We are entirely unconvinced by the thesis, advanced in the dissenting opinion, that the employee's testimony should be discredited because the weight of the conflicting medical testimony allegedly reveals "physical facts which speak the truth unerringly" concerning the extent and effect of employee's injuries. Such "physical facts" in Turay v. Allied Enterprises, Inc., 256 N.W.2d 71 (Minn. 1977) were X-rays which identified beyond doubt which knee an employee had injured in a work-related accident; we held the X-rays to be medical evidence which controlled decision there. In our view, conflicting medical opinions cannot rationally be viewed as deserving of the certainty accorded X-rays.

The majority opinion is a comprehensive, excellent factual analysis of the record. However, because it is a factual matter, we are departing from our longstanding rule of not substituting our view of the facts for that of the Workers' Compensation Court of Appeals. This is not a case of a factual error such as occurred in Turay v. Allied Enterprises, Inc., 256 N.W.2d 71 (Minn. 1977). There we reversed a decision awarding compensation for injury to a right knee where the record disclosed medical treatment to the left knee.

Thus, if employee's testimony about the 1973 incident is accepted, the finding of causal relation between employee's work-related injuries and his disability has substantial support in the evidence. Relying on Turay v. Allied Enterprise, 256 N.W.2d 71 (Minn. 1977) relators insist that employee's testimony about the 1973 injury is not credible. They point out that the first report of injury and physician's report describe neither a shoulder injury nor the incident to which employee testified; that an osteopath whom employee saw in November 1973 and several times thereafter treated both shoulders but most often the right one; and that neither the osteopath nor Dr. Steiner recorded a history of the 1973 incident. Unlike Turay, however, no objective evidence conclusively disproves employee's testimony.

Feb. 5, 1985). It claims Exhibit M was speculative because the exhibit erroneously assumed a 1% per month increase in the CPI. Since the first three years of the lease did not establish an inflation rate of 1% per month, appellant asserts the entire exhibit was speculative. See Turay v. Allied Enterprises, Inc., 256 N.W.2d 71, 74 (Minn. 1977) ("Facts, proven to the point of demonstration, control as against mere declarations of witnesses"). Appellant did not object to the introduction of Exhibit M, however, and we need only consider whether the record supports the trial court's finding.