This position cannot be maintained under the previous decisions of this court. The County Government Act never has used the phrase "a lump sum" and this nomenclature was introduced into our legal literature in connection with the alleged unconstitutionality of the County Government Act in providing in some counties for deputies to be paid by the county and in others that all deputies should be paid by the principal, it being contended that this differentiation destroyed the uniformity of county government required by the constitution ( Tulare County v. May, 118 Cal. 303 [ 50 P. 427]). The question involved in the case at bar was decided against the petitioner, in principle at least, in 1892 in the case of Dougherty v. Austin, 94 Cal. 601 [ 16 L.R.A. 161, 28 P. 834, 29 P. 1092].

In thus classifying county officers by these two methods of compensation, the legislature has kept within the limits of its constitutional powers, because "under either rule a compensation proportionate to duties may be secured." ( Tulare County v. May, 118 Cal. 303, 308 [50 P. 427, 429].) In counties where the "lump sum" system prevails, any increase after the election of a county officer of the gross amount allowed him for the compensation of himself and deputies necessarily would work an increase in his compensation during his term of office, in violation of section 9 of article XI of the constitution.

(Art. XI, §§ 12 and 13; see Tulare County v. May, 118 Cal. 303, 308-309 [50 P. 427]; Banaz v. Smith, 133 Cal. 102, 103 [ 65 P. 309]; Los Angeles County v. Superior Court, supra at 712; Peppin, Municipal Home Rule in California, 34 Cal.L.Rev. 644, 676-690.)

See, also, State v. Blair, 209 Iowa 229, 223 N.W. 555. To the same effect is People v. Gomez, 118 Cal. 326, 50 P. 427. We think the trial court properly submitted to the jury the matter of determining whether defendant committed a simple assault should they find him not guilty of the graver offense charged.

This suggestion requires a reconsideration of some of the fundamental principles involved in the question. It was definitely determined in the case of Tulare County v. May, 118 Cal. 303 [ 50 P. 427], that the system by which in some counties officers were paid in a lump sum and in other counties were paid a certain stipend and were allowed a certain number of deputies to be paid directly from the county treasury, did not destroy the uniformity of county government within the meaning of article XI, section 4, of the constitution. In other words, it was there decided that the legislature could provide both schemes, for the compensation of county officers and their deputies.

Section 5, article XI, of the constitution requires that the legislature shall provide by general and uniform laws for the election or appointment of county officers and shall regulate their compensation. It was held in Tulare County v. May, 118 Cal. 303 [50 P. 427], that the compensation of officers by means of the two systems referred to in Newman v. Lester,supra, did not destroy the uniformity of county government required by this section. No matter which system is followed, the compensation in each case is for the performance of the duties of the particular office, whether they be performed by the officer or by his deputies or assistants.

Likewise, the statute upheld in the case of Board of Law Library Trustees v. Board of Supervisors, 99 Cal. 571, [34 P. 244], left to the election of the different counties the matter of the establishment of law libraries, but such institutions are not part of the system of county government, at least in so far as the execution of "political functions" is concerned, and, consequently, the point here presented was not discussed in that case. In Tulare County v. May, 118 Cal. 303, [50 P. 427], the act provided for one additional deputy sheriff and two deputy clerks in any county in which an additional judge of the superior court was created by the legislature. This provision was valid, for, as stated in the opinion, it operated in each county alike upon the creation of an additional judge in that county by the legislature.

Where the statute provides a fixed salary for an officer and fixed salaries for deputies, all payable out of the county treasury, a subsequent law increasing the compensation of the deputies or their number will take effect at once. (Tulare County v. May, 118 Cal. 304, [50 P. 427]; Newman v. Lester, 11 Cal.App. 577, [ 105 P. 785].) The facts of this case, however, do not bring it within the exception announced by the cases last cited.

Under these circumstances and in view of the principles heretofore stated, we must conclude that the provisions made by the legislature in other acts, or in other sections of the same act, regulating the compensation of officers in other classes of counties, cannot be referred to or taken into consideration for the purpose of determining from them that the provisions relating to the townships in this class of counties are unconstitutional because special, or local, or not uniform with those adopted for the other classes. This proposition was practically decided in Tulare County v. May, 118 Cal. 308, [50 P. 427]. The same doctrine has been announced by this court in other cases and with respect to other subjects.

The legislature cannot classify counties for any other than the sole purpose of fixing the compensation of officers. (Const., art. XI, sec. 5; Longan v. Solano County , 65 Cal. 122; Miller v. Kister , 68 Cal. 142; San Luis Obispo County v. Graves , 84 Cal. 75; Welsh v. Bramlet , 98 Cal. 219; Turner v. Siskiyou County , 109 Cal. 332; Bloss v. Lewis , 109 Cal. 493; Kahn v. Sutro , 114 Cal. 316; El Dorado Co. v. Meiss , 100 Cal. 268; Tulare Co. v. May , 118 Cal. 303.) The acts in question are local and special, and based upon an arbitrary classification.