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Tufts v. Chamberlain

Superior Court of Maine
Apr 5, 2012
Civil Action RE-11-472 (Me. Super. Apr. 5, 2012)

Opinion

Civil Action RE-11-472

04-05-2012

BERNARD W. TUFTS and JUDITH J. TUFTS, Plaintiffs v. NORMAN G. CHAMBERLAIN II, TAHLIA CHAMBERLAIN, MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEM (MERS), And TD BANKNORTH, N.A., Defendants


Joyce A. Wheeler, Justice

JOINDER ORDER

This case is set for hearing on the Defendants' (Norman G. and Tahlia Chamberlain) Motion for Joinder. The Plaintiffs have requested a hearing in response to the court's December 19, 2011 order; however, the parties have been unable to attend a hearing at any of the times offered by the court. To avoid unnecessary further delay, the court will now proceed to rule on this motion without a hearing.

BACKGROUND

This case is in essence a boundary dispute. The Plaintiffs have brought claims for quiet title and declaratory judgment against the Chamberlains, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. and TD Banknorth, N.A. (the Chamberlains' mortgagees), and for trespass against the Chamberlains only. The Chamberlains have counterclaimed against the Tufts, Auburn Savings Bank ("Auburn") and Mortgage Electronic Registration System, Inc. ("MERS") bringing counts under the declaratory judgment act seeking declarations, in the alternative, for deeded ownership, prescriptive easement, adverse possession and for trespass (as against the Tufts counterclaim defendants only) and unjust enrichment. The Defendants have also brought a Motion for Joinder, under M.R. Civ. P 19, in order to join Auburn and MERS as counterclaim defendants.

DISCUSSION

The Defendants move for joinder of Auburn and MERS because Auburn holds a mortgage on the Plaintiffs property, recorded in the Cumberland County Registry of Deeds, Book 26175, Page 7, and MERS is the nominee of Residential Mortgage Services, Inc., also holder of a mortgage on the Plaintiffs' property recorded in the Cumberland County Registry of Deeds in Book 26857, Page 172.

There is no indication as to why Residential Mortgage Services, Inc. has not been joined.

Under M.R. Civ. P. 19(a), a party that is subject to service of process must be joined if complete relief cannot be attained between the existing parties in the absence of the party to be joined or the party to be joined claims an interest in the subject matter of the action and their absence may as a practical matter impede their ability to protect that interest or leave one of the parties subject to substantial risk of inconsistent of multiple obligations. The first part of this rule is designated to protect those who are already parties by forcing all those with an interest in the litigation to participate so that relief may be completely and finally awarded. Efstathiou v. Payeur, 456 A.2d 891, 893 (Me. 1983) {quoting 7 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1604, at 36 (1972) (note omitted)). The second part of the rule is designed to protect the interests of the absent party.

The Defendants argue that Auburn and MERS must be joined because they hold an interest in the Tufts' property as described in the Tufts' deed, recorded in the Cumberland County Registry of Deeds, Book 16503, Page 266, and it is through this deed that the Tufts' claim ownership of the disputed parcel. Therefore, the parties are necessary to fully adjudicate the question of ownership of the disputed parcel. Also, if MERS is not joined, its rights will be adjudicated without the opportunity for them to protect that interest.

Defendants have since dismissed Auburn Savings Bank as its mortgage has since been discharged.

It should be noted that the Plaintiffs chose to include the Chamberlains' mortgagees as defendants. This means that the Plaintiffs determined that they could not obtain complete relief without adjudicating the mortgagees' rights.

The Plaintiffs oppose the motion. Their argument appears to be that because the deed descriptions establish the northern boundary of their property by reference to the Chamberlains' property, and shifting of that boundary does not change the deed description it also does not change the interest that the mortgagee has in the property. This is in contrast to the property description contained in the Defendants' deed, which references the boundary as the "right of way leading into the Late George Newell Chamberlain camp." The Plaintiffs argue that this description is in error and "is also junior or subordinate to the description of the Plaintiffs' northerly boundary as found in their chain of title." (PL Br. 3.) Furthermore, the Plaintiffs argue, because the Defendants have not sought reformation as a remedy it is unnecessary to join the Plaintiffs' mortgagee.

This appears to be an explanation as to why the Defendants' mortgagees were included as defendants but the Plaintiffs' mortgagees are unnecessary parties.

• The Defendants reply, arguing that if the Plaintiffs succeed in their case in chief, the resulting property will be quadrilateral rather than triangular and the deed descriptions will no longer make sense, even if the description of the boundary remains the same and that the mortgagee's interest in the parcel could be affected.

The Plaintiffs' argument is unconvincing. Even if the words of the deed description do not change, the underlying parcel may change which would mean that the mortgagee might then have a larger or smaller interest than believed. The Plaintiffs are also incorrect to state that the northern boundary with the Chamberlain property is described without reference to a monument. The deed description actually refers to two stakes; these are fixed monuments and should be able to be located on face of the earth. Any alteration of ownership of the properties will require an alteration of the deed descriptions. Also, if the mortgagee is not allowed to participate its rights may be adjudicated without participation and without subsequent redress because the issue will have been fully litigated. The Defendants have established that the mortgagee of the Plaintiffs have an interest in the subject of the litigation and that the mortgagee is at risk of being unable to protect those rights if they do not participate in this action, thus making them necessary parties. There is no indication that MERS is not subject to service of process.

The entry is:

The Motion for Joinder is GRANTED.


Summaries of

Tufts v. Chamberlain

Superior Court of Maine
Apr 5, 2012
Civil Action RE-11-472 (Me. Super. Apr. 5, 2012)
Case details for

Tufts v. Chamberlain

Case Details

Full title:BERNARD W. TUFTS and JUDITH J. TUFTS, Plaintiffs v. NORMAN G. CHAMBERLAIN…

Court:Superior Court of Maine

Date published: Apr 5, 2012

Citations

Civil Action RE-11-472 (Me. Super. Apr. 5, 2012)