Sundae v. Anderson, 103 Fed.Appx. 60, 61 (8th Cir. 2004); see Singh v. Reed, 551 F. App'x. 927, 929 (9th Cir. 2014); Turkish v. Brody, 221 So.3d 1206, 1214 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016).

Florida courts have contemplated unjust enrichment claims in the trust context before. See Turkish v. Brody, 221 So. 3d 1206, 1208 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016). Plaintiff has alleged enough facts to support this claim.

We have also considered plaintiffs’ foreign caselaw and opine that none of the cited cases is persuasive. This case does not involve worthless promissory notes, like in Turkish v Brody, 221 So.3d 1206, 1215 (Fla. App., 2016), an outright lie that inspections had been conducted that had not in fact been conducted, like in Meyers v First Tennessee Bank, 503 S.W.3d 365, 381-382 (Tenn App, 2016), or a plaintiff who did not even know that a trust existed, like in Techner v Greenberg, 553 F Appx 495, 499 (C.A.6, 2014). However, we conclude that the account statements in this case adequately disclosed the potential breach-of-trust claims to plaintiffs.

We have also considered plaintiffs' foreign caselaw and opine that none of these cases are persuasive. This case does not involve worthless promissory notes, like in Turkish v Brody, 221 So.3d 1206, 1215 (Fla App, 2016), an outright lie that inspections had been conducted that had not in fact been conducted, like in Meyers v First Tennessee Bank, 503 S.W.3d 365, 381-382 (Tenn App, 2016), or a plaintiff who did not even know that a trust existed, like in Techner v Greenberg, 553 Fed.Appx. 495, 499 (CA 6, 2014). However, we conclude that the account statements in this case adequately disclosed the potential breach of trust claims to plaintiffs.

We conclude that a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the parties intended for Cabanas to be personally liable on the notes, precludes the entry of summary judgment. See Turkish v. Brody, 221 So. 3d 1206, 1216 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016) (reversing summary judgment in favor of estate seeking to collect on promissory notes when genuine issues of material fact exist to determine decedent's intent and personal representative's waiver); see also Walker v. Smith, 257 F. Supp. 2d 691, 698 (S.D. N.Y. 2003) (confirming that a corporate officer signing an instrument on behalf of the corporation is not liable personally, even in a circumstance when the name of the corporation on the instrument is mis-identified). We, therefore, reverse that portion of the summary judgment finding Cabanas liable on the promissory notes, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.