The defendants rely upon cases in which estoppel was applied against a municipality that issued, and later attempted to revoke, building permits. See Aranosian Oil Co. v. City of Portsmouth, 136 N.H. 57, 60, 612 A.2d 357, 359 (1992); Turco v. Town of Barnstead, 136 N.H. 256, 263, 615 A.2d 1237, 1240 (1992). The permits issued in Aranosian and Turco conveyed vested rights that could be reasonably relied upon by the landowner in the future.
[7] The Nelsons bear the burden of proving the elements of their estoppel claim; we will uphold the trial court's denial of that claim "unless it is unsupported by the evidence or erroneous as a matter of law." Turco v. Town of Barnstead, 136 N.H. 256, 261, 615 A.2d 1237, 1239 (1992) (quotation omitted). Despite their assertions, the Nelsons did not prove that any agent of the town ever represented that the town would allow them to cover more than twenty percent of their lot with impervious surfaces in contravention of the 1990 conservation amendment.
RSA 674:41 states that "no building shall be erected on any lot within any part of the municipality nor shall a building permit be issued for the erection of a building unless the street giving access to the lot" meets one of several conditions. RSA 674:41, I; see also Turco v. Town of Barnstead, 136 N.H. 256, 265 (1992) ("This court has held that the statute applies with equal force to building permits and subdivision permits.").
RSA 674:41, I. Although, by its plain language, the statute addresses only the issuance of building permits, "[t]his court has held that the statute applies with equal force to building permits and subdivision permits." Turco v. Town of Barnstead, 136 N.H. 256, 265 (1992). Significantly, nothing in RSA 674:41 prevents a planning board from considering a subdivision proposal with lots that do not satisfy the street access requirement of the statute.
Under New Hampshire law, the State is not estopped by an unauthorized statement of its official. Turco v. Town of Barnstead, 136 N.H. 256, 262, 615 A.2d 1237 (1992) ; City of Concord, 124 N.H. at 468, 471 A.2d 1152. "We have long recognized that all private parties dealing with government officials are charged with notice of the extent and limits of their authority."
Moreover, while we have never directly addressed the issue, it is unclear whether and by what authority the board is vested with the power to grant the petitioner membership in the plan through the use of equitable remedies such as estoppel. See Appeal of Somersworth School Dist., 142 N.H. 837, 841 (1998) (holding that it was erroneous for public employee labor relations board to use equitable remedy to include employee in collective bargaining agreement); cf. Turco v. Town of Barnstead, 136 N.H. 256, 264 (1992) (determining that supreme court and superior court have equitable powers and can grant equitable remedies). As the majority correctly states, equitable estoppel "serves to forbid one to speak against his own act, representations, or commitments to the injury of one to whom they were directed and who reasonably relied thereon."
Although the PELRB may issue cease and desist orders, see RSA 273-A:6, III, VI (1987 Supp. 1997); State Empl. Ass'n v. Board of Trustees, 118 N.H. 466, 468-69, 388 A.2d 203, 204-05 (1978), the statute does not give it the ability to grant all equitable remedies. See RSA 273-A:7 (1987) (the PELRB must petition superior court for an injunction if needed to compel compliance with an order); cf. RSA 498:1 (1997) ("[t]he superior court shall have the powers of a court of equity" in particular cases); Turco v. Town of Barnstead, 136 N.H. 256, 264, 615 A.2d 1237, 1241 (1992) (determining that supreme court and superior court have equitable powers and can grant equitable remedies). As such, the PELRB loses subject matter jurisdiction over this case once it is determined that Tuttle, by virtue of his failure to satisfy the terms of the recognition clause, is not subject to the collective bargaining agreement as ratified by the PELRB. Certainly, the PELRB could have included Tuttle in the bargaining unit had a petition to modify been filed.
Healey v. Town of New Durham, 140 N.H. 232, 239-40, 665 A.2d 360, 367 (1995). They have not asserted that the town's representations concerning the status of the road prejudiced them in any way. Cf. Turco v. Town of Barnstead, 136 N.H. 256, 263, 615 A.2d 1237, 1240 (1992) (plaintiffs spent approximately $67,000 in reliance on representation); Aranosian Oil Co. v. City of Portsmouth, 136 N.H. 57, 60, 612 A.2d 357, 359 (1992) (plaintiff spent $45,000 in reliance on representation). Next, we determine that the town meeting vote established the segment of the road at issue as a discontinued road subject to gates and bars. RSA 229:5, VII; RSA 231:45.
[2] Although municipal corporations may indeed be subject to estoppel, the law does not favor its application against municipalities. Turco v. Town of Barnstead, 136 N.H. 256, 261, 615 A.2d 1237, 1239 (1992). This is especially true when a valuable public interest may be jeopardized by applying the doctrine of estoppel against the municipality.