Opinion
CIVIL ACTION Case No. 00-2511-JAR
August 20, 2002
MEMORANDUM ORDER AND OPINION DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
Plaintiff Ted Tungol brought this action against the defendant Certainteed Corporation ("Certainteed"), his employer, alleging discrimination on the basis of race, national origin and age. The court partially granted Certainteed's motion for summary judgment and dismissed plaintiff's claims for national origin and age discrimination for his 1999 performance review and the May 2000 failure to promote; his race, national origin and age discrimination claims for failure to promote in 1999; and his claims that Certainteed retaliated against him by demoting him and giving him an unsatisfactory performance review in May 1999. The case was tried to a jury and at the close of plaintiff's evidence, the court ruled in favor of Certainteed's motion for judgment as a matter of law on plaintiff's claims of discrimination based on the 1998 and 1999 performance reviews and plaintiff's remaining age claim based on his alleged demotion. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Certainteed on plaintiff's remaining claims of discrimination against him on the basis of national origin and race when it demoted him, of discrimination on the basis of race by failing to promote him in May of 2000 and of retaliation by failing to promote him.
This matter is presently before the court on the plaintiff's motion for a new trial (Doc. 105). Plaintiff requests that the court grant a new trial and set aside the verdict of the jury for three reasons: (1) judgment as a matter of law was improperly entered at the close of plaintiff's evidence on his claims of national origin and race discrimination on his 1998 and 1999 performance reviews; (2) the jury's verdict was against the weight of the evidence; and (3) summary judgment should not have been entered on plaintiff's claims of race and national origin discrimination.
Standards
Although captioned as a motion for new trial, plaintiff also requests the court to alter or amend its judgment. A motion to alter or amend judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e) may be granted only when there has been a manifest error of law or fact, when new evidence has been discovered or when there has been a change in the relevant law. A party cannot invoke Rule 59(e) to raise arguments or evidence that should have been raised in the first instance or to rehash arguments previously considered and rejected by the court. Whether to grant or deny a motion to reconsider is committed to the district court's sound discretion.
All West Pet Supply Co. v. Hill's Pet Prods. Div., Colgate Palmolive Co., 847 F. Supp. 858, 860 (D.Kan. 1994).
See id.; Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Botkin Grain Co., 856 F. Supp. 607, 609 (D.Kan. 1994).
Henry v. Office of Thrift Supervision, No. 92-4272, 1993 WL 545195, at *1 (D.Kan. Dec. 28, 1993) (citing Hancock v. City of Oklahoma City, 857 F.2d 1394, 1395 (10th Cir. 1988).
Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(a) authorizes a court to grant a new trial "for any of the reasons for which new trials have heretofore been granted in actions at law in the courts of the United States." Motions for a new trial are committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. In reviewing a motion for a new trial, the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party. Moreover, motions for a new trial are generally regarded with disfavor and "should only be granted with great caution." A party moving for a new trial based upon an error of law must show that the error affected the substantial rights of the parties; alleged errors that do not affect the essential fairness of the trial should be ignored.
McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 556 (1984); Hinds v. General Motors Corp., 988 F.2d 1039, 1046 (10th Cir. 1993).
Griffin v. Strong, 983 F.2d 1544, 1546 (10th Cir. 1993).
United Phosphorous, Ltd. v. Midland Fumigant, Inc., 21 F. Supp.2d 1247, 1250 (D.Kan. 1998) (quoting United States v. Thornbrugh, 962 F.2d 1438, 1443 (10th Cir. 1992)).
Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. P.B. Hoidale Co., Inc., 804 F. Supp. 137, 141 (D.Kan. 1992).
Judgment as a Matter of Law
Plaintiff argues that judgment as a matter of law should not have been granted at the close of his evidence. Judgment as a matter of law "should be cautiously and sparingly granted," and is appropriate "only if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, points but one way and is susceptible to no reasonable inferences supporting the nonmoving party." Such judgment is proper only when "the evidence so strongly supports an issue that reasonable minds could not differ."In granting Certainteed's motion for judgment as a matter of law, the court held that plaintiff failed to make a prima facie case of discrimination regarding his 1998 and 1999 performance reviews. In order to state a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADEA, Title VII or § 1981, a plaintiff must show that: (1) he was a member of a protected class; (2) he experienced adverse employment action; and (3) similarly situated non-minorities were treated more favorably. The court ruled that while plaintiff established the first two elements, he failed to establish that similarly situated non-minorities and individuals under the age of 40 were treated more favorably. Plaintiff requests a new trial on the issue of race and national origin discrimination, but not his claim of age discrimination.
Bullington v. United Air Lines, Inc., 186 F.3d 1301, 1315-16 (10th Cir. 1999).
Plaintiff testified at trial that he did not know whether others employed by Certainteed received "2" ratings on their evaluation. Plaintiff's witness, Joe Patterson, testified that Eric Schramm, plaintiff's supervisor, had also given him a lower rating for his 1998 work performance than he had received in previous years. Patterson is Caucasian, American-born and under the age of 40 at the time of the evaluation. Plaintiff's evidence regarding the 1999 evaluation was similarly speculative. Because plaintiff offered no evidence to suggest that similarly situated younger non-minorities were treated more favorably, he failed to state a prima facie case of discrimination based on his 1998 and 1999 evaluations. The court denies plaintiff's request for a new trial on this basis.
Jury Verdict
Plaintiff argues that the jury verdict was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. A jury's verdict is entitled to great deference. It is within the jury's province to assess the credibility of witnesses and determine the weight to be given to their testimony. Conflicting evidence does not justify setting aside a jury's verdict.
Beck v. Northern Natural Gas Co., 170 F.3d 1018, 1022 (10th Cir. 1999).
See Dugan v. EMS Helicopters, Inc., 915 F.2d 1428, 1430 (10th Cir. 1990).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, the court concludes that the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict in favor of Certainteed. More specifically, sufficient evidence was presented at trial from which the jury could conclude that (1) plaintiff's transfer to the Senior Process Engineer position in May 1999 was not a demotion; (2) Certainteed's decision to transfer plaintiff was not based upon his race or national origin; and (3) Certainteed's failure to promote plaintiff in May 2000 was not in retaliation for complaining about race discrimination.
See Lampkin v. International Union, 154 F.3d 1136, 1143 (10th Cir. 1998).
The evidence at trial showed that the Senior Process Engineer position was the same grade level as plaintiff's Senior Project Engineer position and that his salary and benefits did not change as a result of his reassignment. Although plaintiff considered his new position to be a demotion because he was required to perform manual labor, the evidence showed that manual labor was not required and was union work.
Additionally, the evidence showed that as a result of the completion of K-21's construction, Certainteed's needs with respect to project engineers had changed and that plaintiff was not the only employee affected. The evidence supported Certainteed's legitimate reasons for transferring plaintiff; other project engineers hired after plaintiff's transfer were for higher level positions than plaintiff's. Certainteed investigated the allegations raised in plaintiff's memo of March 26, 1999, and again in his formal charges of discrimination. Further, evidence was presented that plaintiff was not qualified for promotion to the Principal Project Engineer position.
The court finds that the jury's verdict was not clearly, decidedly or overwhelmingly against the weight of the evidence. The court denies plaintiff's request for a new trial or relief from judgment on this basis.
Summary Judgment
Plaintiff contends that he is entitled to a new trial because a genuine issue of material fact existed with regard to his 1999 failure to promote claim and his retaliation claim based on the transfer to process engineering, the 1999 failure to promote and the 1999 performance evaluation.
Plaintiff is not requesting a new trial on the court's ruling that he failed to exhaust his administrative remedied under the ADEA and Title VII nor his May 1999 failure to promote claim under the ADEA.
After review, the court finds plaintiff's arguments advocating reconsideration of its order partially granting Certainteed summary judgment are merely restatements of arguments previously considered and rejected by the court. While plaintiff disagrees with the court's conclusions, his arguments fail to convince the court that reconsideration of its previous decision is warranted. Pursuant to the review standard set forth above, the court declines to revisit issues fully adjudicated by the court in the absence of any showing of manifest error or mistake. For these reasons, plaintiff's motion shall be denied.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiff's motion for new trial (Doc. 105) is DENIED.
Copies of this order shall be mailed to all counsel of record and plaintiff.