding him by " deliberate concealment of material information in a setting of fiduciary obligation." (Id. at 5.) Although abstention is not appropriate when a state tribunal is incompetent by reason of bias, see Hirsh v. Justices of S.Ct. of Cal., 67 F.3d 708, 713 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam), Petitioner does not provide any specific facts substantiating his allegations against the appellate court, see Kenneally v. Lungren, 967 F.2d 329, 333 (9th Cir. 1992) (" one who alleges bias must overcome a presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving as adjudicators" (internal quotation marks omitted)). Thus, abstention is appropriate here.
Petitioner's circumstances do not create an immediate need for federal equitable relief. As long as his appeal remains pending in state court, his convictions or sentence may be overturned. Accordingly, the Petition must be dismissed. See World Famous Drinking Emporium, Inc. v. City of Tempe, 820 F.2d 1079, 1081 (9th Cir. 1987) (as amended) (" When a case falls within the proscription of Younger, a district court must dismiss the federal action.").
The Court notes that it might not be in Petitioner's best interest for the Court to consider his Petition on the merits. Were it to do so, any subsequent habeas petition filed after his convictions became final would presumably be second or successive and would require the Ninth Circuit's permission to file. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b).
ORDER
IT THEREFORE IS ORDERED that Petitioner's Petition is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The Clerk is directed to administratively close this case.
JUDGMENT
Pursuant to the Order Dismissing Habeas Petition Without Prejudice and Administratively Closing Case, IT IS HEREBY ADJUDGED that this action is dismissed without prejudice.