TURNER COMM v. OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY, ETC

7 Citing cases

  1. D S Grading Co., Inc v. Secretary of Labor

    899 F.2d 1145 (11th Cir. 1990)   Cited 11 times

    Substantial evidence in the record supports the ALJ's findings that D S committed each of these violations, so we must uphold the Commission's adoption of those findings. 29 U.S.C.A. § 660(a); Daniel International v. OSHRC, 683 F.2d 361, 363 (11th Cir. 1982); Cleveland Consolidated, Inc. v. OSHRC, 649 F.2d 1160, 1167 (5th Cir. 1981); H.B. Zachry Co. v. OSHRC, 638 F.2d 812, 815 (5th Cir. 1981); Turner Communications Corp. v. OSHRC, 612 F.2d 941, 944 (5th Cir. 1980); Accu-Namics, Inc. v. OSHRC, 515 F.2d 828, 834-35 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 903, 96 S.Ct. 1492, 47 L.Ed.2d 752 (1976). The more perplexing issues are whether the violations were properly classified as "serious" and "repeated" and whether the penalties were appropriate. A careful review of the record reveals that the ALJ was correct in making these decisions as well.

  2. S H Riggers Erectors v. Occupational

    659 F.2d 1273 (5th Cir. 1981)   Cited 34 times
    Holding that the standard requiring "appropriate personal protective equipment in all operations where there is an exposure to hazardous conditions" required proof of a hazard

    We have previously recognized that although § 1926.28(a) refers only to the "wearing" of personal protective equipment, "merely wearing safety equipment, but not using it, does not comply with [ § 1926.28(a)]," Turner Communications Corp. v. OSHRC, 612 F.2d 941, 944 (5th Cir. 1980), and "that a `safety belt is only used as a safety device when it is both worn and attached by a lanyard or lifeline to a stationary object.'" Marshall v. Southwestern Industrial Contractors Riggers, Inc., 576 F.2d 42, 44 (5th Cir. 1978).

  3. J.D. Abrams, L.P. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n

    No. 22-60610 (5th Cir. Apr. 15, 2024)

    In short, Abrams fails to show that the ALJ abused its "wide discretion to exclude irrelevant or otherwise inadmissible evidence". UNF W., Inc. v. NLRB, 844 F.3d 451, 463 (5th Cir. 2016); see also Turner Commc'ns Corp. v. OSHRC, 612 F.2d 941, 945-46 (5th Cir. 1980) (rejecting petitioner's contention that ALJ improperly excluded irrelevant evidence). Accordingly, Abrams fails to show evidence compelling "a conclusion contrary to the" ALJ's.

  4. J.L. Foti Construction Co. v. Donovan

    786 F.2d 714 (6th Cir. 1986)   Cited 18 times

    Petitioner argues that the inspector's "speculative" testimony was insufficient to sustain the Secretary's burden of proving the violation by a preponderance of the evidence. However, "the Secretary may prove his case on the basis of testimony of an OSHA inspector's `presumed expertise to estimate lengths [and] distances . . . rather than making measurements . . . with instruments. . . .'" Turner Communications Corp. v. OSHRC, 612 F.2d 941, 945 (5th Cir. 1980) (quoting Stephenson Enterprises, Inc. v. Marshall, 578 F.2d 1021, 1026 (5th Cir. 1978)). The ALJ's finding on this issue is supported by substantial evidence.

  5. Brock v. L.R. Willson Sons, Inc.

    773 F.2d 1377 (D.C. Cir. 1985)   Cited 25 times
    Holding that remand is unnecessary when only one conclusion is supportable on the record

    The exterior fall hazard in this case does not, however, fall within the category of de minimis violations because it has a direct and immediate relationship to safety. See infra at 1388-89; see also Turner Communications Corp. v. OSHRC, 612 F.2d 941, 944-45 (5th Cir. 1980) (violation which is serious is not de minimis). This court has not applied the "substantial portion of the work day" test of impracticability when no protection has been provided against exterior falls; thus, we recently affirmed a citation under § .105(a) without discussing the test or the duration of the hazard.

  6. Ray Evers Welding v. Occupational Safety

    625 F.2d 726 (6th Cir. 1980)   Cited 26 times
    Concluding that negligence of industry in not providing safety equipment for employees must be proven

    This action was known by the lead crewman, who had responsibility for assuring compliance with the company's policy that employees should tie off when working at heights above four feet.Turner Communications Corp. v. OSHA Review Comm'n., 612 F.2d 941, at 944 (5th Cir. 1980). Contrary views have been expressed in Bristol Steel Iron Works, Inc. v. OSHA Review Comm'n., 601 F.2d 717 (4th Cir. 1979), and Hoffman Construction Co. v. OSHA Review Comm'n., 546 F.2d 281 (9th Cir. 1976).

  7. Diaz v. R & A Consultants

    579 S.W.3d 460 (Tex. App. 2019)   Cited 5 times

    25 Tex.Admin.Code § 295.47(a)(2). In the construction setting, a fall arresting device has long been referenced as a PPE. SeeTurner Commun. Corp. v. Occupational Safety and Health Rev. Commn. , 612 F.2d 941, 944 (5th Cir. 1980). Fall prevention devices are part of PPE in the OSHA regulations.