Opinion
Case No. 6:03-cv-1782-Orl-22JGG.
April 7, 2004
ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
This cause comes before the Court for consideration of Defendant Canaveral Port Authority's Motion to Dismiss Complaint (Doc. 6), filed January 6, 2004, and Plaintiff Tugz International L.L.C.'s Memorandum (Doc. 10) in opposition thereto. Upon considering the parties' submissions, the Court determines that the motion is due to be denied.
II. BACKGROUND
Tugz International L.L.C. ("Tugz") is an Ohio limited liability company in the business of providing tug and towing services at deep-water ports. Canaveral Port Authority ("CPA"), a port district and a special taxing district of the State of Florida, owns and operates Port Canaveral. Port Canaveral is a busy cruise and cargo port located on the Atlantic Ocean in Brevard County, Florida.
By means of the present lawsuit, Tugz sues CPA for allegedly depriving Tugz of its "right to engage in interstate and/or foreign commerce free from state interference, a right secured by Article I, § 8, cl. 3 of the United States Constitution, commonly known as the Commerce Clause." Complaint (Doc. 1), ¶ 1, at 1. More specifically, Tugz asserts that CPA "has violated the Commerce Clause by granting an exclusive franchise to a single in-state provider of tug and towing services, Seabulk Towing, Inc. (`Seabulk'), located in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, and excluding all competing providers from access to the local market served by Seabulk, including Tugz." Id. Tugz further alleges:
Defendant CPA has already been found by the Federal Maritime Commission ("Commission") and by Administrative Law Judge Michael A. Rosas to have violated various provisions of the Shipping Act of 1984, 46 U.S.C. App. § 1701 et seq., a federal law promulgated to ensure free and open competition in this nation's seaports, by unreasonably refusing to consider or act on Tugz's application for the opportunity to provide tug and towing services at Port Canaveral and by giving an unreasonable preference or advantage to Seabulk. The facts found by the Commission and by Judge Rosas also establish both Defendant's violation of the Commerce Clause and the injury inflicted on Tugz thereby.Id., ¶ 2, at 2.
Tugz brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The company seeks actual and punitive damages, injunctive and declaratory relief, costs and attorneys' fees, and "[s]uch other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper." Doc. 1 at 16.
III. CPA'S MOTION TO DISMISS
CPA raises a number of grounds for dismissal.
First, CPA argues that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this action. CPA characterizes this case as "nothing more than a Shipping Act action disguised as a Commerce Clause claim" and argues that the Federal Maritime Commission ("FMC") has exclusive jurisdiction over Shipping Act claims. Doc. 6 at 3. Alternatively, CPA asserts that if the FMC does not have exclusive jurisdiction over this matter, it at least has primary jurisdiction over Tugz's claims. In either event, maintains CPA, the case does not belong in federal court and should be dismissed.
In its supporting legal memorandum, CPA characterizes this case as "nothing more than an antitrust action disguised as a Commerce Clause claim," which it contends is barred by 46 U.S.C. App. § 1706. Doc. 7 at 6.
Next, CPA contends Tugz's claims are time-barred. Again, this argument is founded on the proposition that Tugz's claims are actually Shipping Act claims in sheep's clothing. Consequently, maintains CPA, the Shipping Act's three year statute of limitations applies, rather than the four year period ordinarily applicable to § 1983 claims.
Finally, CPA argues that Tugz's request for punitive damages must be dismissed based on the contents of ALJ Rosas' written decision attached to the Complaint. In that regard, CPA cites Judge Rosa's finding, for purposes of determining whether CPA should be assessed maximum civil penalties, that the company did not "knowingly and willfully" violate the Shipping Act. Noting Tugz's reliance on Judge Rosas' decision in other respects for collateral estoppel purposes, CPA maintains the "willfulness" finding mandates dismissal of Tugz's punitive damages claim.
IV. TUGZ'S OPPOSITION MEMORANDUM
Responding to the motion to dismiss, Tugz acknowledges that "[t]here is no private right of action under the Shipping Act enforceable in federal court," but emphatically denies that this is a Shipping Act case. Doc. 10 at 2. Tugz also disputes CPA's characterization of this case as an antitrust action. Rather, states Tugz, "[t]his is a case against a government agency which, under the color of state law, willfully violated the constitutional rights of a private party, and for which that party seeks monetary damages." Id. Tugz maintains § 1983 "squarely comprehends such a claim." Id. Hence, Tugz argues, the constitutional claim it advances in the instant case is independent of the Shipping Act. Essentially asserting a variant on the "master of the pleadings" theme more commonly encountered in the removal context, Tugz argues that CPA is not free to re-characterize its properly-pled Commerce Clause claim as a Shipping Act claim.
Tugz further contends that even though Congress has vested the FMC with exclusive jurisdiction over Shipping Act claims, "that does not mean that the Shipping Act preempts all other claims involving maritime activities, including constitutional claims." Id., at 6. In Tugz's view, it is "self evident that the Shipping Act was never intended to preempt and deprive private parties of their right to monetary damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for constitutional violations simply because the case involves maritime activities." Doc. 10 at 7-8. Tugz also maintains that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not prevent this Court from adjudicating Tugz's constitutional claim.
Turning to the punitive damages question, Tugz argues that (1) it was no longer a party to the proceedings before Judge Rosas when the ALJ made his "willfulness" finding, and therefore it cannot be collaterally estopped; (2) the civil penalties assessed against CPA were actually "punitive in nature;" and (3) Judge Rosas' finding was limited to CPA's conduct as of July 21, 2000, yet CPA committed acts after that date that would support an award of punitive damages.
V. ANALYSIS
The Court rejects CPA's argument that this case actually involves Shipping Act or antitrust claims, rather than a Commerce Clause claim. CPA has not presented any legal authority permitting this Court to recast Tugz's claim in this fashion. Tugz has elected to bring a Commerce Clause claim under § 1983, and CPA does not argue that Tugz has failed to properly plead such a claim under C A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, N.Y., 511 U.S. 383 (1994). The Court thus declines CPA's invitation to disregard Tugz's chosen theory of liability.
This ruling disposes of CPA's statute of limitations argument.
Further, CPA has not cited any statutory or decisional authority providing that the Shipping Act preempts constitutional claims arising from conduct that might also give rise to a claim under the Act. To the contrary, there is authority suggesting a federal court does have the power to consider constitutional claims notwithstanding the Commission's exclusive jurisdiction over certain maritime activities. In that regard, the district court in Pasha Auto Warehousing, Inc. v. Philadelphia Reg'l Port Auth., 1998 WL 188848 *6 (E.D. Pa. 1998) noted: "The Shipping Acts do not give the FMC exclusive jurisdiction over every action involving any marine terminal operator; they only provide exclusive jurisdiction over claims involving possible violation of the Shipping Acts." In a footnote appended to that sentence, the district court further stated: "If the FMC had exclusive jurisdiction over all claims involving marine terminal operators, the court would have been unable to consider Holt's constitutional claims in Holt Cargo Systems, Inc. v. Delaware River Port Authority, Civil Action No. 94-7778." Id. at n. 2.
Additionally, CPA's reliance on Holbrook v. City of Alpharetta, Ga., 112 F.3d 1522 (11th Cir. 1997), is misplaced. In Holbrook, the Eleventh Circuit held that a plaintiff cannot bring a § 1983 action founded solely on violations of the Americans With Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act. 112 F.3d at 1531. Central to that determination was that "both the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA provide extensive, comprehensive remedial frameworks that address every aspect of [the plaintiff's] claims under section 1983." Id. Here, by contrast, Tugz's claims do not arise under a comprehensive statutory scheme; rather, they are derived directly from a provision of the U.S. Constitution. Accordingly, Holbrook is inapposite.
The Court also declines CPA's invitation to dismiss this case on the basis that the FMC has primary jurisdiction over the parties' dispute. To reiterate, Tugz's claim does not arise under the Shipping Act; it derives from the Constitution. It is thus entirely appropriate for this Court, rather than the FMC, to adjudicate Tugz's Commerce Clause claim. See Plaquemines Port, Harbor Terminal Dist. v. Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 838 F.2d 536, 544 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (holding it was "entirely correct" for the FMC to decline to decide whether a tariff violated the tonnage clause of the U.S. Constitution "on the ground that the federal courts provide more appropriate forums for constitutional claims").
Turning to Tugz's punitive damages prayer, the Court determines that CPA has failed to demonstrate that Tugz is legally bound by the "willfulness" determination ALJ Rosas made for the purpose of assessing civil penalties. Further, Judge Rosas' finding addressed conduct as of July 21, 2000, yet Tugz asserts that CPA engaged in acts after that date warranting punitive damages. Under these circumstances, the Court concludes that CPA has failed, at least at this juncture, to demonstrate any basis for dismissing Tugz's request for punitive damages.
VI. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, it is ORDERED that Defendant Canaveral Port Authority's Motion to Dismiss Complaint (Doc. 6), filed January 6, 2004, is DENIED.
DONE and ORDERED in Chambers, in Orlando, Florida this7th day of April, 2004.